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ABSTRACT
This study is anchored on the crisis of Congolese refugees that is taking an astronomical
proportion in South Africa. While in different parts in South Africa Congolese refugees may
initiate actions that may fuel the magnitude of a new or the ongoing conflict on one hand, and
those  that  may transform and end war  the  DRC’s war. The  study probes  the  views  and
insights  of  the  Congolese  refugees  on  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the
DRC’s  conflict  and  contends  that  South  Africa  can  draw  from  the  views,  insights  and
perception  of  Congolese  refugees  as  another  alternative  of  bolstering  its  current  peace
building interventions in the DRC. 
The study draws heavily on data gathered from four (4) focus group discussions and 58 in-
depth  interviews  (comprising  mainly, the  Congolese  scholars  and  civil  rights  activists  in
Durban).  The  study  uses  cconflict  transformation  and  realism  theories.  From  a  conflict
transformation perspective, the study argues that drawing from the views and insights of the
Congolese  refugees  may  bolster  an  all-encompassing  South  African  peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC’s conflict. On the other hand, through the tenets of realism, study
argues that South Africa can draw from the insights of the Congolese refugees as one way of
achieving its dominant interests of having a stable DRC and Africa.
Through a survey of scholarship on the link between refugees and conflict transformation, the
findings  of  this  study reveals  that  the  inclusion  of  the  views  and insights  of  Congolese
refugees in its peacebuilding interventions may earn South Africa respect on the continent as
a country that respects the contribution of refugees in peacebuilding. This may advance South
Africa’s interest of taking the lead in peace operations in Africa. However, the study also
reveals that by participating in peacebuilding while pushing for more economic relations with
DRC, the South Africa’s interventions in the DRC’s conflict can be termed as a predatory and
exploitative way of the economics of war. For instance, the Inga Dam, agriculture and the
abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights,
underscores a realist argument that any intervening state intervenes in a conflict country in
pursuit of its national interests.
The findings of this study also reveal that, by drawing on the views of the marginalised non-
state actors like Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South
Africa may fulfil its desire of avoiding spill-overs from the effects of the war in the form of
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the incessant influx of Congolese refugees. An end to war in the DRC may be one way of
furthering economic interests of the South African business segments.
Having taken note that the major findings of the study revolve around contentious primary
issues  relating  to  the  role  of  Congolese  refugees  within  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions, a number of recommendations are made. These include:
1. Establishment  of  refugees’ resource centres  as a new approach of  mitigating their
forgotten role in peacebuilding processes.
2. Clarification of the conflicting interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in the DRC.
3. Inclusion of other non-state actors in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions.
Finally,  a  paradigm shift  is  needed  in  the  conceptualization  of  what  constitutes  conflict
transformation more so peacebuilding interventions. This includes a new theoretical thinking
based on gaining vital views, insights and perspectives from non-state actors like Congolese
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
After more than half a century free of colonialism, many African countries remain moribund
and on the precipice of intrastate war (Tive, 2014). These include countries such as South
Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic
of Congo DRC. This is contrary to what independence is claimed as embodying (Kagwanja,
2009; Obiora, 2011).  As a result “Africa is in the throes of its most serious refugee1 crisis as
conflicts in Burundi,  CAR, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali have
forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes” (UNHCR, 2015:1). The causes
and drivers of conflicts in warring African countries vary from the increasing and growing
global human population,  the widening gap between the rich and the poor, unsustainable
development, depletion of natural resources and ecology to greed for power among leaders.
The ongoing conflicts in countries such as DRC and other sub-Saharan African countries
continue to raise concern for international security (AU, 2015; Weiss and Welz, 2014).  
When conflicts erupt, there is destruction of decades of development projects in the countries
affected. This leads to worse social, political and economic circumstances. As a result, many
citizens  of  the  war-torn  countries  are  increasingly  becoming  refugees  in  different
neighbouring and faraway countries. In Africa, South Africa is bearing the brunt of increasing
numbers of refugees from across the globe (Cohen and Deng, 2012). According to the United
Nations  Refugees Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014),  South Africa is  a home to
millions of refugees. The increasing number of refugees in the country is putting enormous
pressure on South Africa to take a dominant role in intervening in African conflicts, economic
deprivation  and political  instabilities  (Adebo,  2010;  Olusola,  2014;  Pry, 2010).  However,
South Africa’s peacebuilding2 interventions in African conflicts is creating scholarly critique
of the country’s capability in peacebuilding on the continent (Nabishika, 2011; Pillay, 2013;
1 An immigrant who fails to remain in or return to his country and decides to settle in his/her
host country due to past or on-going war/economic/political disruption as a consequence of
war (Andrews, 2003:1).
2 Peacebuilding refers to all strategies that are designed to promote a secure and stable lasting
peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met to avert the recurrence of
violent conflicts (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).  
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Mbeki,  2013).  Nabishika  (2011)  lauds  South  Africa’s  contribution  to  peacekeeping3 and
peacemaking4 missions on the continent. What Nabishika (201:8) queries is whether South
Africa has “mandate and the will beyond rhetoric to effectively address the root causes of the
African conflicts” which many developed Western countries have failed to quell. On the other
hand, Pillay (2013) sees better military tools and expenditure that makes South Africa to have
the capacity to intervene in any African conflict. According to Pillay (2013), South Africa’s
military budget is one of the biggest in Africa accounting for nearly 65% of total military
spending in Southern Africa and 27% in Africa. 
Many scholars argue that instead of resolving African conflicts, South Africa is using conflict
resolution as a tool of expanding its  hegemony on the continent.  Vickers (2012),  Cilliers
(2013) and Oppenheimer and Nick (2014) argue that there is historical evidence to prove that
South Africa has ulterior motives in its peacebuilding intervention on the African continent.
For instance, Oppenheimer (2011) argues that in 1998, the Mandela government used military
intervention in Lesotho as a realist foreign policy tool, to pursue its strategic and economic
interests,  without the authorization from the UN, the AU and the SADC.  Hadebe (2014)
emphasises that South Africa’s role in transforming conflicts in Lesotho is premised on the
country’s quest for national security and for economic interests like the Rand Water project.
Similarly, Cilliers (2014) argues that South Africa used uncalled for diplomacy in the DRC in
1998: Mandela used this crisis to settle his discontent with Robert Mugabe - the then-SADC
chair. Also Mandela had unclear support of both Laurent Kabila and Mobutu Sese Seko. This
is because the government of Mandela had different economic interests with both Mobutu
and Kabila. Likoti (2007) questions whether South Africa’s conflict resolution strategy in the
DRC in 1998 was necessitated by economic self-interests of South Africa’s ruling elite or for
the nation.  Whetho (2013) argues that by continuously intervening in the DRC, South Africa
is joining a group of both state and non-state actors who scramble for the DRC’s vast mineral
3 Peacekeeping is a third party intervention in a conflict country that is done by military
forces from another country/group and is often closely associated with the United Nations
(www.un.org, McAskie, 2006). The military forces must be neutral soldiers of the United
Nations or group of neutral nations. Peacekeeping’s main aim is to help in separating the
fighting parties by putting a barrier (buffer zone).
4 Peacemaking  is  the  diplomatic  attempt  to  end  violent  conflict  between  and  amongst
conflicting  parties  (Ramsbotham  et  al,  2011;  Lederach,  2009;  Fisher,  2010).  A recent
peacemaking  event  is  the  involvement  of  former  UN Secretary  General,  Kofi  Annan  in
negotiating to end Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence (Goldsmith, 2012).  
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resources - a major factor that is perpetuating conflicts in the DRC (Whetho, 2014; see also
Weiss, 2000; Taylor, 2003). 
In  the  Sudanese  conflict,  Chingono and Nakana (2009)  argue that  South  Africa’s during
Mandela’s presidency played a key role in derailing peace talks and by supplying weapons to
both the Sudanese government and to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
(Kagwanja,  2009).  Cilliers  (2013)  criticizes  Thabo  Mbeki’s government  for  using  South
Africa’s conflict transformation strategy as a means of selling South Africa’s arms to the war-
torn countries of the Great Lakes region and in Algeria (see also Oppenheimer, 2011). In
2013, the government of Jacob Zuma was in the limelight over the death of 13 SANDF
soldiers who had been sent secretly to the Central African Republic (CAR). Many scholars
and  security  experts  questioned  why South  Africa  was  secretly  serving  its  perceived
‘peacekeeping  mission’ in  CAR.  The  issue  that  was  raised  was  whose  interests  was  the
mission  serving in  the  CAR- was  it  for  South  Africans,  ANC elites,  CAR,  AU or  UN?
(Dawes, 2013; Thomson, 2013).
The influx of refugees from different warring African countries in South Africa is also seen as
one  of  the  major  motivation  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  African
conflicts.  For instance,  Duncan (2012) and Harris (2008) argue that if  South Africa is  to
address the refugee problem, it has no option but to consolidate its privileged position to
stabilize the continent.  Mbeki (2013) and Duncan (2012) argue that the 2008 xenophobic
attacks are an example of social ills that South Africa will continue to experience if it does
not  democratize and stabilize Africa.  Being the most ‘democratic and developed’ African
economy that is attracting many African immigrants from war-torn countries, Zuma (2015)
cited the 2015 xenophobic violence as an indicator of South Africa having no option but to
reinforce a culture of peace, democracy and human rights on the continent. In 2013, Moeletsi
Mbeki applauded President Zuma for sending a strong contingent of South African Defence
Force (SANDF) to help root out the M23 rebel group in the Eastern part of the DRC (ISS,
2014; ACCORD, 2014).
The foregoing varied arguments on South Africa’s role in peacebuilding interventions on the
African conflicts is pave a way for new research trends into understanding the country’s role
in conflict transformation in Africa. However, most of the assertions of the preceding scholars
on South Africa and peacebuilding are one-dimensional:  they focus on the peacebuilding
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intervener (South Africa), its interests in the conflict situation, humanitarian assistance and
integration or repatriation of refugees. However, there is a dearth of literature on what role
refugees  residing  in  South  Africa  can  contribute  towards  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
mission in war or post-war African states. Also, there is scarcity of literature on attitudes and
perceptions that refugees from war-torn countries have on how South Africa’s involvement in
their countries’ conflict transformation benefits them or South Africans. The lack of literature
on the foregoing assertion is resulting into deficiency of empirically verifiable conclusions.
1.2 South Africa’s Interventions in the DRC (1996- 2016)
Since the 1960s, the DRC has been an epicenter of unending war in the Great Lakes region.
Kamukana (1998) in Recent Conflicts in the Great Lakes argues that the major trigger of the
DRC  conflict  has  been  the  fight  over  natural  resources.  Other  triggers  are:  tribalism,
multinationals  corporations,  presence  of  many  rebel  forces  and  international  forces.
Historically, the DRC has been a bedrock of chaos and confusion since the withdrawal of the
Belgian rule in 1960. Since then, the DRC conflict has been a subject of international concern
and study among international,  regional  and local  scholars.  Efforts  to  break the circle  of
violence in the DRC by leaders such as Patrice Lumumba5 were mysteriously thwarted by
international  actors.  Just  four  days  after  the DRC’s independence,  violence over  political
antagonism,  tribalism,  resources  and  geographical  diversity  erupted  (Merriam,  1961:3).
Scholars such as Taylor (2003: 45) argue that the first years of the DRC’s independence were
awash with tribal wars; the main reason being that tribal leaders/rulers had more power than
the central government (Whetho, 2014).  Furthermore, Maeresera (2012) argues that the DRC
has experienced two civil wars: 1996-1997 (First Congo War) and 1998-2003 (Second Congo
war).  The  First  Congo War  led to the ousting of President  Mobutu Sese Seko while the
Second Congo War highlighted the resource dimensions of conflicts (Weiss, 2000: 4). 
To date,  violence in the DRC continues to be breaking news among many media houses
(third war). While many actors continue to seek a lasting solution to the  DRC conflict, the
complexity and profitability of the DRC’s natural resources and conflict continue to attract
many  foreign  national  armies,  rebel  groups,  grass  root  militias  and  several  profiteering
networks -  war economics6. For instance, there are several rebel and militia groups like the
Union of Congolese Patriots  (UPC), Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC),
5 Patrice Lumumba was Congo’s first Prime Minister.
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National Integrationist  Front (FNI), and the  Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du
Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi  (FDLR-FCA) in the DRC just to name a few
(World Factbook, 2013). In the context of other foreign armies, the DRC is still grappling
with  the issue of  the  Rwandan and Ugandan troops especially in  the  eastern  part  of  the
country. Also,  there  are  a  number of  Multinational  Corporations  that  are  involved in  the
lucrative mining sector. 
The rebel groups, foreign national armies, multinational corporations and militia groups have
made the DRC to remain dangerously unstable and prone to war (Nyathi, 2012; Nabudere,
2004:3; World Factbook, 2013). The presence of worthy natural resources also attracts actors
with economic interest who are willing to use peacebuilding intervention as an instrument
that will enable them access the resources and profit from them (Pry 2010).   Based on the
foregoing arguments, it can be argued that the continuous involvement of internal, regional
and international  peacebuilders  in  the DRC is  an attempt to  access  revenues  and natural
resources in the country (Adebo, 2010).  This is because there are some known factors that
continue to trigger conflict in DRC: ranging from foundations of colonialism, land issues,
greed and weak system of governance that can be globally (by developed nations) addressed
so as to end the DRC war.  
According to Montague (2002), Maystadt et al (2014) and Laudati (2013) the DRC is one of
the wealthiest nations in the world in terms of natural resources. On the contrary, the DRC is
classified as one of the poorest in the world. The DRC boasts of minerals like tin, tantulum,
tungsten, gold, diamonds, cobalt, copper, coltan and timber from its natural forests. Rather
than  making  the  lives  of  Congolese  better,  the  multiplicity  of  natural  resources  has
contributed to an interminable history of conflict. As a result, millions of people have lost
their lives while other have fled to different countries or are residing as Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) within the DRC. Vogt  et al (2012), Lichbach (1995) and the Human Rights
Watch Report (2014), argue that availability of natural resources and conflict are the two
major issues that have made the DRC to become a theatre of international debate among
scholars. As a result, the DRC has become a perfect exemplar of a dysfunctional postcolonial
African state where millions of its citizens are refugees due to unending war. 
6 Situation whereby different actors see war as an opportunity to engage in arms and mineral
business (see Coulomb and Dunne, 2008:46).
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South Africa hosts the majority of Congolese refugees - mostly those who have run away
from the  DRC (UNHCR, 2014).  By involving itself  in  peacebuilding  intervention  in  the
DRC, while hosting a large number of refugees, South Africa is increasingly becoming a
better  ground  for  Congolese  refugees,  rights  groups,  movements  and  activists  to
communicate  their  grievances  over  the  political  situation  in  the  DRC.  Also,  Congolese
refugees  have  on  several  occasions  expressed  their  dissatisfaction  with  South  Africa’s
association with the regime of President Joseph Kabila (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2014).
For instance, in 2012, a group of Congolese refugees demonstrated at Luthuli House (the
Headquarters of African Nation Congress – South Africa’s ruling political party) expressing
their dissatisfaction with the Zuma administration’s support of the illegitimate re-election of
President Kabila to continue occupying the DRC’s presidency. During the demonstration, a
section of Congolese refugees accused the ANC government of supporting Kabila because of
business  ventures  between Khulubuse  Zuma,  a  nephew of  president  Zuma and Katumba
Mwake, a wealthy businessman and Kabila's advisor (Nganje, 2012 in SABC News, 2012). 
Congolese refugees in South Africa have also in several occasions protested and questioned
the way South Africa is conducting its peacebuilding mission in the DRC. For instance, in
2013, Congolese refugees accused the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) of
training a Congolese Battalion whose aim was to crack down Kabila’s dissidents and post-
election  protesters  in  Kinshasa.  On  this  occasion  however,  there  was  a  clash  between
Congolese refugees who were pro- and those who were anti-Kabila. The 2013 demonstration
showed that Congolese refugees residing in South Africa are not homogenous. Furthermore,
the foregoing demonstration clearly indicated that although Congolese refugees are residing
in South Africa, they had/still have some perception on the dynamics of what sustains the
DRC conflict and how South Africa should carry out its peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC (UNHCR, 2013; Nganje, 2014).
At  the  level  of  analysis,  the  foregoing 2012 and 2013 demonstrations  by the  Congolese
refugees in South Africa give ground for a rethinking of issues, approaches and theories that
must inform South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Therefore, there is a
need for an attempt to establish exactly what South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in
the DRC intend to achieve. This is particularly significant in terms of whether South Africa is
using conflict peacebuilding intervention as a way of benefiting from the potential business
initiatives that can emerge from its involvement in the DRC conflict or for the interest of
Congolese citizens. It also problematizes whether South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
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in the DRC are becoming overtly politicized to protect private businesses owned by South
African elites in the DRC and other conflict countries like the CAR that South Africa has
intervened  in  (Pillay,  2013;  Naidu,  2013;  DA,  2013).  This  brings  into  question  what
distinctions South Africa needs to put in place in protecting the interests of Congolese and the
narrower interests of the ANC elites while undertaking its processes in the DRC.
Since  1996,  South  Africa  has  made  several  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC’s
unending war. The current study builds on and feels the gaps and dearth literature on an
empirical  nexus between South Africa and peacebuilding in  the DRC’s conflict,  how the
Congolese refugees perceive it and if the Congolese refugees can contribute to South Africa’s
peacebuilding mission in the DRC. The study aims at understanding the rationale or motive
behind South Africa’s conflict  transformation strategies in the DRC.  It therefore becomes
questionable to reach such a conclusion on whether or not South Africa has the mandate or
the  capacity  to  resolve  the  unending  DRC  conflict  without  drawing  some  substantive
evidence  from the  Congolese  refugees  who  are  party  to  the  conflict  and understand  the
dynamics  of  the  DRC’s war  (as  victims  and  perpetrators). This  study will  also  seek  to
understand if South Africa’s peacebuilding effort is an altruistic act of South Africa seeking to
stop self-immolation by the war-torn DRC. In this study, the ‘moral intent’ of South Africa’s
intervention in the DRC conflict will not be besmirched. However, the study will seek to
explore whether South Africa is  driven by the personal quests  of South African elites to
secure their share of business interests in the mineral rich DRC; or, if it is the case of South
Africa seeking to compete with major world powers in transforming the unending DRC war
without involving the Congolese refugees. Without detracting from the estimable urgency of
stabilizing  the  DRC,  the  study focuses  on  finding  out  if  the  involvement  of  Congolese
refugees can boost South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC. 
This study uses Conflict Transformation and Realism as the relevant theoretical paradigms of
analysing the Congolese refugees’ attitudes/perceptions towards South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention in their  country’s conflict.  In doing so,  the study is  questioning whether the
decision for South Africa to  intervene in  the conflict  is  meant  to  address the underlying
causes of war in the DRC or meant to repatriate Congolese refugees back home. This study
clearly points out that there is dearth of research on views of Congolese refugees residing in
South Africa, pertaining the efforts that are being exerted by the South African government to
intervene in  resolving the conflict  in  the DRC. Therefore,  this  study’s focal point is  that
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documenting and analyzing the views and perceptions of the Congolese refugees residing in
South Africa will  possibly contribute towards improving South Africa’s efforts at  conflict
resolution and also provide a critique of why and how South African intervention in the DRC
and other parts of Africa may be problematic. By doing so, this will become an original and a
new approach in examining the issue of intervention in a conflict situation intended to make a
scholarly contribution to what refugees can offer to an intervening state in their country’s
conflict. Arising from this background, this study is also developing a framework that will be
crucial in understanding the role of refugees abroad in their countries’ conflicts through the
examination of South Africa and peacebuilding intervention in the DRC while probing the
attitudes of the Congolese refugees residing in Durban (along Mahatma Gandhi and Russell
Streets).
1.3 Research hypothesis 
This  study supposes that  there is  a link  between refugees and conflict  transformation (in
peacebuilding interventions) that ought to underpin the strategic behaviour of peacebuilding
interveners in any conflict zones. The study probes and explores the understanding, meanings
and  attitudes  that  Congolese  refugees  (in  South  Africa)  create  towards  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. Another assumption of this study is that there is a
possibility that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions since 1996 are meant to address
the influx of Congolese among other refugees within South Africa. This study also assumes
that there may be a link between Congolese refugees in South Africa and DRC’s conflict that
may underpin the strategic behaviour of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in that
Country. Still, the study assumes that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s
conflict  is  meant  to  promote  its  national  interests,  be  they  economic  or  consolidating  a
hegemonic position on the continent and to be counted among world powers like the United
States of America (USA), China, Russia, France and England. Lastly, this study assumes that
there is a possibly new dimension of peacebuilding intervention that South Africa can draw
from the insights and views of Congolese refugees in relation to the DRC’s conflict. Some of
the views, insights and opinions of Congolese refugees regarding peacebuilding interventions
may help South Africa to bring an end to decades of war in that country.  This is because the
inclusion of the views of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s  peacebuilding intervention
may open a room for a new array of conflict transformation among other existing dimensions
of peacebuilding. According to Nderitu (2013:8), peacebuilding interventions should not be
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conservative in their orientation but need to open new approaches and stages that may bring
lasting peace.  For instance, many international organizations (such as OAU, UN, MUNUSC,
SADC) and other national armies (Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) have
attempted to quell the DRC war (without involving the locals), yet the conflict rages on. The
failure of all the preceding efforts to end the conflict validates a new approach of intervening
in  the  DRC’s conflict;  that  is,  for  South  Africa  to  draw on the  views  of  the  Congolese
refugees on peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This study argues that by incorporating
the views of the Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding intervention policies, South Africa
stands a high chance of bringing an end to decades of war in the DRC. As a result, an end to
DRC’s conflict  will  be a  gain for  South Africa’s national  interests,  be  they economic  or
attaining a powerful position on the continent or addressing its surging refugee problem.  
 
1.4 Research problems and objectives: Key questions:
The aim of this study is to understand the meanings and attitudes Congolese refugees (in
South  Africa)  create  towards  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  mission  in  the  DRC.  While  a
number of scholars (Kadima, Denis and Kalombo, 1995; Smit and Rugunan, 2014; Tonheim
and Swart, 2015) have contributed to the body of knowledge on the role of South Africa and
peacebuilding interventions  in  the  DRC, such studies  have /not  interrogated the attitudes
Congolese refugees residing in South Africa. Given the misconceptions that the Congolese
refugees and other African immigrants are associated with while in South Africa, the issue of
their role in South Africa’s intervention in the DRC conflict remains an important one in
peacebuilding within the under-researched scenery. Therefore, this study assumes that there is
a  lot  that  Congolese  refugees  can  contribute  towards  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC. The key questions that this study asks are: 
1. How aware are Congolese refugees in Durban, of interventions in the DRC’s and
what contributions can they make to South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives in the
DRC?
2. How do the Congolese refugees perceive they can contribute to the peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC?
3. What do Congolese refugees see as the immediate and proximate causes of war in
the DRC?
4. What are some of the national interests that validate South Africa’s intervention in
the DRC according to the Congolese refugees?
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5.  How can the views and insights of Congolese refugees be drawn on to potentially
shape the national interest of South Africa’s interventions in the DRC?
 1.5 Research problems and objectives: Broader issues
Research on conflict transformation has dedicated much effort on peacebuilding by focusing
largely on how to use short, medium and long-term process of either averting or rebuilding
war-affected communities so as to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war
and/or  violence  (Ramsbotham,  Woodhouse  and  Curle,  2011:199).  Curle  (2010)  and
Lambourne (2004) suggest that if we are to reach the desired goal of conflict transformation,
focus should be on building /rebuilding the political, security, justice, social and economic
fabric or institutions of a society in war or those emerging from conflict. Other peace scholars
suggest  that  the  root  cause  of  conflict  needs  to  be  addressed  by  promoting  social  and
economic justice as well as putting in place institutions of governance and rule of law which
will serve as a foundation for peacebuilding, reconciliation and development (Nkhulu, 2005;
Botes, 2001:43). In many of these studies, there is powerlessness of refugees from countries
ravaged by war to contribute towards building/rebuilding peace in their countries. This study
aims to explore the forgotten role of refugees in peacebuilding.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to explore the views, insights, perceptions and attitudes
that  the  Congolese  refugees  in  Durban  have  towards  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC’s conflict.  The researcher  also aims  at  explicating  some of  the
factors that may hinder the incorporation of the views and insights of Congolese refugees
within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s war.  Some of the broader
issues that will be investigated include:
1. Identifying  the  aspired  role(s)  of  the  Congolese  refugees  within  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict.
2. Identifying how the views and insights of the Congolese refugees may contribute to
an all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.
3. Ascertaining whether or not the national interests of South Africa may subvert the
contributions of the Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
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4. Establishing some of the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC as narrated by the Congolese refugees.
1.6 Significance of this study
A number of scholars have inquired into the question of how refugees may participate or
contribute  in  peacebuilding  interventions  of  their  countries’ conflicts.   Scholars  such  as
Taylor and Lederach (2014), Snyder (2015),  Tint, Chirimwami and Sarkis (2014) and Rana
(2016) argue that most peacebuilding efforts globally concentrate on resettling and giving
humanitarian  assistance  to  the  refugees  from  conflict  countries.  The  preceding  scholars
concur that humanitarian assistance boosts refugees’ livelihood while in the host countries.
However, Lambourne (2014) argues that refugees’ participation in mediation and restoration
of peace in their countries is minimal and that the exclusion of refugees from taking an active
role in rebuilding peace of their country is an injustice that most mediators do. There is also a
section of scholarship that explores the role of refugees on social, political, economic and
environment sectors of their host countries (Smit and Rugunanan, 2014; Tonheim and Swart,
2015).  According to  Nderitu  (2014),  there  is  no  gainsaying  that  scholars’ works  -  albeit
limited  but  growing  -  have  addressed  some of  the  triggers  and dynamics  of  the  DRC’s
conflict  and  peacebuilding  interventions:  the  involvement  of  rebels,  foreign  armies  and
multinational  corporations  in  conflict-prone  countries  like  the  DRC.  However,  there  is  a
dearth of  research on the insights,  views and attitudes  of  Congolese refugees  residing in
South Africa, pertaining to the efforts that are being exerted by the South African government
to intervene in resolving the conflict in their country. Little has been researched on what role
the perceptions of the Congolese refugees can possibly contribute towards improving efforts
at conflict resolution in the DRC and at the very least provide a critique of  why and  how
South Africa’s interventions may be problematic. This taints novel attempts by scholars to
explore the strategic behaviours of refugees  vis-a -vis  the unending DRC’s conflict.  This
implies  that  academics  have  largely ignored  the  refugees’ role  in  transformation  of  their
countries’ conflict.  This  view  is  relevant  in  the  context  of  South  African  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC’s conflict. 
This study addresses the need to realize that the inclusion of the insights and views of the
Congolese refugees (in South Africa) may bolster South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in the DRC’s conflict. The study promises a perspective that could shape the dynamics of
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intervention in conflicts such as that of the DRC, South Sudan, Somalia and Syria among
others. Therefore, beyond the claims and counter-claims by scholars on the role of refugees in
conflict  transformation,  this  study  is  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  views,  insights  and
perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in
the DRC’s conflict.  Inclusion of the views and insights of the Congolese refugees within
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions can be argued to be another dimension of seeking
lasting peace to the unending war in the DRC.
The study finds relevancy in interrogating the “why and how” questions in South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. By doing so, the study addresses an extant gap by
exploring attitudes and perceptions that Congolese refugees have towards the efforts of South
Africa  in  DRC’s  peacebuilding  process.  In  addition,  by  examining  the  motivations  and
interests of South Africa in the DRC’s conflict, this study is an empirical approach adding to
the existing scholarship on the political economy of peacebuilding interventions. At a more
practical  level,  this  study  suggests  some  new  policies,  recommendations  and  new
framework(s)  that  may  stimulate  an  effective  and  all-encompassing  South  African
peacebuilding intervention strategy in the DRC’s conflict. This case study may also serve as a
new lesson for other interveners in other conflicts.
1.7 Research methodology and methods:
The attitudes and perceptions of Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC’s conflicts  in this  study require a combination of historical and
qualitative  research  approaches  with  some  flexibility.  Historical  research  “involves
developing  an  understanding  of  the  past  through  the  examination  and  interpretation  of
evidence” which may exist (or be collected) in the form of texts and recorded data, interviews
and observations (Hancock, 2006: 80; Kumar, 2005:188-203).  As qualitative research, this
study  is  offering  a  “close-up”  data  analysis  of  phenomena  (attitudes  of  the  Congolese
refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding mission) without the use of statistics and other
forms  of  quantification  (Thomas  and  Magilvy,  2011:152). The  strengths  of  a  qualitative
research like this one is that it allows the researcher to explore a convoluted phenomenon (the
role of the Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC) in a
holistic  fashion (Lincoln  and Guba,  1985 in  Thomas  and Magilvy, 2011:152). In  end,  it
addresses  the  tendency  of  the  researcher  to  impose  personal  assumptions  or  biases,
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conclusions and results from the data and thus, it obviates  a priori  conclusions (Wiersma,
1995: 211-212). 
1.8 Data collection
The nature of this study necessitated the use of both primary and secondary data garnering
tools.
1.8.1 Primary sources 
Primary sources used were personal interviews, general participant observation and focus
group discussions.  As a  method of  data  collection,  interviews allowed the researchers  to
study experiences and meanings as accounted for by the participants (Kumar, 2005: 127).
Also, by using interviews as a method of data collection, the researcher was able to give each
participant an opportunity to narrate his/her views in his/her own words about South Africa’s
peacebuilding efforts in DRC. 
General  'participation/observation'  afforded  meaningful,  usually  first-hand,  information  to
this  study. It served as both an approach to enquiry and as a data gathering tool. During
interviews and focus  group sessions (organized with the help of one key informant),  the
research observed the behaviours of participants as they interacted.
Focus group discussions were of immense utility in the collection of data during this study.
Through focus group discussions, the researcher was able to gain immense information from
participants  in  the  course  of  their  interactions  with  one  another  to  articulate  ideas  and
arguments that might not have emerged during personal interviews. 
1.8.2 Secondary Sources 
Through the use of secondary sources, the researcher managed to get a grasp of the subject
and the provision of extensive bibliographic information for delving further into the research
topic.  Secondary sources  were used to complement primary sources.  Secondary data was
gathered  from  various  conflict  and  peacebuilding  journals  and  books,  newspapers  and
magazines, archival material, unpublished theses and the internet as well as seminar papers. 
1.9 Data Analysis 
According to Nueman (2000:292), “content analysis involves gathering and analyzing of the
context  of  the  text;  language,  words,  phrases,  themes  and  symbols”.  In  this  study,  data
obtained were  all  subjected  to  substantive  and extensive  qualitative  analysis  through the
instrumentality  of  content  analysis,  descriptive-historical  analysis  method  and  textual
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criticism. Analysis was situated within specific contexts of research questions and structured
hypotheses for the study. In summary, data were dissociated from sources (both primary and
secondary) and communicated to this researcher who in turn placed the data in a context that
he constructed, “based on knowledge of the surrounding conditions of the data, including
what he intended to know about the target of the content analysis” (Phillips, 1997:190).
1.10 Scope of the study
This  study explicated  the perceptions  and attitudes  of  Congolese refugees  towards  South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict. The collection of data was done
through general observation, interviews and focus group discussion with Congolese refugees
residing in Durban (along Mahatma Gandhi and Russell streets). It was impossible for the
study to analyse the views of all Congolese refugees residing in South Africa. 
In terms of timeline, this study interrogated the underlying motivations, strategic interests and
character  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  initiatives  in  the  DRC  during  the  epoch
characterised  by  the  eruption  and  continuation  of  conflicts  in  the  country.  The  study’s
timeline is divided into primary and secondary periods. The primary period that the study
focused on was between 1996 and 2006, which,  arguably, was the most  traumatic  in the
recent history of the DRC. During this period, the country was plagued by what has been
labelled “Africa’s First World War” (Prunier, 2009: 23), and subsequent localised conflicts in
eastern  DRC.  The  secondary  period  was  the  post-2006  to  2014  epoch,  which  has  been
marked by efforts to build peace and rebuild the country.
These  period,  therefore,  are  the  most  amenable  to  analyse  South  Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC.   These  two epochs  are  relevant  for  unpacking South  Africa’s
initiatives that facilitated or undermined peacebuilding in the country. 
1.11 Limitations of the study
The nature of this study is not immune to limitations. Firstly, the researcher acknowledges his
intentional sampling criteria favours the views of “the educated” category of the Congolese
refugees on the subject matter of this study. This may be seen as ruling out the views of the
non-educated category. Also, since majority of this study participants narrated strong anti-
Kabila  sentiments,  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  researcher  did  not  capture  the  views  of
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participants who are pro-Kabila as well as those who might be neutral. In order to address
this challenge and mitigate its effect as well as to ensure objectivity, the researcher undertook
a careful combination of participants’ views as outlined in the data analysis section of this
chapter.
Another limitation is the speed at which developments unfold in the DRC.  Indeed, since
1960s, DRC has been a field of conflict research, almost all published works on the country’s
crisis “risk” being overtaken by new/unforeseen realities within a relatively short time. This
study may not  be  immune  to  the  very  fate:  before  its  completion,  or  while  it  is  being
examined or by the time other readers peruse it. As this study is being printed (December
2016), there are undergoing violent protest in the DRC about the expiry of the presidential
term limit of President Kabila.
Another limitation is language barrier. Since the researcher is not a Congolese, the language
of conducting interviews was limiting especially to Congolese who could not understand
English  or  Kiswahili.  Also,  some  Congolese  refugees  found  it  difficult  to  narrate  their
opinions  on the subject  while  being tape-recorded.  They wanted to  know the motive.  To
address  these  concerns,  the  researcher  relied  heavily  on  the  use  of  Congolese  research
assistants  to  interpret  the  language  and  also  to  create  trust  between  participants  and  the
researcher.
During data collection, a number of participants insisted on being paid as a precondition for
participating in  the study. Due to  research ethics,  the researcher  was unable to  meet this
demand by participants. Because of this, some prospective participants declined or withdrew
from participation in the study. Regrettably, only a few of the participants in this category –
based on information supplied by research assistants – had extensive knowledge of the key
issues  that  this  study  explored.  Nonetheless,  it  can  be  safely  assumed  that  their  non-
participation has not substantively undermined the study and its findings. Similarly, although
some participants who consented to be interview without being paid were unable to guarantee
‘honest’ answers. This was due to participants’ natural instincts of being cognizant that they
are  being  studied  without  pay.  To alleviate  this  concern,  the  researcher  triangulated  his
findings: The researcher used secondary sources. The use of secondary sources in this was
seen as key in addressing this limitation. 
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1.12 Conceptual clarification of key words
This  study – in its  title and through its  chapters – utilised certain concepts/terms or key
words, which this section defines, conceptualises and operationalises in its context. These key
words are conflict, peace, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. This section does
not explicate conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation, as they are
discussed extensively in the theoretical framework segment (chapter four).
1.12.1 Conflict 
Many scholars agree that in the nature of human beings, conflict is a recurring phenomenon
(Miall 2005; Shelling, 1980; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011).  This is because of
the  competing  and  contrasting  interests:  one’s own interests  are  superior  to  those  others
(Donnelly, 2002).  In  normal  life,  conflicting  interests  of  human beings  is  understandable
given the differences in value, attitudes, interests, orientations and goals.  However, this clash
of interest becomes negative in its effects if they lead to violence (what is commonly referred
to  as  war).   According  to  Schelling  (1980:  201),  it  is  the  inability  of  human  beings  to
reconcile  and  resolve  their  divergent  objectives  or  positions  that  leads  to  frustration  or
aggression. 
In this study the concept conflict is utilized as an outcome of a clash or struggle between two
or more actors due to their irreconcilable ideas, positions and goals whereby one actor to the
conflict may seek to neutralize or defeat or eliminate the other for the purpose of pursuing
his/her defined objectives. So as to achieve his/her goal and to defeat the opponent in any
conflict,  an actor  may use different  ways including violence (use of armed conflict)  and
propaganda (Lambourne, 2005). By doing so one actor may achieve either tangible goals
(acquisition of a political position, property or win an election) or intangible ones (control,
domination or prestige). One or more actors may achieve their goals despite the consequences
of their actions which may include colossal loss of lives, destruction to infrastructure, human
displacement, social dislocation (loss of property) and psychosocial traumas (Staub, 2005).
This  violence  leads  to  loss  of  life,  devastating  effects  on  political,  social  and  economic




Johan Galtung (1969:168), a renowned peace scholar, argues that definition of peace may
depart  from the  common,  social  or  to  political  usage  depending on one’s grasp  of  what
conflict is. In peaceful transitions and democracy Resart Bayer (2010: 1) affirms that many
scholars conceptualize peace as absence of violence. However, the absence of violence does
not  necessarily  mean  peace  because  conflicting  parties  may  view  each  other  as  threats
(Goertz, 2005). This has made many peace scholars to contend that there are two descriptions
of peace; that is negative peace as the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war. Positive
peace refers to conditions that are good for management that is ‘orderly resolution of conflict,
harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love’ (Boulding, 1978: 3; also
see Galtung, 1985, Fisher, 2005; Ledarach, 2004). 
This study utilizes the concept peace as the transformation of the actual or potential violence
into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change (Galtung 1985:168).
1.12.3 Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping can be termed as a third party intervention that is often done by military forces
and is  often closely associated with the United Nations (Annan,  1992).  According to  the
United  Nations  Agenda for  Peace (1992),  military forces  must  be neutral  soldiers  of  the
United Nations or group of neutral  nations and they should help to  separate  the fighting
parties. Also, peacekeepers are used to put a barrier (buffer zone) between conflicting parties
and keep them away from attacking each other.  In conflict  resolution and management,
peacekeeping is an important tool and appropriate on three levels; when containing violence
and preventing it from escalating into war, limit the intensity of war once it has broken out
and lastly to secure a cease fire. A recent case of peacekeeping is the deployment of French
soldiers to end the recent Malian violence in 2013. Thus peacekeepers are needed to stabilize
hotspots and diffuse tensions (Ramsbothams et al 2011: 147). 
Although peacekeeping is vital in managing violent conflicts by itself it cannot settle disputes
because  it  is  not  adequate  for  long  term recovery. The  UN peacekeeping  missions  were
criticized  for  their  role  in  Rwanda,  the  former  Yugoslavia  and Somalia.  In  Rwanda and
Somalia intervention came late. The civil war had already started in 1986 in Somalia and
erupted into a full war in 1988-1990 and the Security Council only took action in 1992. The
UN’s intervention in Rwanda was not planned and force numbers were greatly reduced and
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they were powerless to prevent the killings whereby 800 000 people died in the genocide. A
recent taint to peacekeeping efforts is the 2013 case of SANDF involvement in CAR without
the consent of the AU or UN.
This study operationalizes peacekeeping as the use of third part military or police in lowering
the level of destructive behaviours during war, monitoring, policing the situation of war and
support of humanitarian intervention (Galtung, 1992; Ramsbothams et al, 2011).
1.14.4 Peacemaking 
Peacemaking  is  the  diplomatic  attempt  to  end  violent  conflict  between  and  amongst
conflicting parties. A recent peacemaking event is the involvement of former UN Secretary
General, Kofi Annan in negotiating to end the 2007 Kenya’s post-election violence.  Usually
there is a third party to negotiate the peace process and this negotiator may be government
envoys, group of regional organizations or the United Nations. The nature of a diplomatic
intervention  mostly  depends  on  the  unpredictability  of  political  events.  Negotiations  are
important in conflict resolutions because they provide a channel of communication where by
parties look for peaceful settlements and settling their differences (Dasse 2012: 111). Another
example is the Zimbabwean conflict whereby Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South
Africa, was chosen by SADC to be the mediator between the conflicting parties and move
them towards dialogue so that they reach a peace agreement GPA. This means negotiations
seek to construct analytical abilities which assist conflicting parties to recognize common
interests and formulate solutions to achieve mutual gains and co-operation. Successful peace
settlements  must  be  precise  especially  in  difficult  issues  in  the  transitional  process  like
demobilization of assembly points, ceasefire details and voting rights. 
The disadvantage of peacemaking is that negotiations are often slow and gradual. This means
that conflict will still  be going on whilst conflicting parties are holding negotiations. The
greatest issue to lasting and sustainable peace settlements is the issue of credibility of those
mediating (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle 2011:188).
This this study conceptualizes peacemaking as endorsed by Masunungure (2009). According
to  Masunungure  (2009:13),  peacemaking  is  the  use  of  a  third  party  negotiator  to  settle
disagreements that have led to conflict.
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1.12.5 Peacebuilding
The most used concept in this study is peacebuilding. This is what the thesis sees as the focal
point of South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. Peacebuilding can be commonly described
as what it means to have and build lasting peace. Peacebuilding is a long term procedure that
takes place after conflict has stopped and marked by a cease fire or peace agreement. It is also
often described as last phase in the conflict cycle. This implies that the participants have the
independence to create an environment that will eradicate reasons that made them to resort to
violence. For peace building to be effective there is need for sensitivity to local needs and
cultural needs to avoid the imposition of an external model (McAskie2006:18). Peacebuilding
is a multifaceted system that compromises of multiple medium and long term programmes to
address both the cause and consequences of a conflict.
Many scholars argue that for a lasting and enduring peace, peacebuilding must be able to
address structural factors. Galtung (2001) argues that structural violence exists when people
fight for resources because of the unequal distribution and people are willing to die for these
resources (also see Tickner 1995: 51). Peacebuilding is also meant to restore and alter broken
relations, for example reconciliation and trust-building. Donna Pankhurst (1999:239) argues
that  the  truth  process  is  vital  in  policies  of  reconciliation.  The  success  or  failure  of
peacebuilding cannot be determined in two or three years; it is a long process that includes
security  issues  and  political  planning.  Peacebuilding  is  also  a  set  of  challenges  facing
countries  that  have  had  violence,  for  example  setting  up  institutions  that  guarantee  the
establishment of political process that can be considered as open and inclusive. This helps
communities to have a sense of community and common identity and peace building that can
move from negative peace to positive peace whereby disputes do not lead to violence and war
(Pankhurst, 1999).
Peacebuilding has been criticized for its failure to include refugees, IDPs, women and the
youth  in  peacebuilding  processes.   The foregoing groups in  times  of  conflicts  are  active
participants and take up different roles during violent conflicts but they are never recognized
in peace building processes. This thesis investigates the roles that Congolese refugees can
contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.
This  study  uses  Galtung’s  conceptualization  of  peacebuilding.  According  to  Galtung
(1996:112),  peacebuilding is  the infrastructural,  military and socio-economic and political
efforts by an intervener to offer an alternative in removing root causes of war in a conflict
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country. “This is a way of attempting to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root
cause of the conflicts” (Galtung, 1996:112).
1.12.6 Refugee
In most of literature on migrant situations in the world, the concepts refugee and immigrant
have been used synonymously to mean the same (Mutambanengwe, 2012; Andrews, 2003;
Forced  Migration  Studies  programme,  2007;  UNHCR,  2015).  Daley  (2013)  describes  a
refugee as one who has fled his/her country in times of war, political oppression, or religious
persecution. According to UNHCR (2015),  “a refugee is someone who, owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable  or,  owing  to  such  fear,  is  unwilling  to  avail  himself  of  the  protection  of  that
country”7(UNHCR 2010:14). 
There are other definitions of a refugee that have been adopted. The United Nations (2010)
describes  refugees  as  people  who are  running away from being persecuted  in  their  own
country, from war or those who are at the risk of having their human rights violated in their
home country (Mutambanengwe, 2012). Similarly, Andrews (2003:1) describes a refugee as a
person who fails to remain in or return to his country and decides to settle in his/her host
country due to past or ongoing war/economic/political disruption. Another definition adopted
by the Forced Migration Studies programme (2007) defines a refugee “as one who is fleeing
from  his/her  home  in  fear  of  persecution  “(Mutambanengwe,  2012:  14).  Although  the
foregoing definitions and description of refugees have different approaches, there is a one
commonality among all of them. In one way or another they describe “a refugee as a person
who is a product of either a partial or total breakdown of the state vis-à-vis provision of basic
needs to its citizens in terms of human rights, socio-economic needs, or political instabilities
caused by war” (Boswell, 2002:15). 
Most of the preceding definitions of refugees are based on those that were formulated after
World War II when literature on refugees became an area of concern. There is one inference
that can be deduced from the aforementioned conceptualization of refugees: that is, no one
becomes a refugee by choice. To be a refugee one has to have been forced by some factors
7 Resolution 429(V) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the United Nations General 
Assembly of 14 December 1951 (which was later reviewed in 1967).
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and circumstances. Most of these factors are compounded by some sort of state repression of
its citizens in an attempt to establish new order or to force them to submit to government
demands (UNHCR Report, 2015). Also, citizens of a particular state may become refugees as
a result of foreign invasion and inability of their state to protect them from such invasions
(FMSP Report  (2007).  All  in  all,  by  being  a  refugee,  one’s concern  is  liberty,  life  and
individual security. This is because one has been forced to leave his/her home against his/her
will (Mutebi, 2003; Dickson, 2002; Horst, 2013).  Furthermore, over the years, the UNHCR
has expanded the understanding of a migrant to including all persons of concern. According
to  the  UNHCR there  are  also  asylum seekers,  internally  displaced  persons  and  stateless
persons that are of the current global concern as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1. Definitions of migrants/refugees
Definition of Terms
Refugees Any person outside his or her country of origin who is unable or
unwilling  to  return  there  because  of  a  well-founded  fear  of
persecution for one of the reasons set out in the 1951 Convention.
Additionally, if  a  person has  received serious  and indiscriminate
threats  to  his  or  her  life,  physical  integrity, or  freedom resulting




Persons who have sought international protection for refugee status,
but their claims have not yet been determined. Not every asylum
seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee. Every refugee is




Those individuals who have been forced to leave their homes as a
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations
of generalized violence,  violations of human rights, or natural or




Individuals who are not considered as nationals by any state under
the operation of its law. They do not possess the nationality of any
state.  It  may also include persons with undetermined nationality,
such as those persons born in a refugee camp.
Returnees Former refugees or internally displaced persons who return to their
country of origin either spontaneously or in an organized manner.
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Adapted by the Author from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
While  the  refugee  community  is  part  of  the  diaspora,  this  study makes  it  clear  that  the
diaspora is not the refugee community. This study argues that other segments of diaspora-
scholars and business – are at times considered in peacebuilding. However, most refugees are
not considered as part of the diaspora that can contribute to peacebuilding of their country.
Therefore,  the  understanding  of  refugee  in  this  study  is  relatively  ‘broad’  as  it  covers
individuals recognised under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol as well as individuals recognised under the 1969 Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. It also
covers  asylum seekers;  that  is,  individuals  who have sought  international  protection  and
whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined (Lindley, 2014). 
1.12. 7 Ethnicity and tribalism
The  understanding  and  definition  of  ethnicity  and  tribalism  is  slippery  and  rife  with
complications. According to Thiong’o (2009), the invocation of the concept ‘tribe or ethnic’
in the African context, evokes images of a society defined by kinship and regional ties, often
at  odds  with  other  tribes  in  the  region.  According  to  Prunier  (1995),  from  an  African
viewpoint, both ethnicity and tribalism can be argued as two types of political imagination
that are at work on the continent.  Prunier adds that at the heart of this imagination, is a story
or set of stories—initially told by the first colonial settlers and now reproduced through the
postcolonial state—namely, that Africans incorrigibly live in tribes that are always at war
with each other. While such a story provided a ready justification for colonial presence in
Africa, it also served to sustain the colonial policy of divide and rule. As a result, it led to the
formation  of  African  nations  in  which  the  very  assumptions  of  tribes,  tribalism,  and  of
“constant warfare” has come to be reproduced and confirmed. 
Tribalism as a concept seems to have served an important functional construct to European
colonizers.  Because of tribalism,  the African tribe was seen as a residue from some pre-
modern  epoch,  an  expression  of  the  barbarity  and  irrationality  of  African  peoples.  As
tribalism was Africa’s ‘natural’ condition it extended backward and forward into the expanse
of time, seemingly in perpetuity (Braathen, 2000). A good example is the case of Rwanda,
where the concepts ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ were in reality positions of status, not tribal affiliation,
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prior  to  the  advent  of  colonialism  (Mamdani  (2001).  With  the  introduction  of  colonial
bureaucracies, identification cards and censuses served to stagnate social movement between
the groups. In the case of Rwanda, as in other post-colonial African states, ‘tribe’ and ethnic
identity were made essential to the African body politic through the process of colonization.
As  Mamdani  (2001)  argues,  these  systems  were  necessary  to  facilitate  indirect  colonial
governance. It is for this reason that he argues that “[t]tribalism then was the very form that
colonial  rule  took  within  the  local  state.  This  action  was  undertaken  for  two  important
reasons: it prevented solidarity between colonized groups; as well as giving the colonizing
power a lessened load from the internal governance of the colony” (Mamdani, 2001:15). 
One element that was evident in the conceptualization of tribe and ethnicity during colonial
period was the systematic marginalization of particular communities and social inequalities.
This has had important ramifications for the post-colonial African landscape. Returning the
example of Rwanda, the Belgian colonizers privileged the Tutsi community over the Hutu,
going so far as to require all non-Tutsi to invest forced labour into constructing the colonial
infrastructure. 
According to Wanjala (200), ethnicity is essential to the identity of the individual; that it is an
immutable fact of history, region and society.  However, it is not a given that ethnicity is
automatically more important to an individual than other social cleavages, such as religion or
region. Most importantly, the primacy that such an argument places upon ethnicity and tribe
distracts  from the  structural  causes  for  conflict;  it  echoes  the  claims  of  irrationality  that
colonizers used to legitimize their rule. As Ngūgï wa Thiong’o (2009:10) argues, assumed
‘traditional’ hostility was deemed sufficient to explain the reasons that the Kikuyu were the
victims  of  2007  post-election  violence  in  Kenya.  The  explanation  that  there  exists  a
“traditional enmity between Tribe X and Tribe Y” was considered sufficient. Therefore, to
argue that tribalism is Africa’s ‘natural’ condition of the African political system is to argue
against the dynamism and fluidity of identity. 
Although generally considered a  cause for conflict,  ethnicity and tribalism should not be
considered as explanations for Africa’s major challenges. Ethnicity, therefore, can be a cause
for social  upheaval,  conflict  and disintegration,  while on the other hand, it  can also be a
source  of  progress,  as  people  celebrate  plurality  of  ideas  and  identities  in  a  progressive
democracy. According to constructionists, ethnicity and tribalism are concepts that are framed
by historical factors and current contexts. By being a construct, categorization of people into
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different ethnic and tribal groups is a consequence of a ‘socio-historical process by which
groups are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed’ (Omi and Winant, 1994:55). Using
the Hutu and Tutsi as an example, Mamdani shows that rather than assuming that “Hutu” and
“Tutsi” are identities that reflect either biological or cultural differences, they should be seen
as political identities that were formed first and foremost through the state. 
Some understanding of ethnicity and tribalism can be applied in the context of the DRC. The
DRC has a lot of identities. These include tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural,  religious and
geographic identities. When many observers argue that the Congolese conflict is between
different ethnic and tribal groups, they are explicitly endorsing the presence of ethnicity and
tribalism in the DRC. However, according to Mamdani, ethnic and tribal differences in the
DRC are not grounded in natural differences nor naturally arises out of differences in their
respective cultural histories. Rather, it is the effect of a particular history of state formation.
Crucial in this process is the significance of myths, political assumptions, and stories. Thus,
the study will advance the argument that DRC’s mode of ethnic or tribal profiling are socially
constructed concepts that are framed by historical, political and economic factors.
1.13 Structure of the study
There are eight chapters in this study. Chapter one is an introduction/background to the study.
It provides a general background and an overview of the study. It includes an outline of the
research problem, a statement of the research hypothesis, objectives of the study, and research
questions.  It  also  explicates  the  significance  of  the  study,  the  study’s  methodology  and
research design, its scope as well as its methodological and practical limitations. It finally
gives a clarification of key concepts/terms/words as used in this study.
Chapter two is a review and comparison of literature on the nexus between refugees and
conflict transformation. The chapter examines the contending narratives that corroborate and
rebut the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. The chapter probes the potential and
actual impacts of interveners’ peacebuilding processes in conflicts. The essence of the chapter
is  to  engage  critically  with  extant  literature  on  the  correlation  between  South  Africa’s
intervention in the DRC and Congolese refugees. In doing so, the chapter foregrounds the
intervening variables on the contributions of the Congolese refugees (in  South Africa) in
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC conflict. 
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Chapter  three  is  the  theoretical  framework  and  methodology.  It  underscores  a  nuanced
understanding of conflict transformation and realism theories as contextual frameworks for
unpacking South  Africa’s and  peacebuilding  initiative  in  the  DRC and  the  influx  of  the
Congolese  refugees. The  chapter  discusses  why  South  Africa  need/not  to  constitute
Congolese refugees (in South Africa) in its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. 
The chapter also gives an overview of the methodology and data collection techniques and
how they were  presented  during  the  period  of  this  study (2015-  2016).  This  is  vital  in
qualitatively exploring the attitudes and the perception of the Congolese refugees towards
South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. 
Chapter  four  gives  a  historical  overview  of  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC
(protracted proliferations of intrastate and interstate conflicts) since 1960 to date. The chapter
provides some explanations to the causes of the conflict and intervention approaches that
were used in reference to different epochs, regimes and events that have characterized the
present-day DRC. The chapter also explicates the major actors in the DRC conflict and their
contribution to  conflict  in  the region.  Finally, the chapter looks at  how South Africa has
historically been involved in peacebuilding in the DRC, its effects and some reasons why the
former has to respond.
Chapters five and six both constitute major and critical  components  of the study as they
report and analyse the data gathered from both primary and secondary sources in relation to
this study. Chapter five underscores the idea that South Africa’s interventions in DRC is not
premised on an assumption that peacebuilding is a means of addressing the high influx of
Congolese refugees. In doing so, this chapter contends that there is a need for South Africa to
draw from the opinions, views and insights of the Congolese refugees as a way of attempting
to bolster its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. This may offer South Africa
another alternative of bring an end to decades of war in the DRC. As a result, an end to the
DRC’s war may promote the promising role of South Africa as a continental peacebuilder and
further its   economic interests in the DRC.
 Chapter six contextualizes the apparent competing values of theory (what was argued in
theoretical chapter and the qualitative data presented in chapter five. Chapter six begins by
presenting the root causes of war in the DRC (that Congolese refugees were aware of) as
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narrated by Congolese refugees in Durban. Among the causes of war in DRC is poverty and
inequality,  weak  government  institutions  and  corruption,  international  actors  and  MNC’s
greed for money and communal deprivation.  Chapter six also presents the characteristics,
strategies and behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. In the
end it sets a scene for locating South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions within the tenets of
cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism paradigms in chapter seven.
Chapter seven contains the findings of the research that are qualitatively analysed within the
framework of the core of objectives of the study which were as follows: the role of Congolese
refugees  in  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  DRC,  identification  and
establishment of how the interests of South Africa were the primary motivating factor that
informed South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.
Chapter eight is the concluding chapter. It presents a summary of the study and draws some
conclusions from research findings. The conclusions engender salient recommendations on
the perceptions and the role of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding
processes  in  the DRC. A consolidated summary of  the whole thesis  is  made after  which
recommendations are suggested. While this study focuses on the DRC’s conflict, there are
recommendations that are made that may aid in informing other peacebuilding interveners in
other countries that are plagued by or emerging from conflict like South Sudan, CAR and
Somalia. Therefore, this study also calls for further investigations on how valuable refugees





As noted in the preceding chapter, this study explores the attitudes of the Congolese refugees
in South Africa towards South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in their country. The previous
chapter has set the scene for what the study seeks to do and how it seeks to achieve that. It
discussed the background to the study, the research problem and objectives of the study. It
also contained the justification for the study, the research methodology for the study and
finally concluded with the chapter outline for the study. The study’s focal point of analysis
underscores what Congolese refugees residing in Durban South Africa have pertaining to the
efforts that are being exerted by the South African government to intervene in resolving the
conflict in their country, the DRC. Although the literature on conflict is expanding, the role of
refugees in transformation of their respective countries’ conflicts has largely been ignored or
under-researched. However, documenting and analysing refugee’s views and perceptions can
possibly contribute towards improving these efforts at conflict resolution and at the very least
provide  a  critique  of  why  and  how  peacebuilding  interventions  may  be  problematic.
Therefore, in this study, probing the perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South
Africa peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict opens new scholarly approach to
examining the issue of peacebuilding intervention in a conflict situation. 
This  chapter  reviews  past  studies,  critical  and  relevant  literature  on  interconnectedness
between refugees and conflict transformation. The chapter is divided into several themes. The
first theme is on refugees in the world, Africa and South Africa: it will focus on different
definitions, triggers and causes of refugee problem in the world. It gives global, continental
and South African statistics of refugees. It also looks at the relationship between refugees and
conflicts.  The second theme is an understanding and a critique of scholars’ grasp of the role
of refugees in conflict transformation. Under this theme, literature on Congolese refugees in
South Africa which is in direct relation to the study, will be reviewed.
This chapter is a crucial attempt to provide a critical overview of existing studies accounting
for  refugees;  particularly  Congolese  refugees’  role  in  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC. This is useful for two purposes. First, is its value in situating and
mapping the stretch of current studies in this area by providing a nuanced overview of the
focal areas of interest in relation to Congolese refugees residing in South Africa. This would
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afford  a  worthwhile  categorization  of  these  planks  of  literature  along  thematic  patterns.
Secondly and perhaps more importantly is the imperative of understanding existing gaps in
current literature to afford a careful situating and mapping the contribution this current study
is hoping to make. By summarising key points and identifying the existing gaps which this
study intends to fill, the intention of this chapter is not to align this with or against scholarly
arguments on the role of refugees and conflict transformation. However, it mainly teases out
aspects of the debate that furnish insights into the nexus between Congolese refugees and
South  Africa’s  interventions  in  the  DRC’s  conflict.  Thus,  by  doing  so,  the  chapter  is
advancing  an  explanatory  framework  that  engenders  a  nuanced  understanding  of  the
contribution(s)  that  Congolese  refugees  may/not  add  to  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC.
2.2 The link between refugees and conflicts
Since the end of  World War II, there has been increase in the emergence of refugees globally.
According to the United Nation Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015), refugees were
firstly documented when the Soviet forces crushed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Since
then, scholars have paid much attention on interconnection between conflicts and the migrant
crisis of displaced populations which continues to take an astronomical proportion globally
(Naidu and Makanda, 2015:96). Prior to emphasis on interconnectedness between conflicts
and refugees globally, in 1950s the literature was based on how the United Nation Refugee
agency  was  going  to  help  Europeans  that  had  been  displaced  by  WWII  (The  Refugee
Convention, 1951). However, turmoil in Africa due to decolonization war increased. As a
result, there was a shift on literature from refugees in Europe to those in Africa. Since then,
the migrant refugee crisis of displaced populations has taken on alarming and astronomical
proportion globally (Naidu and Makanda, 2015). To date, intra-state conflicts and their links
to displacement and migration of people in search of safety is becoming an ever present
aspect of global society (Bariagaber, 2013). This has led to evolution of many protocols that
govern the protection of refugees in the world. There is the 19518 and 19679 United Nation
Protocol relating to Status of Refugees.  The preceding UN protocol is based on Article 14 of
the Universal Declaration of human rights of 1948. It “recognizes the right of persons to seek
8United Nations General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 1950, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f08a27.html 
9 The Protocol  of 1967 is  attached to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2198
(XXI)  of  16  December  1967,  available  at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1cc50.html.
28
asylum from persecution in other countries, the United Nations Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, is the centrepiece of international refugee protection
today” (UNHCR, 2010:2).  Until  January 2016,  when this  study is  being done,  over  150
countries have acceded and enshrined into their legislation, both 1951 and 1967 UN Refugee
Convention.
Other protocols on protection of refugees include that of the Organization of African Unity
(now African Union)  Convention governing the Specific  aspects  of  Refugee Problems in
Africa that was adopted 10 September 1969. According to the AU protocol there is a need for
a  continuous  collaboration  between  the  AU and  the  Office  of  the  United  Nations  High
Commissioner for Refugees on the  increasing numbers of refugees in Africa and desirous of
finding ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing them
with  a  better  life  and  future10.  There  is  also  the  European  Union  Council  Directive
2004/83/EC of 29 April 200411. Another protocol on protection of refugees was adopted by
the  Colloquium  on  International  Protection  of  Refugees  in  Latin  America,  Mexico  and
Panama  at  Cartagena,  Colombia  in  November  1984  (UNHCR,  2010).  The  Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees was purposely convened to protect refugees in Central America,
Mexico and Panama.
There are a number of studies that have investigated other factors that lead individuals to flee
their countries. A study done by Forced Migration Studies programme, FMSP Report (2007)
found out that there are other factors that make people to become refugees. Although the
FMSP (2007) links many factors to the upsurge of refugees in the world, the UNHCR Global
Report (2015) see both intra and interstate conflicts as the major causes of the situation.  The
UNHCR (2015) argues that there is compelling evidence to prove that countries that are in
conflicts either intra or interstate war are the greatest contributors to this problem of refugees
in the world. According to the United Nation Refugees Council Report (2015), in 2014 there
were over 60 million displaced people across the globe, including 14.4 million refugees, the
largest amount since the Second World War (The Economist, 2015). There were 2.9 million
new refugees in 2014, the highest ever 8 recorded rise. Of these 51% were children and 86%
10African  Commission  on  Human  and  Peoples'
Rightshttp:www.achpr.org/instruments/refugee-convention.  
11 Is a protocol on the minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country
nationals or stateless persons as refugees  or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted. 
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were hosted in developing countries (UNHCR, 2015:2). Accordingly, most of the preceding
population was forcibly displaced by war. 
Figure 2.  Global population displaced by war (UNHCR Global Trends, 2015)
There is compelling evidence – anchored substantially on case studies from Africa and Asia –
suggesting that countries that are experiencing war are the leading contributors of refugees in
the  world.  For  instance,  Albrecht  (2015)  argues  that  warring  countries  such  as  Syria,
Pakistan, Yemen, Ukraine, DRC, CAR, South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi (had generalized
violence and human rights violations) are the leading contributors of refugees in the world.
This is well documented in the UNHCR 2014 Global Refugees statistics as shown in Figure
2. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI), the current instability that is being experienced
in  many countries  has  made,  “the  world  to  become an  increasingly unstable  place,  thus
contributing to an inevitable rise in displaced peoples” (GPI, 2015:46). As figure 2 shows,
although economic situation and natural disasters are also contributors to the global refugee
menace, war is considered as the greatest. 
There  are  many scholarly reasons  why war  is  a  major  contributor  to  the  global  refugee
menace.  Bussy and Gallo (2016) argue that countries that are experiencing war have the
highest levels of abuse to human rights and autocratic and controlling regimes. As a result,
citizens of war-torn countries are most likely to run into exile in search of refugee.  Sriram,
Martin-Ortega  and  Herman  (2014) argue  that  war  and  violence  give  an  opportunity  for
massive violation of human rights. This has been vindicated by a need for prosecution of
perpetrators of crimes against humanity in post-conflict situations like Rwanda, Kenya and
Ivory Coast (Autesserre, 2014).  Chikanda and Crush (2015) and Fritsch, Johnson and Juska
(2010) argue that countries that are experiencing conflict are likely to be less economically
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developed.  It is the effects of war coupled with economic constraints that make citizens of a
warring country to run away to other countries in search for asylum and refugee. According
to UNHCR (2014), the violation of violation of human rights and poor economies as a result
of war continues to heighten the increasing numbers of  refugees in the world. Therefore, it
can  be  argued that,  war  provides  the basis  on which  the  influx  of  refugees  occurs.  One
dominant view in the preceding literature on war refugees is that although no one knows
where refugees are headed to, but he/she can be certain of where they are coming from: that
is, warring countries as shown in table 1. 
 Table 1:  Regional statistics of refugees (UNHCR, 2015)
Region Refugees and those in
refugee-like status
Those  assisted  by
UNHCR
Asylum Seekers
Africa 3,377,724 3,024,094 454,404
Asia 6,317,462 5,371,934 165,381
Europe 1,152,762 25,459 400,418
Latin America and the
Caribbean
382,025 97,944 22,937
North America 424,011 Nil 106,491
Oceania 45,295 11 14,818
Total 11,699,279 8,519,442 1,164,449
Adopted by the Author from the UNHCR Global Trends (2014)
Table 1 above shows that Africa and Asia that are the main contributors of the refugees in the
World. 
2.3 Refugee situation in Africa. 
The literature on the link between conflict and refugees in Africa encompasses a plethora of
perspectives.  A  survey  of  the  literature  suggests  that  some  broad  scholarly  positions
encapsulate various narratives and reflect the contentions around the subject. For example,
the works of Stola (1992) highlighted over two decades ago, the sheer size and magnitude of
the phenomenon of refugees and forced migration in the context of Africa, and traced its
historical evolution, “intensity and atrocity in time and space” across Africa. However, more
recently, Hendricks (2015) and Moore and Shellman (2004) point out that the literature on
refugees and forced migration is dominated by the “idiographic”, meaning that it appears to
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primarily comprise  “descriptive  case  studies,  advocacy and awareness  pieces,  and policy
evaluations” (Moore and Shellman 2004:723). They also point out that the literature is also
mainly “systemic” and “structural in its theoretical” stance, protesting that the same is not
true for the extant work on voluntary migration.  For example,  some literature on refugee
situation in Africa is sceptical in blaming the current mounting reluctance and increasing lack
of interest of Western countries to intervene in African civil and political conflicts as a root
cause of refugee situation on the continent (Fuertes, 2016). Yet amidst different scholarly
positions on African conflicts, there is empirical evidence that Africa has contributed to 30%
of refugee global population (UNHCR, 2015).
From this point henceforth, it is worth noting that literature on the interface between conflict
and refugees in Africa consists of three strands. The first strand examines the African conflict
countries that are greatest contributors of refugees and those that host them. In the second
component  are  analyses  that  focus  on  refugees,  their  reception  in  host  countries  and
humanitarian assistance. The third strand is the participation and role of refugees in conflict
transformation. 
According to  Naidu and Makanda (2015),  Central  African  Republic,  South  Sudan,  Mali,
Burundi, Somalia and Democratic Republic of the Congo are example of countries in Africa
that are imbricated in political instability, strife, war and to a lesser extent, natural disasters.
According to UNHCR (2015:1), “Africa is in the throes of its most serious refugee crisis as
conflicts in Central African Republic, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Mali have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes” (UNHCR 2015:1).
The  global  rising  numbers  of  refugees  from Africa  is  contrary  to  what  independence  is
claimed  as  embodying  or  meant  to  embody  (Tint,  Chirimwami  and  Sarkis,  2014).  For
instance,  the UNHCR Report  (2015) projected that  the numbers of  people of  concern in
Africa were expected to decrease slightly from 15.1 million in 2014 to 14.9 million in 2015.
This was attributed to the increasing global repatriation, resettlement of refugees and other
durable political  solutions  that  were  being put  to  avert  wars  in  conflicting  countries. On
contrary,  despite  Africa  having  the  highest  number  of  peace  operations  since  2011,  the
number of refugees has continued to increase (Arrous and Feldman, 2014). As a result, there
has been an increase in growth in literature on conflicts in Africa (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Yearbook 2012). 
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To-date, Africa continues to register a high rate of armed conflict, violence and human rights
abuses. For instance, of the estimated 54.7 million displaced persons, “more than a quarter
(27%) of the globally displaced are in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Colleta, 2015: 273). Similarly,
the UNHCR Global Trends (2015) found out that in 2014 alone, the sub-Saharan Africa saw
3.7  million  people  become  refugees  and  11.4  million  IDPs.  This  was  a  17%  increase
compared to 2013. Most of these refugees were mainly from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia,
Central Africa, DRC, Burundi, Mali and Eritrea (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2013: 29). 
Regionally, the  horn of  Africa and the great  lake  regions  are  the leading contributors  of
refugees on the continent. In 2015, using large datasets obtained from a diverse group of
conflict prone countries in the horn of Africa and great lake region, the UNHCR projected
that  the  influx  of  refugees  will  skyrocket  from 2015-2017  due  to  continuing  upheavals,
violence and instabilities in CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Burundi and Somalia. In the horn of
Africa, the outbreak of violence in South Sudan in 2014 has so far displaced 1.5 million
persons of which over 500,000 have fled to the countries like Ethiopia (188,500), Uganda
(128,400), Sudan (115,500), and Kenya (67,000). Similarly, there has been an influx of 123,
000 Eritrean refugees into Ethiopia. In Somalia, the ongoing violence and drought has forced
many Somalis to flee mainly into Kenya (11,500), Ethiopia (6,300), and Yemen (17,600). In
the great lakes, there is renewed fighting between rebels and government forces in the DRC.
This has so far displaced over 1 million persons in which thousands of Congolese who have
fled into Uganda (13,300), Burundi (7,500), and Kenya (6,000). Also, the continuing fighting
in the CAR has forced over 160,300 persons to flee into Cameroon (116,600), the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (19,500), Chad (14,200), and the Republic of Congo (11,300). In these
regions,  Kenya and Tanzania  are  the  two countries  that  are  saddled  with the  devastating
effects of refugees’ influx.
 
In the West Africa, there has been some stability which has led into more positive efforts
being put into repatriations of Ivorian refugees back to home from neighbouring countries. In
June  2014,  however,  the  outbreak  of  Ebola  virus  in  Guinea,  Liberia,  and  Sierra  Leone
hampered repatriation. To-date there is still a significant number of Mali and Niger people
(about  267,000)  who  remain  displaced  internally  and  externally.  In  Nigeria,  the  Boko
Haram12 insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria,  Chad and Cameroon has  forced more than
12An Islamic terrorist group based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and 
northern Cameroon(   U.S. Department of State, Bureau of counterterrorism, 2014).
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650,000  displacement  within  Nigeria  and  an  estimated  70,000  have  become  refugees  in
Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
In North Africa, there are still instabilities that are being experienced in countries like Egypt
and Libya. Also there is terrorism that is being carried out in the Sahel and Sinai regions
(UNHCR,  2015).  In  most  cases,  the  North  Africa  has  remained either  as  transit  or  final
destination  for  sizeable  mixed migration  flows from sub-Saharan  Africa.  North  Africa  is
known  as  gateway  to  Europe  where  many  illegal  immigrants  have  drowned  in  the
Mediterranean Sea. 
In  the  Southern  Africa  region,  the  social  political  atmosphere  remains  relatively  calm.
However, instabilities in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland and Madagascar are contributing to
increasing numbers of refugees mostly in South Africa and Botswana. According to UNHCR
(2015),  there are  more than half  a  million people of concern.  Most  of  the population of
concern in  the  Southern region are migrants  from the East,  Central  and West  regions  of
Africa;  majority  of  refugees  reside  in  South  Africa,  Botswana  and  Angola.  Among  the
mentioned,  refugees  host  countries,  South  Africa  continues  to  harbours  the  challenging
effects of hosting the highest number of refugees. Globally, South Africa is ranked number
three in the world in terms of reception of refugees and asylum seekers (UNHRC, 2015). 
Table 2. 2014 Africa’s refugee statistics
Region Number of refugees % increase in 2014
Central and Great lakes 662,600 28.4%
East and Horn of Africa   2,601,400 27.6%
Southern Africa 174,700 29.9%
West Africa 252,000 4.0%
Total number of refugees 3,690,700 25.9%
Source UNHCR Global Trends (2015)
Thus far, it can be seen that the statistics on refugees in the East and Horn of Africa and the
central and Great lakes where the DRC is situated are the leading contributors of refugees on
the continent. Still, majority of Congolese refugees live in South Africa (Hendricks, 2015). It
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is on the foregoing basis that the researcher was motivated to explore some of the interests of
peacebuilding interveners within the African continent.  In the context of this study, due to
incessant  war  the  DRC has  attracted  a  number  of  peacebuilding  interventions  both  from
inside and outside Africa.  According to the UNHCR Global Report (2014), has contributed
to  over  1.2  million  refugees  and  almost  27,000  asylum  seekers,  108,000  returnees  and
hundreds  of  thousands  of  internally  displaced  persons  (UNHCR  Global  Report,  2014;
Nderitu, 2014) in the world. For instance, by January 2014, over 455, 522 refugees had fled
the DRC (ASR, 2014). In Africa alone, the number of Congolese refugees represents 18% of
the  total  refugee  population.  The  Annual  Tripartite  Consultation  and  Working  Group  on
Resettlement  (ATCWR,  2015)  conducted  a  study  and  established  that  out  of  455,  522
Congolese refugees, 50% (225,609 persons) are spread across five countries in the Great
Lakes Region, 39% (177,751 persons) are spread across six countries in East and Horn of
Africa, and 11 per cent (52,162) are in the Southern Africa region of which majority of reside
in South Africa (ATCWR, 2015). 
2. 4 The Refugee Situation in South Africa
According to Betts, Loescher and Milner (2013), there are three important reasons why South
Africa attracts both war and economic migrants.  Firstly, most migrants see South Africa as
one of the richest and most developed economy on the continent, where they can find better
life. Secondly,  Betts, Loescher and Milner see South Africa to be unique in the context of
hosting refugees. In South Africa refugees do not live in camps. This is contrary to many
African host countries like Kenya and Uganda where refugees still live in camps (UNHCR,
2013).  This  is  one  of  the  reason  that  has  made  South  Africa  to  be  “a  country  which
experiences  the  highest  rates  of  asylum seekers  of  any country in  the  world”  (UNHCR,
2009b). By 2012, South Africa was among the top three countries in the world in terms of
receiving and hosting refugees and asylum seekers: USA had 70, 400, Germany had 64, 700
and South Africa had 61, 500 (UNHCR Global Trends, 2014).  Thirdly, Betts, Loescher and
Milner (2013) argue that most immigrants use South Africa not just as a destination in itself
but, also as a gateway and transit to other places like Europe and the United States. The
preceding is  some of  the reasons why  since  2007 to-date  (2016),  South Africa  has  been
experiencing a significant increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers. Majority of
these  refugees  originate  from  neighbouring  Zimbabwe  (UNHCR,  2011)  and  from  the
conflict-prone DRC, Sudan and CAR (UNHCR, 2015). 
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 As a country, South Africa became a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention in 1993
but legislated its refugee Act (Act no.130) in 1998.  This was after the country started to
experience a high influx of refugees. According to the Refugees Act (no. 130 of 1998), one
qualifies for refugee status if that person: 
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her
race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular
social group, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual
residence is  unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it;  or (b)
owing  to  external  aggression,  occupation,  foreign  domination  or  events
seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either a part or the whole of
his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her
place  of  habitual  residence  in  order  to  seek  refuge  elsewhere;  or  (c)  is  a
dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b) (DHA, 1998:6–8).
The Refugee Act No.130 of 1998 made South Africa to be one among few countries in the
world that had put in place legislation that grants refugees their basic principles of protection:
freedom of movement, work and access to basic social services. For this reason, South Africa
is respected global as a country that has enacted one of the most progressive law on refugees.
Although the Refugees  Act No.130 provides refugees  with basic principle  of protections,
there  are  studies  that  show  that  Refugees  residing  in  South  Africa  typically  rely  on  an
informal  economy (Landau,  2004;  Lindstrom,  2003).  For  instance,  Misago  and  Monson
(2010) and Polzer (2007) argue that most refugees in the country lack proper documents. This
limits  their access to jobs, housing and other public services; rental  accommodations and
permits for businesses. Refugees in South Africa are targets of institutionalised xenophobia.
This is due to a section of South Africans who perceive migrants as criminals who have come
to steal  their  jobs  (Misago and Monson, 2010).  Other  studies  have established that  most
refugees in South Africa are in many cases, less vulnerable than South Africans in terms of
their  abilities  to  generate  income (Landau  and Duponchel,  2011).  For  instance,  UNHCR
(2010)  found  out  that  in  South  Africa  refugees  and  asylum seekers  benefited  from the
government’s numerous legal  rights;  right  to work health  care and social  services.  Other
scholars argue that despite South African government facing challenges of service delivery to
its people it is also facing a mounting task of assisting refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR,
2010).  It is important to note that in South Africa, an asylum seeker is not classified as a
refugee until DHA recognises him or her as such. Once asylum is granted and refugee status
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approved, the refugee is allowed to access to certain rights, as described in Refugees Act No.
130 of 1998. As previously argued, unlike other refugee host countries especially in Africa,
South Africa has no official refugee camps. 
By  January  2015,  South  Africa  had  over  300,000  both  registered  refugees  and  asylum
seekers. Most literature contend that majority of refugees in South Africa reside in urban
areas; inner-city areas (Landau, 2006). According to Landau (2006), due to complex situation
of urban areas, it is challenging for the government to offer refugees protection. For instance,
in 2008, there were xenophobic attacks that were experienced across the country’s major
urban areas where 62 people dead, wounding over 670, dozens raped and more than 100,000
displaced  (Misago  and  Monson,  2010).  Similarly,  in  2015,  there  was  another  wave  of
xenophobic attacks that were mostly experienced in the city of Durban (Crea et al, 2016).
Instead of the South African government putting a restriction on the attacks, most of the
senior  officials  were  sceptical  and  in  denial  of  the  existence  of  xenophobic  violence.
Accordingly,  some  of  the  official  used  statements  that  instigated  the  preceding  violence
(Amnesty International, 2015). Other challenges that refugees in South Africa face beyond
xenophobia includes weak presence of state to offer them security. Foster (2012) argues that
there is weak state security accorded to refugees which perpetuates a culture of impunity for
offenders who commit crime against foreigners.  Marindze, (2010) blames authority figures
who perceive asylum claims of insecurity as bogus, as key cause of a culture of impunity.
Neocosmos  (2010)  links  corruption  and  laxity  among  government  officials  as  a  leading
contributor to government’s lack of protection of refugees.  In this case, many officials are
“collectively going out of their way to repel, hinder, and undermine asylum seekers’ capacity
to receive fairly adjudicated claims” (Neocosmos (2010: 48). According to Women Refugee
Council (WRC, 2011), urbanization has also made it difficult for the government and NGOs
to get effective evidence documenting and supporting the needs of refugees. For instance,
WRC (2011) established that many women refugees who had received livelihood support
were forced to locate their business in unsafe areas of Johannesburg. Still, the WRC (2011)
argue  that  many  women  refugees  who  had  established  small  businesses  had  inadequate
government support for licensing and stocking their businesses (Krause-Vilmer and Chaffin,
2011a). 
The foregoing discussions on situations of refugees in South Africa are important as they
enhance the understanding of how the country is grappling with increasing influx of refugees
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from all  over  the  world.  The preceding scholarship  situate  government  laws guiding the
reception of refugees in the country by moving away from the simplistic tendency to draw a
linear  linkage  between  how  the  government  has  protected  the  rights  of  refugees  and
challenges it faces. For example, in 2014, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP,
2014), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 2014) and the Africa Centre for Migration and
Society  (ACMS,  2014)  established  that  there  was  limited  government  efforts  in  curbing
hostility of locals towards foreigners (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; ISS, 2014; Landau, 2012;
Vearey, 2013). This has made the government to come up with new legislations that seek to
curb the unprecedented inflow of refugees and in assisting new migrants to resettle in the
country (Kamwimbi et al, 2010; Mhlanga, 2011). Despite all the difficulties and the pressure
that the South African government  is  facing,  the country remains a leading host of most
African refugees. Table 3 shows the number of refugees in South Africa and their countries of
origin (Bekkai, 2015)
 Table 3.  Statistics of refugees in South Africa by Country
Country of origin Refugees Asylum Seekers Total
DRC 15,000 8,500 23,500
Ethiopia 9,600 4,600 14,200
Somalia 24, 000 24,000
Others 20, 400 189,000 209,400
Zimbabwe 43,000 43,000
Total 68,000 245,100 313,100
Adopted by the Author from the UNHCR Global Appeal (2015).
According to DHA (2014), 230,000 migrants arrived in the country seeking asylum in 2014
alone. Out of the 230, 000, the DHA granted refugee status to about 65,000. As table 3 shows,
the  leading refugee  contributing  countries  in  2014 were:  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo
(DRC), Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Somalia. 
2.5. Refugees and Conflict Transformation: Exploring the toolbox
Most of the literature on refugee crisis links the occurrence of conflicts and the outpouring of
refuges, its impacts on political, social and economic in the world. In most of the literature,
there is an assertion that a positive correlation exists betwixt (re)occurrence of conflicts and
resurgence of the refugee problem.   However, since 1945 (the establishment of Peace Studies
as  a  discipline)  much  literature  on  conflict  resolution  has  mainly  concentrated  on  the
termination of war. While conflict transformation tends to deal with conflict itself: causes and
how to  terminate  it,  peacebuilding  deals  with  addressing  structures  (political,  social  and
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economic) within which the conflict was embedded in and how to find its long term process
(Ramsbotham,  Woodhouse  and  Oliver,  2011:288).  The  bulk  of  the  literature  on  conflict
transformation however, has focused on analysing and understanding the dynamics of the
conflict (Stedman, 1996:61; Liden, 2009a; Richmond, 2012). Wallenstein (2002) argues that
the basic elements of conflict resolution should be honouring the peace-agreement: a formal
understanding among the conflicting parties. A similar view is held by McAskie (2008) who
argue that if conflict is to be resolved, the former conflicting parties should be willing co-
exist and tolerate each other so as to positively resolve the conflict. Some scholars argue that
conflict transformation should ensure that all actors are incorporated in stopping the violence
(Staub, 2006; Lambourne, 2007; Rigby, 2001; Parkhurst, 2010; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).
There  is  a  section  of  scholars  who  are  at  leery  with  the  current  literature  on  conflict
transformation  that  hinges  on  liberal-peace13 conceptualization  of  peacebuilding.  For
instance, McGirty (2009) argues that liberal conceptualization of peacebuilding has led to
endorsement  of  hegemonic  rules  within  conflicting  state.  According  to  McGirty,
contemporary  interventions  have  concentrated  on  stabilising/ending  violence  in  war-torn
countries by dealing with the conflict elites without addressing their root causes. Similarly,
Banks  (2010)  argue  that  the  contemporary  liberal  approach  to  peacebuilding  need  to
expounded so as to accommodate the needs of all people of a conflicting country and not only
serve the interest  of  the conflicting elites.  As a  result,  Banks (2010) criticise the current
liberal model of peacebuilding for being:  1) conservative and stability based- focuses on
state-building. 2)  Orthodoxy and characterized with pluralisms and democratic reforms. 3)
justice-emancipatory but lacking the interest of civil society and common citizens (locals).
Additionally, Boege (2012) argues that by focusing exclusively on state-building and regime
change/endorsement,  liberal  model  of peacebuilding overlooks the causes of war and the
interest  of  the  locals.  Therefore,  it  serves  the  interests  of  the  interveners  and  not  the
conflicting country.  As a result, it displaces the indigenous legitimacy with institutions that
are  inflexible;  this  is  one  characteristic  of  politics  in  many  unstable  African  states.
Ramsbotham,  Woodhouse  and  Curle  (2011:233)  criticize  liberal  conceptualization  of
peacebuilding for being in contradiction of what conflict transformations aims at achieving.
According Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011:233), any peacebuilding intervention
13 A claim that countries that are democratic see no need of going to war with one another.
Therefore, a proper strategy of ending war is by democratizing the conflicting country (see
Rosato 2003:585) 
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need to be transformative and cosmopolitan  in  that  it  should  seek to  privilege  local  and
civilian capacity building and should re-negotiate between local and international interveners.
From the preceding paragraph, it can be deduced that most scholarship is concerned with the
question whose interests should conflict transformation14 serve? However, in the context of
peacebuilding intervention  in  African  and Asian conflicts,  Lederach (2004) and Williams
(2015) note that there is a sizeable literature that has challenged peacebuilding interveners’
role in conflict states. According to Lederach and Appleby (2010) peacebuilding interventions
should empower locals of war-torn countries, promote human rights and cultural resources
within a given setting. Staub (2006), Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) argue that
conflict transformation in a conflict or post-conflict society should engage with all actors to
stop the occurrence or  re-occurrence of violence.  Staub (2006) argues  that  peacebuilding
efforts  should  serve  to  correct  severed  relations,  violated  norms,  distorted  identities  and
absorbed impacts  of  trauma created as  a  result  of  violence.  “This  becomes  an important
mechanism of  restoring  trust  for  building  a  shared  future  thus,  averting  future  violence”
(Ramsbotham,  Woodhouse  and  Curle,  2011:  231).  While  the  role  of  interveners  in  any
conflict is contested, Reychler and Colorado (2001:12) argue that there is ‘no one-size fits all
strategy’. According to Reychler and Colorado, interveners need to employ more than one
strategy: this attests to the variegated nature of peacebuilding intervention exercise (Reychler
and  Colorado,  2001).  In  the  context  of  this  study,  one  way  of  having  an  integrated
peacebuilding  intervention  strategy is  to  incorporate  the  views  of  refugees  hosted  by an
intervening state. In one way or another, while in their countries of origin, refugees are either
perpetrators or victims of the ongoing or a past conflict (Lwambo, 2013). Still, refugees may
be  influencing  an  ongoing  conflict  at  the  comfy  of  their  host  country;  this  may  be  an
intervening state. Therefore, there is a need for erecting a scholarship that is grounded on the
roles of refugees in peacebuilding interventions; this is what this study is founded.
At this juncture, it is worth noting that a review of literature on conflict transformation since
1945  has  given  no/least  attention  to  the  role  of  refugees  in  peacebuilding  intervention
processes in their countries’ conflict. Despite the literature paying less attention to refugees,
14 The  dichotomy  between  conflict  transformation  and  peacebuilding  is  blurred.  While
conflict  transformation  tend  to  deal  with  conflict  itself:  causes  and how to  terminate  it,
peacebuilding deals with addressing structures (political, social and economic) within which
the  conflict  was  embedded  in  and  how  to  find  its  long  term  process  (Ramsbotham,
Woodhouse and Oliver, 2011:288).
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UNHCR (2015) reports that at the end of 2014 over 45.2 people globally had been forcefully
displaced  by war.  Instead  of  addressing  the  root  causes  of  conflict,  most  peacebuilding
interveners, have either militarily or diplomatically intervened in warring states as a way of
addressing  the  refugee  crisis.  While  this  being  the  case,  peacebuilding  interveners  have
lacked to tap on the wisdom of the refugees before carrying out their military or diplomatic
interventions.  As  a  result,  the  role  of  refugees  in  peacebuilding  interventions  has  been
subverted or least investigated by most scholars.  
However, there are scholars who have attempted to investigate the role of refugees either in
the host or home countries. Jacobsen (2002) argues that while in their host countries, refugees
pose  security, economic  and environmental  benefits  and burdens.  According  to  Jacobsen
(2002) refugees are human resource assets  to the host countries in form of humanitarian
assistance,  economic assets  and human capital.  In support of Jacobsen argument,  a study
done by Addo (2008) in Ghana established that  Liberian women refugees were involved in
various  income-generating  activities:  petty-trading,  hair-dressing  and  dress-making  which
were helping in improving the economy of Ghana. A study done in Canada by MacLean et al
(2004) established that the influx of refugees and immigrants from Malaria-prone tropical
countries  was  a  threat  to  Canadian  public  health.   So  as  to  curb  the  spread  of  malaria,
MacLean  et al (2004) recommended that the Canadian authorities needed to improve the
surveillance of increasing number of refugees.
In the context of conflict transformation, there exist a small number of scholarship that has
given refugees a priority. Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller (2010) in argue other than
seeking  their  opinions,  most  host  and  intervening  states  are  concerned  with  immediate
humanitarian  assistance,  repatriation,  and  restrictions  on  a  wide  range  of  rights  of  the
refugees. According to Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, refugees are considered as a
threat to  security and political  concerns of host states.  This is  the reason why most  host
countries restrict refugees’ movements and places them in confined camps.  An study done by
Chimni (2002 found out that most host countries mount pressure to the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to facilitate and promote the return of refugees in
their countries. Preceding category of host countries do not care whether the conditions that
bred war in refugee’s home countries have been addressed or not. A current example is the
case  of  Somali  refugees  in  Kenya,  whereby the Kenyan government  is  insisting that  the
UNHCR should repatriate them even though the conditions in Somalia are not yet conducive
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for  return  (Stanley,  2015).  According  to  Sanchez  (2011:  iii),  “If  the  issues  causing
displacement  were  to  be  solved,  then  the  intervening  host  countries  would  be  able  to
concentrate on their own population” (Sanchez, 2011: iii). However, while Chimni (1998),
Sanchez (2011) and Stanley (2015) suggest that refugees should play a crucial role in their
countries’ peacebuilding, they do not spell out whether or not an intervening host state should
consider the views of refugees on peacebuilding interventions. A study done by Menkhaus
(2010) established that Somalian refugees especially in England and US were both assets and
liabilities  to  peacebuilding  in  Somalia:  some  were  perpetuating  war  while  other  were
contributing  to  peace.  Positively,  Somalian  diaspora  were  continuously  becoming  civil
society activists who funded and advocated for good governance, progressive principle and
ensuring that the intervening states in the Somalia’s conflict puts the interest of local at heart.
Negatively,  Menkhaus  (2008)  argues  that  many  Somalian  diasporas  were  using  their
resources  to  finance  the  escalation  of  the  ongoing conflict  in  that  country. According to
Anderson and McKnight (2015), some of the Al-Shabaab funding comes from some Somalis
in  diaspora.  There  is  also  literature  that  deals  with  the  role  of  Palestinian  refugees  and
immigrants in resolving the Palestinian conflict. According to Rempel (2013), since 1990, the
Palestinian refugees sought to negotiate for a seat in negotiation between PLO and Israel in
securing a lasting solution to the Gaza conflict. 
The  foregoing  scholarship  shows that  there  is  global  growing  recognition  of  the  role  of
refugees in peacebuilding interventions. The growing recognition of refugees as party to the
conflict, reveals that they may offer some contribution on building peace in their countries’
conflicts.   (Aleinikoff  and  Poellot,  2013).  The  foregoing  scholarship  on  refugees  and
peacebuilding depicts that in some situations, refugees may contribute positively. However,
there cis dearth of scholarship on how refugees may contribute positively to peacebuilding of
their country. For instance, there a number of studies that show how South Africans while in
exile played an important role in pressuring the host countries in Africa, Europe, Asia and
North America to support their struggle against the apartheid regime. Ottaway (1991) argues
that after going into exile in 1961, the then president of the ANC established a number of
anti-apartheid  missions  across  the  African  continent.  It  was  in  some  of  the  established
missions that many South African had their military training grounds and for strategizing on
how to dismantle the apartheid government. Freund and Padayachee pointed out that in the
US and UK, there were a number of South African exiles who solicited funding for the ANC
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and also drew the attention of the international community to the plight of South Africans
under the apartheid regimes (Freund and Padayachee, 1998). 
 
A studies done by Vanore et al (2015) and Horst et al (2010) established that   those who are
forced into exile can build peace in their country of origin through political  or economic
means. For instance, Horst et al (2010) argues that the political role of the Somali refugees
living in Italy led to an evolution of different Somali Association. The associations provided a
form of support to the new and incoming Somali refugees. This association also assisted new
Somali refugees to know their rights and how to become legal in Italy.  According to Horst et
al  (2010:19)  the  political  engagement  of  Somali  refugees  living  in  Italy  was  termed  as
“translocal  politics”.  This  term is “defined  as  the  initiatives  of  migrant  communities  or
individuals  who seek to  provide  concrete  support  to  specific  localities  in  the  country of
origin…  through  political  activities  in  which  the  migrant  communities  engage  the
government of their country of residence on issues that exclusively concern the country from
which  they  came”  (ibid).  Similarly,  Adele  Galipo  (2011)  argues  that  through  financial
remittance to their home country, refugees in Europe- with a particular focus on those in
Italy-  can be viewed as positively affecting the peace process. The idea is that these financial
remittances go into developmental projects in their homelands. Galipo (2011) nonetheless
emphasizes the political dimension as quite pertinent as through this, the refugees are able to
exert pressure on and call the international community to the plight of their fellow country
people. As Abdille and Pirkkalainen (2009:34) see it, “advocacy and lobbying are instruments
used  by diasporas  to  bring  issues  concerning  their  respective  countries  of  origin  to  the
international agenda”. Further still, Galipo (2011), citing Horst (2009) argues that through
lobbying,  the  refugees  among  another  segments  of  diaspora  raise  awareness,  organize
demonstrations for certain causes and promote public education and relations. “The lobbying
usually takes  place  in  the  country of  settlement,  but  it  may be  that  refugees  manage to
network with international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs” (Galipo, 2011:10). 
However, despite the fact that literature from the South African exiles and Somali refugees in
Europe indicate that refugees and immigrants can play a crucial role in peacebuilding, most
scholarship have concentrated on the need for humanitarian assistance and repatriation. There
is also a growing scholarship on why refugees are the root cause of anti-foreign sentiments
from the locals. According to Kibreab (1993) and Amnesty International (2015), refugee and
immigrants  are  the  root  cause  of  anti-foreign  stereotype  and  xenophobia.  Other  than
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addressing  the  root  causes  of  xenophobia:  socio-economic  factors,  Amnesty International
(2015) established that South Africa enforced tough immigration rules so that to limit the
number of immigrants entering the country. The Human Science Research Council (HSRC,
2010)  argues  that  xenophobic  sentiment  in  South  Africa  is  shared  by  a  considerable
proportion of South Africans across the socio-demographic and socio-economic spectrum. It
appears that  negative stereotypical  views about  refugees are  fairly widespread,  especially
among  South  Africans  who  perceive  them  as  threats  in  the  job  market  (Amnesty
International, 2015; HSRC, 2010; Landau, 2011). 
Shifting away from the concerns of foregoing scholars, Mbeki (2013) argues that the 2008
xenophobic attacks are example of social ills that South Africa will continue to experience if
it  does  not  participate  in  peacebuilding  interventions  on  the  continent.   Similarly, Zuma
(2015) cited the 2015 xenophobic violence as an indicator of South Africa having no option
but to intervene in African conflicts so as to promote democracy and human rights. While
reaping from the negative impacts of war on the continent-refugees- a number of scholars are
now paying attention to the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in Africa. At this point,
it is imperative to critique the literature on the role South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in  Africa.  Later  on,  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  DRC will  be given
special attention. 
  
2.6 South Africa and peacebuilding intervention in Africa.
A  number  of  scholars  have  critiqued  the  relevancy  of  South  Africa’s  involvement  in
transforming conflict situations in different African countries (see Pillay 2013). Pillay (2013)
claims that because of better military tools and expenditure, South Africa has the capacity to
intervene in any African conflict, pointing out that South Africa is the largest military spender
in Africa accounting for nearly sixty-five percent of total military spending in southern Africa
and twenty-seven percent in Africa. Duncan (2014) argues that if South Africa is to be rid of
political and economic immigrants, it has no option but to consolidate its privileged position
to stabilize the continent. Moeletsi Mbeki, the brother of former President of South Africa,
Thabo Mbeki, has publicly claimed that the mounting migration of other African citizens,
especially from war-torn areas into South Africa, is a wake-up call for the country to act.
Mbeki mentions the 2008 xenophobic attacks as an example of social ills that South Africa
will  continue  to  face  if  it  does  not  democratize  and  stabilize  Africa.  Being  the  most
‘democratic and developed’ African economy, Jacob Zuma, current President of South Africa,
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in turn publicly informs the country that South Africa has no option but to reinforce a culture
of peace, democracy and human rights on the continent. 
Other scholars argue that instead of resolving African conflicts, South Africa is using conflict
resolution as a tool for expanding its hegemony and enacting a double standard, “as Africa’s
Big  Brother”.  Cilliers  and  Schunemann  (2013)  argue  that  historically,  in  some  conflict
situations, there is some evidence that South Africa had ulterior motives—other than conflict
resolution— in its intervention, claiming that Mandela used this crisis to settle his discontent
with  Robert  Mugabe—the  then  SADC chair.  Chingono  and Nakana  (2009)  add  that  the
regime of Mandela played a key role in derailing peace talks in Sudan by supplying weapons
to both, the Sudanese government and to the Sudanese People Liberation Movement. Cilliers
and Schunemann (2013) criticize Mbeki’s time in the Presidency for using South Africa’s
conflict transformation strategy as a means of selling South Africa’s arms to the war-torn
countries  of  the great  lakes  and in  Algeria  and to  campaign for the country’s permanent
position at the United Nation Security Council.  By continuously intervening in the DRC,
South Africa is joining a group of both state and non-state actors who scramble for the DRC’s
vast  mineral  resources—a major  factor  that  is  perpetuating conflicts  in  the  DRC (Taylor
2003; Whetho 2014).
The foregoing scholars’ work in South Africa’s role in resolving and transforming African
conflicts, is thus cumulatively and potentially paving way for more (hopefully new) research
trends into understanding South Africa’s role in conflict transformation in Africa. However,
one asserts that there are also new types of empirically based research that are needed. This is
because  most  literature  of  literature  on  South  Africa  and  peacebuilding  focuses  on  the
intervener (South Africa), its interests in the conflict situation, humanitarian assistance and
integration or repatriation of refugees. However, there is a dearth of literature on what role
refugees  residing  in  South  Africa  can  contribute  towards  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions  warring  and post-war African  states.  Also,  there  is  scarcity of  literature  on
attitudes and perceptions that refugees from war-torn countries have on how South Africa’s
involvement in their countries’ conflict transformation benefits them or South Africans.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the intend of this study is to offer ‘thick’ empirical and
material contexts of how lived experiences of the refugees residing (in South Africa) can
enhance and deepen the scholarship on understanding the imbricated complexities in South
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Africa’s peacebuilding interventionist stance on the continent. While the above points to the
kinds of qualitative research being suggested, other scholars propose theoretical models that
can also change the shape of focused work on South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in
Africa. Prominent peace scholars like Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011), Ledarach
(2005)  and  Doyle  (2000)  propose  a  reconstructed  model  of  conflict  resolution—a
transformative and cosmopolitan model that seeks to privilege local and civilian capacity
building  and  to  renegotiate  between  local  and  international  perspectives. Still  Ledarach
(2015)  and  Paffenholz  (2014)  advocate  for  a transformative  and  cosmopolitan  model  of
peacebuilding that includes those in exile such as refugees and migrants. In retrospect, this
study  argues  that  by  focusing  on  refugees,  the  venture  of  peacebuilding  interventions
scholarship should bring one back to the empirical contexts and the qualitative and lived
experiences  that  the  researcher  is  contending for. In  this  case,  the  researcher  brings  into
context the empirical and qualitative case of the role of Congolese refugees (in South Africa)
within the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. 
2.7 South Africa, Peacebuilding and Congolese Refugees 
Tonheim and Swart  (2015)   argue  that  the  DRC’s conflict  has  become one of  the  most
important  cases  for  gauging  the  capacity  and  the  will  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions on the African continent. According to Tonheim and Swart (2015), the way the
Syrian conflict has become gauge for the power of the military power of the US and Russia,
DRC’s conflict is to South Africa. While South Africa continuous to seek peace in the DRC,
at the same time, it is experiencing a high influx of Congolese refugees. This has made the
influx of Congolese refugees in South Africa not to be immune from scholars’ contestation.
While  a  number  of  scholars  have  paid  attention  to  the  capacity  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions on the continent (as shown in the preceding sub-section), there is
a growing scholarship on Congolese refugees in South Africa.  For instance, the works of
Bouillon (1996a&b) mainly focuses on discrimination Congolese and other Franco-phone
refugees undergo while settling in South Africa.   Other scholars like  Kadima, Denis and
Kalombo (1995) argue that it is a daunting task for Congolese refugees to get identification
documents in South Africa. This hampers their efforts of looking for work or doing business.
More recent works of Smit and Rugunanan (2014) argue that due to lack of identification
documents, refugees from the DRC, Burundi and Zimbabweans were interviewed between
running informal businesses and illegal hawking.  Similarly, very recently, Gordon (2014)
and Mondoko-Inaka argue that Congolese refugees migrate to South African urban centres
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for economic, political, cultural and psychological survival. Lakika, Kankonde and Ritchers
(2015) describe and analyse the psychological trajectories Congolese refugees undergo while
coping with their post-war suffering they harboured from the country.  Lakika,   Kankonde
and  Richters (2015) gave attention to the counselling services offered by an NGO (Centre for
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, CSVR) in Johannesburg and found out that that
many  Congolese  refugees  were  unaware  of  the  purpose  of  counselling.  “They  attended
sessions primarily with the hope that by doing so they could find ways out of their socio-
economic  plights  and  receive  referrals  to  urgently  needed  medical  services”( Lakika,
Kankonde and   Richters,  2015:xii).  In  relation  Congolese politics,  a group of  Congolese
refugees demonstrated at Luthuli House (African Nation Congress Headquarters) expressing
their disappointment with the Zuma regime over its apparent disinterest in the DRC post-
election stalemate in 2012 (Smit and Rugunanan, 2014)
In the context of Durban (location of this study), most scholarship present Congolese as the
biggest group among the refugee population (Sabet-Sarghi, 2000; Amisi, 2005;  Zihindula,
Meyer-Weitz and Akintola, 2015). For instance, the 2012 DHA Durban Refugee Reception
centre statistics shows that out of the 6412 new asylum seekers applicants 30% were from
DRC (Cohan, 2014). Majority of literature presents Congolese refugees in Durban as people
who are  concerned with  eking a  daily living. For  instance,  in  attempt  to  understand the
livelihood  strategies  of  Durban  Congolese  refugees,  Amisi  (2005:2)  established  that
Congolese in Durban formed social networks as their social capital. This has enabled them to
meet their day-to-day needs through easy access to additional resources. Still, Amisi (2005)
Congolese like any other refugees are considered to be a threat to the existing social fabric
and, consequently, they are not easily integrated in Durban by South Africans. According to
Amisi,  the  Congolese  refugee  community  revives  and  strengthens  the  existing  and  new
informal and formal social networks as a survival strategy in Durban. 
Most of the foregoing literature view and refract the Congolese refugees as those in need of
humanitarian assistance, psychosocial help, in need of a good reception in their host countries
and to be repatriated back to their homes at the end of the conflict. This has left them (the
subaltern refugee) vulnerable, both in the DRC and in South Africa, and to have no role in
peacebuilding of their country. Such arguments assume that all Congolese refugees are people
who are preoccupied with only the immediate concerns of supporting themselves and eking
out  a living while  in  South Africa.  Such studies lack the recognition that  there is  also a
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particular  group  of  Congolese  refugees  and  Rights  groups  (intelligentsia,  academics  and
activists)  whose  concern  is  a  better  DRC  and  an  all-encompassing  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding process in their country.
However, there is a small category of scholars who are showing how the Congolese refugees
in Durban are becoming involved in politics and peacebuilding of their country. For instance,
Khwela et al (2014) argues that there is a growing solidarity of Congolese  scholars, right
groups and activists  who are concerned with good governance and an end to the DRC’s
conflict. In many instances, the preceding Congolese solidarity has come out and expressed
their  dissatisfaction  with South  Africa’s  lack  of  interest  in  interfering  in  the  DRC’s
governance and mistreatment of Congolese in South Africa. For instance, in 2014, Congolese
refugees in conjunction with Abahleli Basemjondolo (a civil society group that advocates for
the rights of shack-dwellers) demonstrated in Durban CBD to expose both South African and
international  agents  that  were perpetuating conflicts  in  the  DRC (Khwela et  al  2014).  A
similar  protest  had  been done  in  2002 during  the  first  ever  AU summit  at  the  Durban’s
International Convention Centre. During this summit, Congolese refugees demonstrated and
protested against the Rwanda’s interference in the internal affairs of DRC (Pan African News
agency, 2002).  Such demonstrations highlight the need for the involvement of Congolese
refugees residing in South Africa a chance to participate in the affairs of their country. In
most of their demonstration, the Durban Congolese refugees have argued that South Africa
was not concerned with the DRC’s governance and conflict.
Therefore, one can argue that the preceding demonstration proves  that there is a particular
groups of Congolese refugees whose are concerned with seeing a better DRC and an all-
encompassing South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in their country. This is paving way
for  new  research  on  the  role  of  Congolese  refugees  in  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC. As the strongest economy coupled with experience of a peaceful
transition  from apartheid to  democracy and a  culture of  respect  for  human rights,  South
Africa is  perceived by Congolese as a country that can be a tool  for peace in the DRC.
However, in relation to the DRC’s conflict, Gbaya (2015:57) argues that the rate and the level
at which South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is determined by the extent to
which  the  South  Africa’s  economic  interests  are  threatened.  Like  the  current  trends  of
interventions,  this  study  admits  that  South  Africa  has  narrowed  its  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC by focusing largely on how to ‘use short, medium and long-term
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processes  of  either  averting  or  rebuilding  war-affected  communities  so  as  to  reduce  the
likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war and/or  violence’ (Ramsbotham et  al.  2011:
199). In a similar vein, Shepherd (2014) suggests that the limited success of South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in  the DRC is  a result  of a  lack of  commitment  or a  lack of
adequate insight into the best possible way to bring about sustainable peace in the DRC.
Accordingly, Shepherd accedes that a true and lasting peace can only be emplaced in the
DRC  if  intervention  efforts  adopt  a  multilateral  approach  which  considers  all  parties
(implicitly refugees) in the peace building process. In relation to this study, one approach that
can be accentuated is the incorporation of the views of Congolese refugees in Durban with
the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. This study is of the view that most
scholars need to explore the attitudes and the perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards
South Africa’s intervention in the DRC on one hand, and on the other hand, to explicate the
capacity and the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
However, from the survey on literature,  the role  of Congolese refugees within the South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict  remains under-researched. Ones
argues, a study like this one: that explores the attitudes and perceptions of the Congolese
refugees towards South Africa and peacebuilding in the DRC, is valuable. While most of
scholars (as shown) assume that most Congolese refugees are people who are concerned with
immediate concerns of supporting themselves and eking out a living, the under-researched
role of Congolese refugees (in Durban) on South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in DRC
becomes  a  motivation  and  edifice  of  this  contemporary  study.  From  the  foregoing
discussions, a logical conclusion this study is founded on is that the analysis of the role of
refugees in peacebuilding interventions is dependent, not on humanitarian assistance received
from the host country, but on interrogating their lived experiences on the root causes of war
in their country as narrated by them. These are what have been lacking or less documented by
many scholars in relation to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As such,
this study bridges this scholarly gap. 
Therefore,  this  study’s  utilization  of  cosmopolitan  conflict  transformation  (CCTR)  and
realism  tenets  (as  discussed  in  the  next  chapter)  is  informed  by  a  quest  for  a  refined
understanding  of  the  role  of  Congolese  refugees  in  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions. This study applies some of the elements captured in this review section in its
explication of the role of Durban Congolese community. In view of the subject matter of this
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research, the study places emphasis on the role of Congolese refugees residing in Durban in
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Although the tenets of cosmopolitan
conflict transformation and realism paradigms may be trailed by contradictions and academic
controversy, the elements associated with a nuanced understanding of the preceding paradigm
will be useful parameters within which one can interrogate the South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC. As such, the study will potentially fill the gap left by preceding
scholars’ non-empirical  assumption on what  perception Congolese refugees  have towards
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. By gaining such vital insights and
perspectives from the Congolese refugees in Durban, this study will cast a more critical gaze
on what has motivated the lack of incorporation of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. In
the end, this links in general the subject matter of this study: South Africa and Peacebuilding
in the DRC; Probing the attitudes of Congolese refugees in Durban
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to interrogate and contextualize the literature on the South Africa
and peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: the role of refugees within the South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions. The section noted that most of works done by scholars contains
narratives  that  corroborate,  modify  or  rebut  the  role  of  refugees  in  peacebuilding
interventions. This has led to a robust scholarly debate about the nexus between refugees and
conflict transformation. 
This chapter examined this debate and highlighted the neglected realities of refugees’ role in
peacebuilding  interventions.  In  many  countries  that  have  experienced  war  are  greatest
contributors of refugees in South Africa and globally. 
However, the section noted many scholars have carried out theoretical studies that suggest the
difficulties that  refugees face while  in their  hosts’ countries,  particularly in  South Africa.
Such  difficulties  included:  humanitarian,  economic,  social,  physical  and  psycho-social
construction of their lives after war. However, the review of many of these literatures lacked
empirical backing of refugees’ role in peacebuilding interventions of their countries. Given
that refugees are party of the ongoing or ended conflicts either as victims or perpetuators,
they understand the dynamics of the root causes of wars in their countries. Therefore, there is
need to probe their  attitudes and perceptions towards peacebuilding interventions of their
countries.  In  doing so,  the  thrust  of  the  chapter  found out  that  experiences,  insights  and
arguments  of  empirical  realities  of  the  subaltern  Congolese  refugees  in  Durban,  can
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substantively contribute to the knowledge of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in
DRC and on the continent. The next chapter examines theoretical and analytical perspectives
of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism; combines scholarly narratives with the




THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction 
The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  attempt  critical  analysis  of  what  constitutes  peacebuilding
interventions  as  narrated  by refugees.  So  as  to  arrive  at  its  aim,  this  chapter  explicates
theoretical  frameworks  (conflict  transformation  and  realism  theory),  methodology  and
methods that were adopted in this study. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first
section  presents  cosmopolitan  conflict  transformation  (CCTR)  and  realism as  the  major
approaches  of  unpacking  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC.  Firstly,
CCTR is explicated as an intervention perspective that advocates for the transformation of
attitudes and relationships of all parties to the conflict: conflicting parties, non-combatants,
civilian,  refugees  and IDPs by use of bottom-up and top-down strategies.   Secondly, the
section contextualises realism as an international relation theory. According to Pugh, Cooper
and Turner (2016), by choosing to intervene- whether diplomatically or militarily in a conflict
state, an intervening country does so in pursuit of its interests which may include foreign,
economic and security interests.  While CCTR seeks to address and end the root causes of
conflicts in the DRC, realism explains the motives behind and why and whose interests South
Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC are serving. MacGinty and Richmond (2016) argue that it
is difficult to conceptualize national interests. This is because in collectives and institutions,
what appears as collective or institutional interest may be the interest of a segment within a
state (Nye et al, 2012: 10). For instance, what may appear to be national interest of South
Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC  may  be  the  interest  of  South  Africa’s
business class and elite.  According to  Iglesias (2014), it  is conceivable that a segment of
South Africa’s state and business actors actually benefit from the conflict in DRC.  Therefore,
the utilization of realism allowed the study to meet one of its objectives: to explore some of
the benefits South Africa can reap from its incessant peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
Similarly, realism justified this study’s aim as to why the inclusion of the Congolese refugees
within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC could promote the continental
interest of South Africa of being seen as a stable African country (Zuma, 2014).  
The second part of this chapter  presents  the  research design, methodology and methods of
analysis that were employed during the study. According to Silverman (2000), methodology
defines  how  one  will  go  about  studying  the  phenomenon  while  the  methods  are  the
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techniques that are used to collect the data. The idea in this section is to explicate how data
was obtained during fieldwork, sampled, presented and to situate the data in the context of
the discussion in preceding theoretical chapters. 
This study was done qualitatively by exploring and discovering what attitudes, concerns and
perceptions refugees have towards an intervening state’s peacebuilding interventions in their
country in a way that generates “rich data” (Domegan and Fleming, 2007;  Hopkins, 1980).
As  qualitative  research,  this  study  is  offering  a  “close-up”  data  analysis  of  phenomena
(attitudes  of  the  Congolese  refugees  towards  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions)
(Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:152). The strength of a qualitative research like this one is that it
allows the researcher to explore a complex phenomenon (the role of the Congolese refugees
in  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  mission  in  the  DRC) in  a  holistic  fashion (Thomas  and
Magilvy, 2011:152). In end, it addressed the tendency of the researcher to impose personal
assumptions  or  biases,  conclusions  and  results  from the  data;  thus,  it  obviated  a  priori
conclusions (Wiersma, 1995: 211-212). 
The  third  section  of  the  chapter  is  an  explication  of  data  analysis  methods  and  ethical
considerations made throughout the study. The ethical considerations guiding this study were
embedded in protecting the autonomy of the participants and ensuring that they were well
informed during the collection of data. The study was also based on the beneficence of the
treatment  of  participants  (Creswell,  2012:22).  Beneficence  insists  on  maximising  good
outcomes while minimising risks for the participants.
Finally, the chapter looks  at data analysis with a view to systematically search for meaning
(Onwuegbuzie  and  Leech,  2007).  When  the  data  collected  is  examined,  it  will  yield  a
coherent account of the findings (Green et al., 2007). Thus, analysis of data was engaged in to
establish findings on the Congolese refugees in Durban. The study used thematic analysis on
primary  data  and  content  analysis  on  secondary  data.  Both  methods  of  data  analysis
complemented each other to shape the evaluation of the comprehensive data collected. 
3.2 Major Theories upon which the study was adopted 
Conflict  transformation  and  realism were  the  two   theoretical  paradigms  that  this  study
adopted. The choice of the two theories was to assail the arguments of proponents of conflict
transformation and peace research like Galtung (1969), Kriesberg, (2004), Ledarach (2005)
and  Ramsbothams,  Woodhouse  and  Curle  (2011)  who argue  that  the  causes  of  war  and
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problems of sustaining peace are so complex that no single approach can be used to address
them. In choosing the two theories, the researcher aimed at using multiple cognate theories so
as to understand South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that  conflict transformation and resolution emerged as a
non-violent  response in  offering  ways  to  “resolving” rather  than  containing  or  managing
conflicts. However, there may be different ways and dimensions that Congolese refugees may
see as the immediate and proxy causes of war in the DRC. Although South Africa has a clue
on what precipitates war in the DRC, this study argues that by drawing from the insights of
the Congolese refugees, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict may
be enhanced.  This  may give South Africa a new approach of resolving and transforming
conflict in DRC and quite possibly elsewhere in Africa (see Adebayo, 2005:231). From a
realist  perspective,  however,  by choosing to  intervene  in  the  DRC’s conflict,  it  is  to  be
understood that South Africa would nevertheless work to protect its own sovereign interests -
whether through means that are economic or security or military. In situating why and whose
interest South Africa serves in its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, realism is a relevant
paradigm of explicating this.  Among other national interests of South Africa, is the problem
of  the  influx  of  refugees  (Mbeki,  2013).  Therefore,  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC can be argued to among many ways of having a stable and peaceful
DRC so as to reduce the influx of refugees. By having lasting peace in the DRC and other
war-torn African countries, South Africa will have a less influx of refugees and thus, be able
to focus on economic empowerment of its citizens.
3.2.1 Conflict transformation theory
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in intra-state conflicts, especially in
Africa (Lambourne, 2004:21) as a result of poor governance and frustration of the peoples’
basic needs (Connolly 2012). This has made many peace scholars to be preoccupied with the
quest  for  understanding  the  causes  and  non-violent  mean  of  ending  conflicts.  One  such
scholar was Johan Galtung (1964).  Galtung (1964: 432) is the first peace scholar to envisage
two descriptions of peace; negative peace (the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war),
and positive peace (conditions that are good for management, orderly resolution of conflict,
harmony associated with mature relationships,  gentleness,  and love)  (Boulding,  1978:  3).
This later led to the emergence of conflict transformation as a field of study and a profession. 
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As a  field  of  research  into  what  breeds  war  and  how to  non-violently  end  it,  Lederach
(1995b:17) argues that “conflict transformation emerged as a search for an adequate language
to  explain  the  peacemaking  venture”.  It  became  “a  relatively  new  invention  within  the
broader field of peace and conflict studies” (Botes, 2003: i. d.) and “a process that will make
up for the inadequacies of mere resolution” (Mitchell, 2002: 1). According to Galtung (1969),
effective conflict resolution and rebuilding peace in any conflict society requires engaging all
actors  of  the  conflict  (victims,  perpetrators,  society,  policy  makers)  (Staub,  2005:890).
Therefore, it emerged among conflict transformation theorists  like Miall (2005:4) that any
intervention in any conflict should surpass “reframing of position and the identification of
win-win outcomes”.  This is because, when violence or war breaks up, many strategies of
interveners tend to address antagonisms between top conflicting elites and militant group
leaders without addressing the root cause(s) of war; frustrated basic human rights and needs
(Sandole,2010:9). The preceding approach in resolution of conflict was referred to as liberal
approach which serves the interest of the powerful and in maintaining the status quo in a
conflict  society. Other  than  eliminating  the  root  causes  of  war, the  liberal  approach was
faulted for creating favourable conditions that endorsed a culture of violence. 
Auvinen and Kivimaki (1996:3) argue that in any conflict situation, peacebuilding interveners
should  seek  constructive  changes  rather  than  satisfy the  demands  of  the  warring parties.
According  Auvinen  and  Kivimaki  (1996:3),  there  are  other  casualties  that  are  more
fundamental to and involved in a conflict  than at  the level  of conflict.  Similarly, Spence
(2001:45) argues that conflict transformation should give interveners minds “that are flexible,
consultative and collaborative and that operate from a contextual understanding of the root
causes  of  conflict”.   Furthermore,  Miall  (2005:4)  contends  that  “conflict  transformation
should be a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses,
and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent
conflict”. By seeking to change “the conditions that give rise to the underlying root causes of
the conflict” (Diamond, 1994: 3), the rationale of conflict transformation is to prevent the
emergence or resurgence of conflict (International Alert, 1998: 28) and, at the same time,  “to
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promote nation and state-building15, reconciliation forgiveness and justice16, change agentry,
and social transformation” (Botes, 2003:i). 
Galtung (1964) in his founding  Journal of Peace Research was the first peace scholar to
make an attempt to develop a theory that could explicate an understanding on how to end
violent conflict. In his attempt, Galtung envisaged two descriptions of peace- that is, negative
peace as the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war and positive peace as conditions
that  are  good  for  management,  ‘orderly  resolution  of  conflict,  harmony  associated  with
mature relationships, gentleness, and love’ (Boulding, 1978: 3).  This led to the founding of
Positive-negative peace theory. Positive-negative peace theory bases its conceptualization of
conflict transformation on the understanding of violence as direct and indirect violence. It is
an expounded conceptualization of violence and hence has an expounded understanding of
peace. 
Galtung  saw peace  research  as  research  into  conditions  that  draw closer  to  peace  while
averting violence. This led him to conceptualize negative peace as the absence of violence
and positive peace as an integration of the human society (1964: 2). However, he argued that
these two dimensions of peace are inseparable; one leads into the other. Galtung argues that
negative peace is  characterized by ceasefires  or  what  we see when the world’s powerful
nations or the UN or NATO, equipped with their coercive military power, try to bring about
an end to war or violence. Although he does not advocate for coercion, he asserts that it may
lead to positive peace. Like Galtung, Sandole (2010:9) notes that “negative peace might be a
necessary condition for positive peace.  However, negative peace tends not to be sufficient.”
According to Sandole (2010), negative peace falls short of transforming deep-rooted causes
and conditions of conflict which might arise. This is because, when violence or war ends,
15 Nation-building is process of (re)building a common identity among citizens of a country
either  culturally or  politically  (Fukuyama,  2007:10).  State-building  is  the  process  of  (re)
building  legitimate  and functioning institutions  to  enable  a  country to  effectively deliver
economic, political and social service to its citizens. Nation and state building complement
each other (Fukuyama, 2007:10). 
16 Reconciliation is the mutual acceptance by groups of each other. It aims at changing the
psychological  orientation of the groups towards each other  after  massive violence (Staub
(2005).  Forgiveness is the means by which the wrongs committed to each other by former
antagonists   are sought to be moderated through truth telling (Tutu, 1999). Justice may mean
fairness in one situation while in another; it may mean a form of reconciliation (Ramsbotham
et al, 2011).
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many  strategies  of  conflict  resolution  tend  to  address  antagonisms  between  top  leaders
without addressing the root cause(s) of war (frustrated basic human needs). According to
Galtung,  effective  conflict  resolution requires  engagement  with all  actors  to  the  violence
(victim and perpetrators) with the society at  large, policy makers who shape policies and
governance of a conflicting society (Staub, 2005).
The  development  of  positive-negative peace  theory  was  inspired  by  the  health  sciences
whereby health can be seen as absence of disease as well as the capability of the body to
resist  disease. Galtung in positive-negative peace theory likens negative peace to curative
health  while  positive peace is  likened to  preventive health  (Galtung 1985).  According to
Galtung, peace research should concern itself on how to avert conditions or root causes of
that which breeds violence and conflicts and their relation to negative and positive peace:
structural violence  (Wolff and Yakinthou 2011).  Galtung (1990) in  positive-negative peace
theory is preoccupied with the notion of structural violence which he sees as a consequence
of  cultural  violence.  Galtung ruled out  the liberals’  just  war theory17 arguing that  it  was
violence committed by self-styled leaders in the world. Due to increased intra-state and inter-
state conflicts that were experienced in the 1990s, Galtung (1990:24) redefined violence as
‘the avoidable insults to basic human needs’. According to Galtung, violence runs from a
created  liberal  culture  of  violence  (cultural  violence)  to  socio-political  and  economic
structures that do not meet the basic needs of all (structural violence). This leads to war and
upheaval (direct violence). Therefore, structural violence exists when economic and social
conditions lead to loss of lives and sufferings as a consequence of the unequal distribution of
resources,  not  as  a  result  of  physical  violence.  This  led  to  the  development  of  conflict
transformation  theory as  “a process  of  engaging with  and transforming the  relationships,
interests,  discourses,  and  if  necessary,  the  very  constitution  of  society  that  supports  the
continuation of violent conflict” (Miall, 2005:4). 
In  dealing  with  the  effects  of  war,  conflict  transformation  should  seek  to  “address  the
underlying structures, agencies and practices within socio-political system that precipitates
violence” (Whetho,  2014:  117).  The task of  interveners  in  conflict  transformation should
17 Just war theory argues that there are cases where war is justified and permissible and gives
norms that justifies war and how soldiers ought to carry out a just war (Clark, 1988, Norman,
1995  and  Walzer,  1977).  In  his  support  of  just  war,  Brandt  (1972:  153)  uses  Winston
Churchill as an arbiter of just war theory. According to Brandt, Churchill justified obliteration
bombing as retaliation (1972:158).  
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transcend beyond issues of conflict to transform relationships between all conflicting/non-
conflicting parties. In doing so, peacebuilding interveners will be paying attention to structure
of  parties  and  relationships  that  may/not  be  embedded  in  conflict  and  those  that  extend
beyond the conflict (Miall, 2005: 4). Put vividly, conflict transformation is the “process by
which people change situations, relationships or structures so that they become less violent,
less  conflictual  and less  unjust”  (International  Alert,  1998:28).  The main  aim of  conflict
transformation is to address violence that runs from a created culture of violence (cultural
violence) to socio-political and economic structures that do not meet the basic needs of all
(structural violence).  Therefore, interveners should focus on structural violence that exists
when economic and social conditions that lead to loss of life and suffering, as a consequence
of unequal resource distribution, rather than as the sole result of physical violence (Galtung,
2001:24).  Doyle and Sambanis (2011:31) add that the success of conflict transformation is
determined by a multitude of elements that contribute to the enhancement of peace. These
elements  according  to  Ali  and  Matthews  (2004:12)  include;  negative  peace  (closure  of
violence), a healthy economy, resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, new political
institutions that are broadly representative, and mechanisms which deal with the injustices of
the past and the future. There is also a need for interventions that aim at healing traumas. This
is to ensure that there is a positive orientation between antagonistic groups after violence –
reconciliation (Staub, 2005:894).
Although the concept of conflict transformation emerged in the 1990s as the world witnessed
both intra and interstate wars, Ramsbotham et al. (2009: 22) argues that the emergence of
these  conflicts  opened  a  room for  a  need  of  transforming  and  (re)construction  and/or  a
(re)conceptualization of existing paradigms of intervention.  The aforementioned wars also
led to a numbers of peace scholars to argue that the “existing conflict resolution mechanisms
were ineffective in  confronting this  model  of conflict  development” (Ramsbotham  et  al.,
2009:  5).  While  advocating  for  the  traditional  conflict  transformation  and  resolution,
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2011) and Botes (2009) criticize a number of approaches for
resolving  conflicts  that  were  being  used  by  ‘liberal  interveners’.  “Modern  conflict
transformation strategies concentrate mainly on termination of war, drafting constitution and
electioneering without analyzing and understanding the deep-rooted causes of conflict and all
the affected parties” (Wellerstein, 2007:13). As a result, cosmopolitan conflict transformation
theory (CCTR) in the field of conflict and peace research was adopted. 
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3.2.1.1   Cosmopolitan Conflict Transformation Theory (CCTR)
Other than remaining within the realms of the traditional negative-positive peace and conflict
transformation  theories,  the  CCTR  is  a  more  comprehensive  structural and  systematic
approach  (Ramsbotham  et  al.,  2009:  23)  of  analyzing  the  attitudes  of  all  parties  to  the
conflict.  According  to  Botes  (2009),  Ramsbotham,  Woodhouse  and  Curle  (2011)  and
Ledarach (2010), CCTR is a framework that seeks to incorporate all parties to the conflict in
finding lasting peace to an on-going or previous conflict: conflicting parties, non-combatants,
civilian, refugees and IDPs by use of bottom-up and top-down strategies. CCTR advocates
that  people’s basic  needs  have to  be met  (culture of peace and,  reconciliation and peace
education) while the latter involves transformation of institutions and leaders. Involvement of
all stakeholders in a war-torn or post-conflict society brings lasting peace.
While advocating for CCTR, Ramsbotham et al (2011) and Lederach (2010) appeal back to
the  tenets  of  negative-positive  peace:  negative  peace as  the  absence  of  turmoil,  tension,
conflict and war and  positive peace as conditions that are good for management, ‘orderly
resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love’
(Boulding,  1978:  3  in  Makanda,  2014).  Wellerstein (2007) argues  that  any peacebuilding
interventions  should  put  into  consideration  the  following  three  approaches:  a)  conflict
dynamics, b) need-based conflict origins, and c) rational strategic calculations. In doing so,
the preceding CCTR will allow interveners to transform structural dimensions of a society,
oppression of people and ensure that that there is a more democratic society which supports
peace and social justice (Cannolly, 2012). Also, Kriesberg  (2004:35) argues that there is a
need for a CCTR strategy that addresses the complex environmental, communal and socio-
economic issues in maximizing mutual benefits to all groups that find themselves in conflict. 
According to Wolff and Yakinthou (2011), CCTR is long-term perspective of peace that seeks
to avoid intractable conflicts, transforming protracted conflicts into tractable ones.   It is a
theory that underscores the significance of “addressing the structural  roots of conflict  by
changing existing patterns of behaviours and creating a culture of non-violent approaches that
proposes an integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing about long-term changes
in personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions” (United States Institute of Peace,
2011: 15-16).  In the context of this study, CCTR is based on (re)constructive and long-term
development of peace and security in a divided society like the DRC. By seeking long-term
development, CCTR is a process of building peace, which, according to CARE International
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(2010: 7) recognizes and supports the central role played by local and international actors and
all  other  stakeholders  and  processes  that  are  deemed  necessary  in  ending  violence  and
constructively addressing both the immediate effects and structural causes of violent conflict
(Shulika, 2013:89).The fundamental principle of CCTR is to view conflicts in a holistic way
and “seek to  transform not  only the parties’ perceptions but  also the environment  within
which conflict occurs” (Whetho, 2014:123). According to Lederach and Maiese (2003: i. d.),
there are four central  modes that CCTR targets in any conflict.  These are:  personal/actor
transformation,  relational  transformation,  structural  transformation,  and  cultural
transformation. However, other scholars, Ramsbotham et al (2011) and Miall (2005: 10) add
context and issue transformations as the fifth and the sixth targets of CCTR as shown in the
table 4. 
Table 4.  CCTR Modes 
Adapted by the Author from Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Oliver (2011).
Mode Focus
Context transformation Changing  local,  national,  regional  and
international environment
Structure transformation change  from  asymmetric  to  symmetric
relations, power structures and root causes
of violence
Actor transformation Changes  of  leadership,  goals  and  intra-
party politics.
changes in party’s constituencies and actors
Issue transformation - transcendence of contested issues
- constructive compromise
- changing issues
- de-linking or re-linking issues
Personal/elite transformation - changes of perspective
- changes of heart
- changes of will
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- gestures of conciliation
From table 9 above, CCTR is a peacebuilding perspective that is geared towards a long-term,
structural and relational transformation in an ongoing or a past war. The strength of CCTR as
shown in the table 9 lies in its comprehensiveness, its emphasis on tackling the root causes of
conflict,  and  its  recognition  of  the  need  to  change  not  only  situations  but  also  people,
relationships,  structures  and  agencies  that  engender  conflict.  This  underscores  the
researcher’s  growing  scholarly  interest  in  applying  the  framework  in  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.
Over the years, as it is argued in chapter four, the DRC is a country whereby violence has
been used as a  tool  of  addressing conflicts.  In many intervention strategies in  the  DRC,
interveners  have  made  it  to  witness  many  transformational  processes  ranging  from
simplification to exaggeration, polarization to de-polarization, and escalation to de-escalation
of  conflicts.  As  a  perspective  that  explicates  the  various  impacts  and  factors  in  conflict
(historical legacies, agencies, structures, and relationships), CCTR furnishes the insights on
the role of Congolese refugees (residing in South Africa) in South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC.  
In this study, by highlighting South Africa’s peacebuilding initiative in the DRC using CCTR,
the researcher has generated new data and added to the existing discourses on the role of
refugees in conflict transformation. Boates (2009) argues that many interveners, negotiators
and peacemakers intervene in conflicts by offering mediations between key conflicting elites
while sidelining other minor groups. This sets new grounds for future conflicts (MacGinty
and Richmond, 2016). Within the DRC’s context, Nderitu (2013) argues that most efforts to
bring peace during the first and the second Congo wars involved reconciling top conflicting
elites. In the context of this study, the decision of most interveners to deal with  decision
making elites, opinion makers and influential figures in a conflict country, subverts the role of
refugees  as  an equally important  party to  the ongoing or  ended conflict  of their  country
(Richmond and Tellidis,  2014) This  study utilizes CCTR in showing how the views and
insights  of  the  Congolese  refugees  on  peacebuilding  can  serve  as  one  among  other
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alternatives contributing  to an effective South African intervention in the DRC’s conflict.
Also  CCTR is  used  as  perspective  that  is  vital  in  offering  some  explanation  as  to  why
exclusion  of  the  Congolese  refugees  just  like  any  other  groups  within  conflict  country,
foregrounds future conflicts. Therefore, through the tenets of CCTR, this study argues that
although Congolese refugees are non-state actors, their views on peacebuilding may enhance
South Africa’s interventions in the DRC’s conflict in one way or another. 
Scholars like Ledarach (2015) and Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) have used
CCTR approach to understand the role played by interveners among other actors that are
involved in  current  conflicts.  They have  not  used  this  approach in  analysing  the  role  of
Congolese refugees-residing in South Africa - in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in  the DRC. As such,  this  study is  aimed at  being a  potentially new contribution to  the
existing  literature  in  conflict  transformation,  particularly  in  unending  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC. As Isike and Okeke-Uzodike (2010: 683) argue, any peacebuilding
intervention should have the capacity to conceive of and engender meaningful responses that
are capable of resolving the incidence of violence and its recurrence in society.  
3.2.2 Realism: Explaining the interest of peacebuilding interventions
 As it is argued in chapter four, looking at both international and local actors’ interests and
behavior in the DRC from 1960 to 2014, it was evident that the interests of some social and
economic groups are changing considerably over time, prompting changes in behavior toward
peacebuilding intervention projects. This fluidity of interests in the DRC’s conflict presents
an important opportunity for South Africa to seek to promote the peace and rule of law in that
country.  This  does  not  rule  out  the  fact  that  South  Africa  does  not  have  other  national
interests in the DRC. It is through the tenets that such interests can be explicated.
Realism  has  endured  as  a  traditional  tenet  in  political  thought.  According  to  Baldwin
(1993:11) precursors of realism such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes among
many others emphasize the anarchic, self-interested and militaristic nature of the international
order  (Baldwin  1993:  11).   It  became prominent  as  response  to,  or  as  an  attack  on  the
perceived inadequacies, alleged failures and weaknesses of idealism18 (that had emerged at
18Idealism in international relations represents a set of ideas which together oppose war and
advocate the reform of international community through dependence upon moral values and
the development of international institutions and international law (Herz, 1951). 
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the end of the First World War) from preventing the re-occurrence of the Second World War.
The failure of idealism to avert the Second World War exposed idealism as a failed tool for
studying international relations. This led Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and Kenneth Waltz to
coin  realism as  a  new perspective  of  studying  international  relations  (Hollis  and  Smith,
1990:21). 
According to Donnelly (2002), realism is based on two core assumptions. Firstly, it assumes
that people are essentially selfish and competitive, egotistic (concern for one’s own interests
or wellbeing, or selfishness; the belief that one’s own interests are morally superior to those
others). According to realism, states are composed of, and led by, people who are inherently
selfish, greedy and power-seeking meaning that state behaviour cannot but exhibit the same
characteristics. This is also a defining characteristic of human nature that had been advocated
by Thomas Hobbes. Secondly, realism contends that the state-system operates in a context of
international anarchy (lack of central government in the international system), in a sense that
there is no authority higher than that of states (Morgenthau, 1948: 75). From the preceding
assumption  realists  maintain  that  no  form  of  world  government  can  ever  be  created:
international relations is in effect conducted in an international state of nature. Realists view
states as coherent and cohesive units and regard them as the most important actors on the
world stage. This is why according to realists the international system is characterized by an
irresistible  tendency towards conflict (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,  1981:189).  As a theory,
realism  identifies power, national interests  and state survival as crucial  in the analysis  of
interstate relations (Clapman, 1996:230).
According to realism, any international interactions between states19 are simply guided by the
laws  of  nature  (anarchy).  In  these  interactions/dealings  the  state  is  the  major  and  most
important actor of all. The works of Carr (1946: II) and Morgenthau (1948) shape a coherent
conception  of  the  claims  of  realism.  Carr  (1946)  argues  that  the  international  system is
defined by insecurities, uncertainties, tensions and selfish cooperation between states seeking
to maximize their  parochial  interests (Keohane and Martin 1995: 40). To expound Carr’s
view, Zachary and Masters (2013) cite the anarchic nature of the permanent members of the
United Nation Security Council (UNSC).  Zachary and Masters (2013) use the Syrian crisis
to contextualize how Russia, China and the USA are supporting different parties to the Syrian
19 State is a compulsory political organization with a centralized government that maintains a
monopoly of  the  legitimate  use  of  force  within  a  certain  territory (Weber,  Lassman  and
Speirs, 1994).
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conflict in pursuance of their national interests. This is against the principle of impartiality
that is exemplified by the UNSC. The handling of the Syrian crisis re-echoes Morgenthau’s
view that “political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and
cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (Morgenthau, 1951:18).
From  the  preceding  paragraph,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  dealings,  interventions  and
cooperation between states and other international actors for instance,  the United Nations
(UN) is shaped and defined by and in terms of national interest: that is national power and
security  of  survival  (Morgenthau,  1948:  75).   Realism  upholds  that,  in  international
interactions, each state acts in accordance with its interests (whatever they are). Accordingly,
this makes states to be generally selfish in pursuing their interests (Donnelly, 2008; Goodin,
2010) while in a particular international cooperation.  Due to selfishness of the state system
and the conflicting interests among the actors, the international system becomes one which is
marked by constant struggles for dominance by one actor or a group of actors (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, 1981:189). Therefore, in realists’ view, power, national interests and state survival
are what  characterize interstate  relations (Heywood, 1997:142;  Hoffman, 1999: 241-250).
Furthermore, realism advocates that some nation states may sometimes break international
guiding principles in pursuing and safeguarding their national interests which to some extent
may be for public benefit. Even in cases where states act unselfishly towards each other, they
are  inclined  to  pursue  parochial  objectives  which  they  often  explain  as  their  “national”
interests’ (George and Keohane, 1980:260). 
Contextualised in Africa, the common challenge involved in intrastate conflicts is evident in
the fact that internal conflicts are raising concerns around refugee flows, arms proliferation
and the  growth of  organized  international  criminal  enterprises  and terrorist  organizations
(Bizos 2011: 2). For instance, the Somalia conflict (by Al Shabaab) is adversely affecting the
security situation of Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea  (Ogola, 2012; Lockwood, 2011; Downie,
2011; Booth, 2005). The crisis in the DRC for instance, has spread its malevolent effects
across the eastern, central and southern African regions for over five decades (Reuter, 2013;
Thomson, 2013). The Somalia, Central Africa Republic, South Sudan and Burundi among
other  warring  nations  highlight  some  instances  where  internal  conflicts  in  Africa  have
metastasized into regional challenges. Within the umbrella of the UN or AU IGAD, SADC
among others (intergovernmental bodies that are expected to confront the security challenges
on the continent has been termed ineffective in carrying out this mandate (Murithi, 2012),
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some individual  African countries have taken dominance of using the foregoing IGOs to
intervene in some African conflicts.  For instance, Kenya has become the highest contributor
of troops that have intervened in Somalia under AMISON. Still,  due to its economic and
military advantage, Kenya has utilized IGAD and dominated in the affairs of the Great Lakes
region (Ogola, 2012). In so doing, Kenya has protected its national interests within the Horn
of  Africa  and  Great  Lakes  regions.  Similarly,  South  Africa  has  utilized  its  advantaged
position in Africa under the UN, AU and SADEC to continue intervening the DRC, CAR,
Lesotho and Zimbabwe (Thomson, 2014). In this context, it is the insecurities, uncertainties
and tensions that the preceding African conflicts pose to Kenya and South Africa that have
made the preceding countries to intervene as a way of protecting their national interests. 
According  to  Mearsheimer  and  Walt  (2013),  in  most  cases,  realism sees  state’s military
capability as the most  vital  intervention strategy in achieving any national  interest  of an
intervening state (Dougherty, Robert  and Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84). For instance, the US and
NATO have  been  justifying  the  use  of  military  force  in  Iraq  in  and  Afghanistan  so  as
safeguard the interests of the US and members of NATO. Waltz (2000: 67) further argues that
any  state  firstly  seeks  its  survival  from  physical  threat(s)  before  seeking  other  national
interests  (Mearsheimer and Walt,  2013).  In the context of this  study, this means that any
state’s decision to undertake peacebuilding intervention (either militarily or diplomatically,
whichever the case) does so in pursuing its interests. From a realist perspective, the success
of any state’s peacebuilding intervention in any conflict, asserts, preserves and improves the
powers of an intervening state. At the same time any failure of peacebuilding intervention
could weaken and ruin the power of an intervener (Morgenthau, 1951:27). In peacebuilding
intervention  as  the  study  outlines,  the  exercise  of  power  by  intervening  states  includes
military,  economic  and  technological  capability.  It  is  the  foregoing  powers  that  shape
peacebuilding interventions, actions and behaviours of the intervener. 
A substantive approach that can be used to analyse South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention
in  the  DRC’s conflict  from a  realist  perspective  is  to  situate  South  Africa’s intervention
efforts  in  the  purview  of  the  country’s  foreign  policy.  Gbaya  (2015)  for  instance,
conceptualizes South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy as one vital tool to addressing the
issue of poverty, promoting development internally and externally. The underlying rationale
here is the supposition that in dealing with the conflicts that surrounds it, South Africa will
undoubtedly be promoting its own prosperity. Thus, one correlation between South Africa’s
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peacebuilding intervention and promotion of interest hinges on the desire on the part of the
South African government to avoid a spill-over of the effects of the war in DRC in the form
of  the  incessant  influx  of  refugees  into  South  Africa  and  to  further  establish  itself  as  a
regional and continental hegemon. 
That is to say, South Africa through its intervention efforts seeks to promote her own interests
by ensuring a peaceful and stable DRC. As Gbaya (2015) argues that through its foreign
policy, “South Africa accords central importance to its immediate African neighbourhood and
the African continent”. Accordingly, the direction of South Africa’s foreign policy would be
to continually support (directly or indirectly), regional and continental processes that respond
to and resolve crises.  The preceding supposition does not intend to deny the conduction of
South Africa’s foreign affairs in the absence of ethical values. Lalbalhadur (2014) however
supposes that “foreign policy decisions are not simply a matter of applying ethics and values.
Rather,  these  decisions  are  often  complex  and  need  to  calculate  the  trade-offs  between
competing domestic and international imperatives, as well as short and long term interests”
(in Gbaya, 2015:14)
Again, another equally important way to sift out the presence of interests in South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC takes the shape of economic expansion. At the heart of
South Africa’s economic interests is a peaceful DRC. It is said that South Africa has more
regional  investments  than  any other  African  country,  with  a  reasonable  amount  of  such
investments in the DRC. Gbaya (2015) suggests that regional investments contribute about
1.8 trillion ZAR to the South African economy. With regards to its peacebuilding intervention
efforts in the DRC, Gbaya suggests that South Africa’s bid for political leadership in Africa,
its attempts at economic integration and expansion “has consistently implied that it should
help resolve African conflicts and play a more active role in peace missions” (2015:3). 
Supposedly, economic prominence stems from a political and military presence; the realists
view that  a  salient  intent  for  the  promotion  of  interests  precedes  a  country’s decision  to
intervene in another country’s conflict (Coates, 2013). The Inga Dam, agriculture and the
abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights,
further support the realists’ view that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is
driven primarily by interests. Effectually, Gbaya (2015:15) emphasizes that “South Africa
determines its policies towards the DRC according to its national interest  or its role as a
champion of Africa in the handling of crises”. Therefore, South Africa’s approach to the DRC
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crises cannot be contrary to its national interest. As it stands, inter alia, and to mention just a
few,  “South  African  businesses  in  the  DRC  are  G4  Securicor,  African  Explosives  and
Chemical Industries Limited, SRK Consulting, Standard Bank DRC, Ruashi Mining, Hermis
Transport, Group Five, Vodacom, F.H. Bertling, AngloGold Ashanti, Shoprite, PG Glass, BSI
Steel, Motor Engineering, South African Express, South African Airways, Bell Equipment
and Global Paints and Chemicals” (cited in Gbaya, 2015:55-57).
So far, the realist perspective has been used to examine how interests (economic, security and
hegemonic) have been the guiding compass for South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. A
dearth of literature however exists as to the actual role or how the South African government
has made efforts to include the opinions of the Congolese refugees living in the country in the
peace  process  of  their  homeland.  Although  realism  has  not  been  utilised  to  show  how
refugees-who are not state actors- can influence South African foreign policies, this study
uses it to explicate reasons as to why South Africa needs to draw from their insights so as to
bring an end to decades of war in the DRC and to promote the current promising South
Africa’s economic interests in the Congo. An end to war in the DRC could position South
Africa among global powerhouses.  With the current talks of having a permanent African
representative at the UNSC, any approach that South Africa uses to bring an end to war in the
DRC and other  war-torn African countries will  make it  win the continental  support  as  a
permanent representative of Africa in the UNSC (Zuma; 2015). Therefore, this study argues
that  the  incorporation  of  Congolese  refugees’  insights  and  perspectives  within  its
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC holds key in understanding what breeds war in that
country and thus, gives South Africa a better chance of bringing an end to that conflict; it may
may give South Africa a continental support for its quest for a permanent position at the
UNSC and respect at the AU. By taking inventory of the Congolese attitudes towards South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, this study argues that the tenets of CCTR
will become the national interests of South Africa; it also assails realism. 
3.3 Research methodology and methods
There  are  three  major  approaches  in  which  social  realities  can  be  studied.  These  are;
quantitative, qualitative and a mixed method approaches. This study adopted the qualitative
approach in its  inquiry.  For Denzin and Lincoln,  (2005),  qualitative research involves an
interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter; it attempts to make sense of, or to
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them.   According to  Tsang
(2013), the aim of the qualitative approach is that it intends to explore and to discover issues
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about a problem. The underpinning rationale here is that very little knowledge is available
and there are different dimensions to this one problem. At the time when the study was being
undertaken,  there  were  no  updated  official  profiles  and statistics  of  views  of  Congolese
refugees  on  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC.  For  this  reason,  the
nature of this research demanded that the researcher takes an exploratory analysis.  Hence,
through  the  gathering  of  qualitative  data  from  observation  and  participant  observation
(fieldwork), interviews and review of documents, the study was able to observe this complex
phenomenon.  Still,  by carefully  exploring  it,  the  study was  able  to  describe  it  and  very
importantly make new discoveries. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) assert that qualitative research
places emphasis on the process of discovering how the social meaning is constructed and
accentuates the relationship between the investigator and the topic studied. 
As  a  qualitative  research,  this  study  broadly  sought  to  understand  the  social  reality  of
individuals and groups within a particular context (Sarantakos, 2005). That is to say that by
employing the use of the qualitative approach, the intention of the researcher is to explore
amongst other things the comportments, the perceptions and the experiences of people and
what shapes such. Essentially, the core of a qualitative research hinges on an interpretive
approach to  social  reality and in  the  narrative of  the  lived  experiences  of  human beings
(Creswell,  2009).  Due  to  the  divergent  ways  through  which  social  realities  can  be
approached, a primary task of a researcher would be to find the best way to design how to
approach the phenomenon they intend to explore. This can be realised by having an effective
research design that can discern the kind of evidence that is needed in order to adequately
address the research questions, objectives, and problem statement (Mouton, 2008:49).
Arguably, the value of a research design is such that it  ensures that whatever evidence is
gathered  in  the  course  of  an  inquiry  should  enable  the  researcher  to  effectively  answer
whatever questions the study intends to address (Creswell, 2013).  According to Yin (2013),
the focus of a research design is on the logical structure of a proposed inquiry. Implicit in the
preceding notion is the supposition that a research design does not refer to a mode of data
collection. It concerns itself with ensuring that a researcher asks the right questions so as to
gain the right answers. Gathering evidence requires a specification of the type of evidence
needed  to  answer  inter  alia, the  research  question,  or  to  accurately  describe  some
phenomenon. In other words, when designing research, we need to ask: “given this research
question (or theory),  what type of evidence is needed to answer the question (or test  the
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theory)  in  a  convincing  way” (Vaishnavi  and  Kuechler,  2015:25).  Therefore,  a  research
design affords researchers with the acuity of what evidence they need to gather in response to
their research questions and objectives.
This study was done qualitatively through an exploration of views, insights and attitudes of
Congolese refugees - in Durban - towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC’s conflict. It was done in a manner that it generated “rich data” (Domegan and Fleming,
2007) for the subject under investigation. In using a qualitative approach, the researcher was
able  to  explore  this  complex  phenomenon  (the  role  of  the  Congolese  refugees  in  South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is the DRC) in a holistic fashion (Magilvy, 2011:152). In
addition,  it  addressed  the  tendency of  the  researcher  to  impose  personal  assumptions  or
biases, conclusions and result from the data – thus, it obviated a priori conclusions.
3.3.1 Case study methodology 
This study adopted a qualitative case study approach.  According to Pamela Baxter and Susan
Jack (2008), a qualitative case study methodology allows one phenomenon to be explored
and understood from multiple facets or lenses. In other words, it  is ‘a strategy for doing
research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon
while  using multiple  sources  of evidence’ (Hsieh,  2004). According to Simons (2009:21)
“case  study is  an in-depth  exploration  from multiple  perspectives  of  the  complexity and
uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a ‘real life’
context”. Similarly, Roberts et al (2004) posit that in a case study, the intent is to provide a
‘telling case’ out of which theory, concepts and hypotheses can be drawn. Insights from these
studies can then be transferred to other situations where similar conditions exist (Roberts et
al. 2004). In Yin’s (2013:25) view, a case study analysis is described as an “empirical enquiry
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. Especially when the
boundary between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and it relies on multiple
sources of evidence”.  Similarly,  Tsang (2013) submits that  the value of using case study
analysis hinges on the fact that the researcher investigates predefined phenomena and has no
power to manipulate variables. The main objective of case study analysis is the focus it places
on investigating phenomena within its context.
From the preceding positions, it can be postulated that one merit of using case study is that
“the  in-depth  approach  taken  in  case  studies  means  that,  by documenting  and analysing
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developments as they occur, it  is  possible  to provide timely insights  into the factors that
researchers consider to be critical to the outcomes of the ‘case’ under examination” (Moriarty,
2011:16).  In  exploring  the  attitudes  and  the  views  of  Congolese  refuges  towards  South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, this study firmly posits that the use of a case
study will enable it to “document multiple view points and highlights areas of consensus and
conflict” (Moriarty, 2011:17). Another advantage of adopting a case study analysis is that it
makes the research design more precise, manageable, credible, concentrated, and practical.
Additionally,  and  in  concurrence  with  some  (Simons,  2009;  Moriarty,  2011)  of  the
aforementioned positions, a case study analysis also accords the researcher an opportunity to
identify substantial resource materials for the study. 
Durban was chosen as the study location. According to Lindau (2013) most migrants in South
Africa settle in the major cities such as Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. This study
was initially planned to be carried out in Johannesburg. Johannesburg unlike Durban hosts
the highest number of refugees and immigrants from all over the world including Congolese
refuges. Due to technical and logistical constrains, Durban was chosen as the second city with
the highest population of Congolese refugees. Therefore, the researcher hastens to point out
that the cases selected for this study are not representative of the entire Congolese refugees in
South  Africa  but  act  as  an  instrumental  case  study.  Creswell  (2012:465)  states  that  an
instrumental  case  ‘serves  the  purpose  of  illuminating  a  particular  issue.’  Thus,  an
instrumental case provides insight into a subject under study.  
3.4 Sampling 
According to Cohen et al (2007) sampling in relation to appropriate research methodology
determines the quality of  any study. This  means that  researchers  ought  to  choose a  well
calculated sampling criterion and  be guided by the principle so  that his/her study sample
does not necessarily represent the ‘undifferentiated’ or wider population (Cohen et al., 2007).
In the context of this  study, the researcher obtained the views of 58 Congolese refugees.
Although 58 participants may be viewed as a small sample, given the narrative nature of this
study, it had the potency of producing a representative view of the entire Congolese refugees
(Charmaz, 2012:21). Although it can be argued that 58 participants cannot  represent all the
views  of  Congolese  refugees  in  South  Africa,  the  sample  chosen  yielded  the  required
empirical data on the role of refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC.  Still,  Babie  and Mourton (2012) argue that qualitative  research is  not  to  base its
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analysis of data on statistical suggestion as those demanded by a quantitative inquiry. This is
in tandem with “the tradition of qualitative research which tends to focus on  meaning and
motivation that  underlie  understandings  of  processes  in  the  social  world”  (Kalof  et  al
2008:79).  In  this  study,  the  selection  of  sample  did  not  intend  to  meet  numerical
representativeness of the Congolese refugees in Durban and mostly, South Africa. Reason
being that the research was exploring a particular social context: how the views of Congolese
refugees can contribute towards a more comprehensive and all-encompassing South African
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.  
In this study, the researcher favoured purposive sampling which consisted of intentionally
selecting Congolese refugees who met the set requirements (Babbie and Mouton, 1998: 166;
Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie, 2012). Creswell (2012:206) posits that the standard for choosing
a sample through purposive sampling is whether they are ‘information rich.’ Tongco (2007)
asserts that purposive sampling is a deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the
informant possesses. In this study the obvious quality that was used was the participants’
awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions of ages between 18 and 70. It was
based  on  the  foregoing  purposive  sampling  criterion  that  the  researcher  deliberately
considered Congolese academia, civil rights activists, former government soldiers and rebels
with less consideration of street vendors whose most concern was to eke out a living. The
study assumes that the educated category or civil rights activities are more aware of South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. 
3.5 Data collection 
In  qualitative  research,  data  collections  involve  obtaining  intricate  details  about  a  social
phenomenon.  This  includes  observing  feelings  and  thought  processes  of  participants
(Creswell, 2012). So as to achieve the foregoing details from the participants, the researcher
used three qualitative methods of collecting data to probe the views of Congolese refugees on
South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC; personal  interviews,  focus  group
discussions, general participant observations and review of relevant documents
3.5.1 Personal interviews 
As  a  method  of  data  collection,  interviews  allow  researchers  to  study  experiences  and
meanings as accounted for by the participants.  Kumar (2005: 127) posits that the choice of
interviews is determined by at least three criteria: the “nature of the investigation” (that is, the
sensitive nature of issues involved); the “geographical distribution of the study population”;
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and  the  “type  of  study population.”  The  researcher  favoured  the  use  of  interviews  over
questionnaires because this study primarily aimed at understanding the opinions of Congolese
refugees whom it purposively located as participants (Congolese refugees who are academics
and those involved in informal employment).
By  using  interviews,  the  researcher  was  able  to  mitigate  the  problems  of  “limited
administration/application, low response rate and limited opportunity to clarify issues/views
that  questionnaires  could  have  accorded this  study”  (Kumar,  2005:  114). Also,  by using
interviews as a method of data collection, the researcher was able to give each participant (in
the selected sample) an opportunity to narrate his/her views in his/her own words about South
Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the DRC. 
Before  interviews  commenced,  Congolese  refugees  who  showed  interest  and  met  the
sampling criteria were given a consent form which included details of the intended study and
the descriptions of the research. The researcher strove to recruit Congolese refugees from all
walks  of  life  as  its  participants:  academics,  activists,  business  owners  and  those  in
employment-self or in organizations. However, the study was biased towards the views of
Congolese  intelligentsia,  academics  and  rights  activists  because  the  nature  of  interview
questions  demanded specific  background and knowledge of  South  Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC’s  conflict.  However,  this  did  not  mean  that  the  researcher
discredited the views of other participants; who were more preoccupied with their immediate
daily needs what South Africa was doing in the DRC. Also, all participants were informed on
the nature of the interview and were informed that no money or any other incentive was to be
given to participants to take part in this study
While  preparing  for  this  study,  the  researcher  had  sought  to  garner  the  views  of  60
purposively  sampled  Congolese  refugees.  However,  during  this  study,  the  researcher
managed to garner views from 58 Congolese refugees.  Interviews took three forms; face-to-
face,  telephonic  and  electronic.   It  was  face-to-face  interviews  that  enabled  a  deeper
exploration  and  engagement  with  issues  pertaining  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC’s conflict. All in all, whether face-to-face, telephonic and electronic,
most interviewees’ responses to questions offered personal insights that the researcher could
not obtain during focus group discussions or general participant observation.
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So as  to  gain  deep understanding  of  participants’ views,  the  researcher  made  interviews
informal. This allowed participants to narrate their views with ease. Subsequent interviews
were also done. However, subsequent interviews depended on the information provided in the
first one. In all interview sessions the researcher restricted interviews within a particular time
frame (45 minutes-long personal interviews). 
3.5.2 Focus Group Discussions 
Focus groups discussions are of immense utility in the collection of qualitative data. This is
because, they allow participants in the course of interactions with one another to articulate
ideas and arguments that might not have emerged during personal interviews. Fontana and
Frey (1994: 364-365) argue that it is necessary for a focus group to be small and to include
individuals from different fields or “walks of life”- that is, if the subject matter of the study
permits (Babbie and Mouton, 1998: 166; Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie, 2012). In this study, the
researcher re-grouped participants whom he had interviewed into 6 focus discussion groups.
The reason for using same participant as those used in interview was to address the question
of a new recruitment strategy and to validate some of the views that had been garnered during
personal interview sessions. 
Initially, each focus group discussion comprised 10 participants. In most of the focus group
discussions, different sessions were moderated by a participant who was unanimously elected
by the  group.  This  allowed  the  researcher  to  be  a  participant  and not  a  moderator. The
researcher intervened on situations where there was a need for clarity and in situations where
discussions  became  disruptive  and  chaotic.  The  researcher  organized  two  sessions  each
lasting for an hour. During the focus group sessions, the researcher was subsequently tape-
recording  and  transcribing  the  proceedings. In  sum,  the  focus  group  discussions
complemented other data collection modes, namely interviews and document review. One
challenge that the researcher experienced during focus group discussion was disagreement
among participants which disrupted the rest of the session. Focus group discussions became a
basis on which the researcher drew some themes (see the theme on participants’ region of
origin in the DRC). It became evident that while Congolese refugees are away from home,
the communal identity that characterize the realpolitik of the DRC exists among them.
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Table 5. Focus Groups distribution 




D 11 2016 
Total 35 
According to table 5, two focus groups were held in 2015 and the other two held in 2016 with
Congolese  academics,  activists  and few from informal  sector  in  the  city of  Durban.  The
researcher had hoped to carry out six focus groups comprising 10 participants each. However,
focus groups that took place comprised of 9, 8, 7 and 11 respectively as shown in table 5. In
total  35 persons -  comprising of  Congolese  academics,  rights  activists,  professionals  and
business persons – participated in the focus group discussions
3.5. 3 General Participants Observation 
As a methodological approach, 'participation/observation' affords meaningful, usually first-
hand, information.  It serves as both an approach to enquiry and as a data gathering tool.
During  the  period  of  this  study  (2015-  2016),  the  researcher  visited  and  resided  along
Mahatma Gandhi and Russel streets (Durban CBD) - where some Congolese families are
residing - on five occasions: 1 week per month. Also, during focus group sessions (organized
with the help of one key informant), the research could observe the behaviours of participants
as they interacted. 
3.5.4 Review of Document and Scholarly Articles 
This  study  also  garnered  data  through  review  of  relevant  documents  on  the  subject.
Documents  that  were  reviewed  included  formal  policy  statements  of  the  Department  of
International  Relations  and  Cooperation  in  relation  to  South  Africa’s  foreign  policy  on
African conflicts. Newspaper articles and radio interview transcriptions were also reviewed.
Other sources of secondary data for this study comprised books, journal articles, magazines,
newspapers, government legislations/reports, company reports, UN reports and the internet.
The  internet  served  as  an  invaluable  source  of  information  for  the  study  given  the
contemporary nature of the subject matter of the study and the typically dramatic manner in
which events unfold in the DRC. These secondary sources provided extensive bibliographic
and contextual information that complemented the primary sources of data, thus illuminating
the study.
74
All the foregoing data-gathering tools will provide the study with a fairly sufficient pool of
information  for  garnering  the  attitudes  of  the  Congolese  refugees  towards  South  Africa's
conflict resolution strategies and policies in the DRC.
3.6 Analysis of Data  
In analysis, the researcher brings order, structure and meaning in the data obtained. During
this process, pertinent themes and patterns are identified within the collected data (Ngulube,
2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In this study, content and narrative analysis were the main
processes that were used to bring order, structure and meaning to garnered data. Content
analysis is defined as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically
identifying  specified  characteristics  within  a  text"  (Krippendorff,  2004:  9).  Lasswell
(1949:120) says that content analysis seeks to find out “who says what, to whom, why, to
what extent and with what effect?” Weitzmann further observes that “in any content analysis,
the task is to make inferences from data to certain aspects of their context and to justify these
inferences  in  terms  of  the  knowledge about  the  stable  factors  in  the  system of  interest”
(Weitzmann,  1995:95).  Content  analysis  in  this  study will  mean that  data  be transcribed,
coded and presented  under  emerging themes.   This  means the  analysis  of  information is
conveyed in various forms so that the researcher may be able to situate data in the research
context. A key to doing this was to delineate the object of inquiry (Altheide, 1996: 14), and to
situate the data in the context of the main aspects of this study.
Narrative analysis is a method whereby researchers give emphasis on the content of a text,
“what” is said more than “how” it is said, the “told” rather than the “telling” (Riessman,
2005:3) to find a common thematic element across research participants as they narrate and
respond  to  interview  questions  (Langellier,  2001:  700).  In  this  study,  narrative  analysis
involves  making sense  of  what  Congolese  refugees  narrated during interviews and focus
group discussions. 
For the purpose of this research, analysis was performed relative to and justified in terms of
the context of data.  The following basic concepts offered a conceptual framework within
which the researcher’s role was represented: the data as communicated to the researcher; the
context of the data; how the researcher’s (analyst’s) data partition researcher’s reality; the
target of the content analysis; inferences as the basic intellectual task; and validity as ultimate
criterion  of  success.  The  preceding  framework  was  “intended  to  serve  three  purposes:
prescriptive, analytical and methodological” (Babbie, 2007:95); prescriptive in the sense that
it guided “the conceptualization and the design of practical content analyses for any given
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circumstance”  (Babbie,  2007:95);  analytical  in  the  sense  that  it  facilitated  the  critical
examination of context analysis results obtained by others; methodological in the sense that it
directed “the growth and systematic improvement of methods for content analysis” (Babbie,
2007: 95). 
3.7 Reliability and validity 
In  this  study, validity and reliability was realised  using  Lincoln  and Guba’s (2000)  four
constructs;  credibility,  dependability,  transferability,  and  confirmability.  Credibility  was
demonstrated  through the  presentation  of  a  full  account  of  this  study in  a  very accurate
manner. The  researcher  achieved  dependability  through  keeping  and  maintaining  a  clear
account of the data analysis process of this study. Since the researcher viewed peacebuilding
intervention as a  variegated process,  he was aware that  some questions  could have been
answered differently if they were to be asked by another researcher. Therefore, the researcher
respected  the  fact  that  participants  can  change  their  minds  at  any  given  moment.
Dependability  of  this  study  was  achieved  by  the  purposive  nature  of  the  sample  of
participants selected: the researcher selected participants that he considered enlightened about
the subject under investigation. In relation to transferability, the researcher ensured that the
findings  of  this  study can  be  applied  to  other  contexts:  context  in  which  peacebuilding
interveners  can  draw  from  the  knowledge  of  refugees  on  their  country’s  conflicts.  For
instance, the findings of this study can be applied to peacebuilding interventions in South
Sudan, CAR and Syria among other conflict-prone countries. In the foregoing assertion, this
study does not generalize its findings but it is adding to a scarce body of knowledge on the
role  of  refugees  in  peacebuilding  interventions.  Confirmability in  this  study ensured that
researcher reflects the actual responses of participants. 
Being  an  international  student  and  coming  from a  country  that  is  marred  with  identity
conflicts,  the  views  of  some  the  participants  of  this  study  documented  the  researcher’s
subjective self in this study. The researcher hails from Kenya, a country that is yet to heal
from the impacts of 2007/8 post-election violence.  For instance, on 29th December 2007,
Kenya was marred with violence in different  parts  after  the announcement of the former
President, Mwai Kibaki as the victor in a disputed general election (Hansen, 2013).  Branch
(2011) argues that the 2007/8 Post-election Violence (PEV) was an insurrection of a section
of some Kenyan communities registering their discontent with the Kibaki regime. Mwakilishi
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(2012)  and  Goldsmith  (2012) argue  that  the  heart  of  the  2007/8  PEV in  Kenya  was  a
consequence  of  structural  injustices:  communal  deprivation,  economic  and  political
marginalization  of  other  communities  practiced  by all  post-colonial  regimes. Participants
selected in this study yielded  enormous data as some of their views confirmed or refuted
some scholarly claims on the causes of war in the DRC (Malterud, 2001:333; Stearns, 2012 ).
This aided this study to realize its research question on what Congolese refugees consider to
be proxy and immediate causes of war in the DRC.
3.8 Conclusion 
This  chapter  critically  discussed  conflict  transformation  (CCTR)  and  realism as  relevant
lenses through which data of this study can be refracted for analysis. According to CCTR,
interveners not only need to end wars but also address the sources and causes of the situation
that breeds conflicts. Interveners should also necessitate conditions for transforming attitudes
and relationships between all actors in a conflict by use of bottom-up and top-down strategy.
In the former, people’s basic needs have to be met (culture of peace and peace education)
while  in  the  latter, institutions  within  a  conflict  country enjoy more attention (Lederach,
2015).  The chapter  unpacked the idea of conflict intervention using cosmopolitan conflict
transformation theory (CCTR): an expounded model of conflict transformation theory which
has its root in negative-positive peace model (Galtung, 1969).  
Firstly, the chapter made a case for CCTR due to its strengths. It was noted that CCTR differs
with some contemporary conflict transformation strategies that are modelled on liberal peace.
This renders their  approaches inadequate to deal with all  actors in a conflict  situation.  A
distinguishing element of CCTR perspective to other conflict transformation paradigms is the
idea  that  it  emphasizes  an  orderly  resolution  of  any  conflict  and  that  peacebuilding
interventions should undergo several processes or ebbs and flows depending on the interests
and actions of belligerents, (non)armed groups and interveners. In addition, CCTR advocates
the replacement of structures and conditions that breed violence/war with those that build
sustainable  peace.  CCTR  is  of  utility  to  this  study  in  the  context  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  ebbs and flows that  have  characterized  conflicts  in  the
DRC. 
For the purpose of providing a holistic framework of understanding the interests of South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, the chapter unpacked the tenets of realism.
This  study  noted  that  in  its  traditional  conceptualization  realism  considers  Congolese
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refugees as non-state actors who probably have no role in peace building. In its peacebuilding
interventions, South Africa is seeking for a stable DRC so as to pursue its economic and
security interests. One way of looking for solution for a peaceful and stable DRC according
to this study, is for South Africa to draw on the insights and views of Congolese refugees as
part  of its  peacebuilding intervention.   An end to the DRC’s conflict  will  position South
Africa among other  global  powers and in claiming status at  the UNSC and AU.  Whilst
literature  on  realism  tends  to  ignore  non-state  actors,  this  study  sees  incorporation  of
Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict as one among
many ways of realising some of South Africa’s national interests globally.  Using the realist
paradigm as a theoretical tool of analysis, the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation
are assailed by realism 
Finally, the chapter discussed research design, methodology and methods, data analysis and
presented  Congolese  refugees  in  different  themes.  The  chapter  justified  the  use  of  the
qualitative case study methodology for this study.  Purposive sampling was used to select the
participants of this study. Through purposive sampling, the researcher selected an information
rich  sample:  Congolese  refugees  that  were  cognizant  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC.  Personal  interviews,  focus  group  discussions  and  general
participant observation were used to garner data. Data garnered was analysed through content
and narrative analysis and presented using different themes; gender, age, educational levels,
marital status and their different political and ideological comportments. In summary, data
garnered was dissociated from sources (both primary and secondary).  
Therefore,  one notes that  the background and research problem (Chapter one),  review of
relevant literature on interface between refugees and conflict transformation (in Chapter Two)
and analyses of conflict transformation and realism and methodology in this chapter (Chapter
Three) provides the backdrop for exploring the views and attitudes of Congolese refugees in
Durban (location of this  study)  towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in  the
DRC’s conflict. However, before an explication of the views of the Congolese refugees, it is
important  that  a  historical  perspective  of  peacebuilding  be  re-echoed.  The  next  chapter
presents the historicity of the DRC’s conflict and peacebuilding interventions. A historical
perspective  of  peacebuilding  interventions  aids  this  study  to  locate  the  views  of  the




THE HISTORY OF PEACEBUIDING INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: FROM 1960 TO 2014
4.1 Introduction
As it was argued in the background chapter, the condition of war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) is not a new occurrence. The country has been engulfed in violent inter and
intra state conflicts despite efforts by local and international actors to solve the conflicts after
DRC’s independence. This has resulted in the current ranking of Central Africa and the Great
Lakes  region  as  among  the  United  Nations  populations  of  concern,  with  the  DRC
contributing over 1.2 million refugees and almost 27,000 asylum seekers, 108,000 returnees
and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (UNHCR Global Report, 2014).
While  the complexity of  the wars  in  DRC is  grounded in  many factors  that  include  the
legacies  of colonial  rule,  the divisions  of postcolonial  leaders’ dictatorship and autocratic
rule,  war in  neighboring countries such as the 1994 genocide in  Rwanda have had huge
impact, for example, the influx of Rwandan refugees to constant military excursions into the
DRC by Rwanda and wars  against  DRC with  Uganda,  Rwanda,  Angola,  Zimbabwe and
Burundi. Also, the DRC has several rebel groups, many of them ‘protectors’ of mines and
conduits of western powers (Autessere, 2006). 
This  chapter  gives  a  historical  development  of  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC’s
conflict  and  antagonisms.  The  assumption  in  this  chapter  is  that,  through  a  historical
overview of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC war which is multifaceted, the interests
of interveners in their quest for an all-encompassing conflict transformation strategy can be
understood.  The  chapter  begins  by  contextualizing  peacebuilding  and  interventions  and
peacebuilding  and conflict  transformation.  The  second  part  of  the  chapter  is  a  historical
exploration  of  DRC’s conflict  and South Africa’s peacebuilding  intervention  efforts  from
1996 to  2014.  In doing so,  the  chapter  provides  some explanations  to  the  causes  of  the
conflict and some peacebuilding interventions by referring to the different histories, regimes
and events that have characterized the present DRC. The chapter eventually looks at South
Africa as a major actor in the DRC’s peacebuilding interventions from 1996 to today. This is
an  attempt  to  locate  some  of  the  views  of  the  Congolese  refugees  on  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding initiatives within the larger context of the history of peacebuilding in the DRC.
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4.2 Peacebuilding interventions and conflict transformation 
Recently, most interventions and peace operations have emphasized peacebuilding in conflict
and  post-conflict  societies.  In  this  context,  the  dichotomy  between  interventions  (be  it
military or for humanitarian assistance) and peacebuilding has become fluid. On one hand, it
can be argued that peacebuilding interventions in a conflict or post-conflict situation can take
different forms. On the other hand, it can be said that peacebuilding interventions depend on
who the interveners and their interests in a post conflict situation are.   Du Plessis (2000:1)
contextualises intervention as any form of “interference of one state in the affairs of another
state  thereby  resulting  in  the  temporary  interruption  of  normal  bilateral  patterns  of
relationship between the two”. Leurdijk (1986:90) and Holsti (1995: 204) see intervention to
“designate  any  activity  that  deliberately  seeks  to  change  the  political  leader(s)  or  the
constitutional structure of a foreign political jurisdiction”. Intervention may take place in two
ways: 1) In a situation where an intervening state sets aside the existing relations with the
target state and puts all its efforts towards changing the political structure and authority of
that target state. 2) In cases where an intervening state seeks to preserve the existing political
structure and authority of the target state (Amer, 1994:5; Rousenau, 1968: 161-165). In most
cases  it  refers  to  unlimited  actions  that  may  be  undertaken  by  intervening  states  or
intergovernmental organization or sub-regional organizations for the maintenance of peace
and security (Du Plessis, 200:4; Rousenau, 1968:167).
From the foregoing, it seems that the concept of intervention covers a wide range of issues
and phenomena such as attempts by given states to change the internal political, economic,
military, and social structures of those target states with or without the consent of the target
states. Intervention can also refer to those actions undertaken by states or group of states with
the  approval  of  international  organisations  such  as  the  UN  Security  Council,  regional
organisations  such as  the AU and sub-regional  organisations  like  SADC. The underlying
factor is that these actions (whether coercive or non-coercive) will be in pursuit of given
objectives (as in the case of intervention by a given state) or regional or international values
such as restoration of democracy and peace (as in the case of intervention by multilateral and
regional organisations (Du Plessis, 2000:5 See also Schwarz, 1970:175-177).
For attainment of peace and order within the global scene,  intervention may be coercive,
humanitarian or peaceful. Coercive intervention refers to those actions undertaken by a state
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or a group of states in utilising the available conventional military arsenal such as battle
tanks, fighter aircraft and strategic, operational and tactical deployment of combat troops who
are expected to engage in coercive military action (Du Plessis, 2000:10; see also Kanter and
Bruce,  1994:14-15).  It  is  within this  coercive action where there is  movement of regular
troops or  forces  (airborne and water  borne)  of  the intervening states or states  from their
territory into the territory or territorial waters of the target state country, or “forceful military
action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some
political issue or dispute” (Pearson and Baumann, 1988:2). It is also important to note that
military intervention in intrastate conflicts involves the large scale troop deployment to either
stabilize  a  regime  against  anti-government  forces  or  to  overthrow  an  established  set  of
authorities. More often, intervention is the result of a crisis which calls for such an action;
troops are rapidly deployed and the insurgents or rebels are often caught by surprise (Holsti,
1995:206).
In humanitarian intervention, armed force by a state or states is used to protect the citizens of
the target state from pronounced human rights violations. The cases of UN and AU missions
in Darfur are notable examples of this type of humanitarian intervention. Whilst it may be
directed  at  a  given  regime  that  violates  human  rights  through  repression,  humanitarian
intervention  can  also  be  directed  at  non  state  actors  such  as  ethnic  groups  involved  in
genocidal  activities.  In  terms  of  definition,  humanitarian  intervention  thus  refers  to  the
limited use of force for altruistic reasons with a humanitarian objective (Du Plessis, 2000:12).
It also covers a broad scope of non-forcible action such as humanitarian assistance or relief
operations which complement peaceful interventions (Roper, 1998:208; Du Plessis, 2000:12).
These operations could include the distribution of food relief aid among others.
In the case of peaceful military intervention, there is non-use of combat and force. Military
forces are only deployed for the enforcement of peace (peacekeeping). Ramsbothams, Oliver
and Woodhouse (2011) argue that  peaceful intervention is  appropriate on three levels;  1)
when containing violence and preventing it from escalating into war. 2) To limit the intensity
of war once it has broken out and 3) to secure a cease fire. One good example is the recent
deployment of France soldiers to end the 2012 Malian violence.  Such deployments are often
carried out by multilateral security regimes such as the UN and related regional bodies like
the  AU  or  NATO  for  the  purposes  of  humanitarian  assistance  involving  peace  support
operations (Seawall, 1994:84-85; Du Plessis, 2000:10). Du Plessis observes that the role of
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the armed forces in peaceful military interventions would be to assist the vulnerable, that is
non-combatants  such  as  women  and  children,  and  to  help  maintain  the  ceasefire  while
negotiations among the belligerent  parties are  underway (Du Plessis,  2000:11;  Freedman,
1994:3). Non-combatants, especially women, children, the disabled, the poor and the elderly,
are more prone to the vicious effects of armed conflicts (The United Nations Office of the
Special  Adviser  on  Africa  2005:8). The  idea  of  employing  peacekeeping  troops  was
emphasised by then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992  Agenda for
Peace  which proposed that  collective security regimes such as  the UN Security Council,
NATO, the AU Peace and Security Commission, the SADC OPDSC should be the institutions
responsible  for  the  effecting  of  multilateral  peaceful  interventions  (Du  Plessis,  2000:11;
Ghali,  1992:78).  Ghali  advocated for  the  deployment of  peacekeeping troops by security
regimes  for  the  purposes  of  preventing  the  escalation  of  conflicts  which  could  lead  to
humanitarian catastrophes  such as  the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  Ghali  also proposed that
peacekeeping troops could be deployed for the purposes enforcing peace through forcible
military intervention (Ramsbotham, 1995:20; Evans, 1993:8-10).
In the context of this study, peacebuilding intervention is to be understood as any form of
intervention geared towards positive peace (be it coercive, humanitarian or peaceful); that is,
“orderly  resolution  of  the  conditions  that  give  rise  to  the  underlying  root  causes  of  the
conflict”  (Diamond,  1994:  3)  and in  preventing  the  emergence  or  resurgence  of  conflict
(International Alert, 1998: 28) and, at the same time,  to promote nation-building and state-
building20, reconciliation forgiveness and justice21, change agentry, and social transformation”
(Botes, 2003:i).  Although humanitarian intervention is sometimes regarded as being similar
to peacebuilding intervention, the difference between the two is that the former is undertaken
for humanitarian purposes (Du Plessis, 2000:12; Arend and Beck, 1993:112) while the latter
20 Nation-building is process of (re)building a common identity among citizen of a country
either  culturally,  politically  (Fukuyama,  2007:10).  State-building  is  the  process  of  (re)
building  legitimate  and functioning institutions  to  enable  a  country to  effectively deliver
economic, political and social service to its citizens. Nation and state building complement
each other (Fukuyama, 2007:10). 
21 Reconciliation is the mutual acceptance by groups of each other. It aims at changing the
psychological  orientation of the groups towards each other  after  massive violence (Staub
(2005).  Forgiveness is the means by which the wrongs committed to each other by former
antagonists   are sought to be moderated through truth telling (Tutu, 1999). Justice may mean
fairness in one situation while in another; it may mean a form of reconciliation (Ramsbotham
et al, 2011).
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is  an  infrastructural  effort  either  within  or  between  nations  that  offers  alternatives  in
removing  root  causes  of  war  (eliminating  structural  violence  within  a  conflict  society)
(Galtung, 1969). 
According  to  Miall  (2005:4)  conflict  transformation  is  a  process  of  engaging  with  and
transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very constitution of
society that supports the continuation of violent conflict”. Dealing with the effects of war,
conflict  transformation  should  seek  to  “address  the  underlying  structures,  agencies  and
practices  within  socio-political  system  that  precipitates  violence”  (Whetho,  2014:  117).
Contextualized as a form of intervention, conflict transformation will mean any means that
interveners use to seek constructive changes in a conflict or a post-conflict situation (Auvinen
and Kivimaki,  1996:3).  The desire of conflict  transformation is to achieve peacebuilding.
While the main aim of conflict transformation is to root out conditions that breed war within
a  conflict  society, peacebuilding  on the  other  hand focuses  on  long-term process,  and is
committed  to  pursuance  of  constructive  change.  Both  peacebuilding  and  conflict
transformation intervention are geared towards eliminating structural  violence that  breeds
war. 
There is a big role that is played by interveners in peacebuilding and conflict transformation.
One of the key interveners in most conflicts has been the UN and regional bodies like the AU,
NATO  among  others.  For  instance,  in  Sudan  and  Somalia,  the  African  Union  sent  a
peacekeeping mission to the countries to facilitate peace processes, contain the unrest and
protect  civilians.  Civil  societies  and  NGOs  have  played  a  key  role  in  peacebuilding
interventions. Most of civil societies have been advocates of human rights. Individuals and
groups of states in many cases have played an active role in intervening into some conflicts
across the globe.  
Therefore, peacebuilding interventions include all actions taken by intergovernmental bodies,
states, civil societies and NGOs so as to identify and support structures which strengthen and
solidify  peace  in  order  to  avoid  a  relapse  into  conflict  (Ghali,  1992:8).  However,  some
scholars have asked on what conditions and when interveners are allowed to intervene in
peacebuilding. It is against this backdrop that there has been a wide debate on peacebuilding
intervention  in  the  DRC.  There  are  many  peacebuilding  intervention  attempts  (both
internationally and locally) that have been put in place to end the DRC conflict. According to
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the United States Bureau of African Affairs Report (2011), between 1997 and 2013, twenty-
three peace agreements have been signed in the DRC with no sign of visible peace. Most of
these attempts have achieved several partially respected ceasefire agreements. However, they
have failed to end the violence or to re-establish central government authority throughout the
DRC (Nugent, 2011). For instance, rebel armies and militia still retain a firm grip on the Kivu
Provinces  in  the  Eastern  DRC and have  defied  many peace  agreements  that  include  the
Amani programme of January 2008, bilateral accords between Rwanda and the DRC and the
engagement  of  the  United  Nations  Organization  Stabilization  Mission  in  the  Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) that have tried to stabilize the region. This proves that
conflicts  in  the  DRC  continue  despite  ongoing  peacebuilding  interventions  and  peace
agreements (US Bureau of African Affairs, 2011).
4.3 The history of conflict and Peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: 1960-2014
The DRC borders the Atlantic Ocean and nine countries, the Republic of Congo, the Central
African  Republic,  Sudan,  Uganda,  Rwanda,  Burundi,  Tanzania,  Zambia and Angola.  The
country has an overall population of more than 75 million people. While the country has
sufficient  resources  to  guarantee  both  human  and  state  security  to  its  citizen,  unending
conflicts  have  made  it  to  be  ranked  among  the  poorest  countries  in  the  world  (World
Factbook,  2014).  The country has experienced both unending intra and interstate conflict
since its  independence in 1961. Due to its richness in natural resources, scholars such as
Collier  and Hoeffler (2004) have vindicated their  arguments that intra-state and interstate
conflict  is  rampant  in  countries  that  are  endowed  with  valuable  natural  resources  like
diamonds, gold and oil. Due to greed, there is a high tendency of the elite in countries like
DRC to finance violence as means of competing for natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004:563).  Also,  the availability of  valuable  minerals  has  made the DRC’s neighbouring
countries to directly or indirectly contribute to the conflict by either engaging their national
armies  or  supporting  rebels  (Hochschild,  1998).   For  example,  the  DRC’s wars  against
neighbouring  states  like  Uganda,  Rwanda,  Burundi,  Zimbabwe  and  Angola,  have
compounded the conflict in the DRC (Autessere Severine, 2006). Also, rebel groups who
claim support from neighbouring countries like Rwanda and Uganda, hold large parts of the
East and North of the country (Crawford, 1965).  
4.3.1 Pre-independent Congo
The DRC was colonized by Belgium as a free state. The Belgians put in governing systems
that promoted exclusion and pitted ethnic groups against each other. Between 1937 and the
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mid-1950s, the Belgian colonial administration resettled thousands of Rwandans in today’s
DRC to provide a ready workforce for large colonial agricultural and mining concerns in
North-Kivu. This resettlement was relatively easy as the area then known as Ruanda- Urundi
and now known as Rwanda and Burundi was by then under Belgian rule. Significant numbers
of  Rwandan  migrants  also  came  to  Congo  to  seek  land  in  the  then  relatively  sparsely
populated east of the country. In 1959, it was alleged that the Tutsi had plotted to kill Hutu
leader Gregoire Kayibanda. Rumors that Hutu politician Dominique Mbonyumtwa had died
at the hands of the Tutsis set off the Hutu’s against the Tutsi in violence that they called “the
wind of destruction”. The Belgians arrived to quell the violence and support the Hutu.  The
UN set up a special Commission to investigate which reported in the Tutsi’s favour. Several
Tutsis were exiled to neighbouring countries. The Tutsi who fled to the Congo became known
as the Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge to date play a significant role in the issues that
guide peace and war in the DRC.
During the colonial period, the Belgian Government treated the Congolese like lesser people
with no intellect. Most of Congolese were denied access to formal education especially at
higher levels. For instance, by independence unlike other colonies, not even one Congolese
citizen had received a university degree (Hochschild, 1998). Congo remained a colony until
agitation for independence forced Brussels to grant it freedom on June 30, 1960. At this time,
two people were visible as leaders for the agitation for independence: Joseph Kasavubu and
Patrice Lumumba. The former was in charge of Abako party (Alliance des Bakongo). The
party was mostly made up of the Bakongo from the lower Congo River. Patrice Lumumba
was President of the Congolese National Movement. His party was dominated by nationalist
sentiment  and  growing  demands  for  independence  (Nugent,  2011).  Due  to  continuous
demands for independence, the Belgian gave in and elections were held in 1960 in which
Patrice Lumumba of the leftist Movement National Congolais became Prime minister while
Joseph Kasavubu of the ABAKO Party became the head of state.  In just  four days  after
Congo attained its independence (after the Belgians withdrew their forces), there was an open
conflict over political antagonism, tribalism, conflict for resources and geographical diversity
(Alan, 1961).  
As from July 1960 (just after independence), regional secessionist movements sprung up. For
instance, within weeks of independence, the Katanga Province (supported by Belgium) led by
Moise Tshombe, seceded from the new republic.  Similarly, South Kasai - another mining
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province - seceded from the central republic. As a result, civil war emerged. Belgium sent
paratroopers to quell the civil war with no success. Also, the central government became
paralyzed by conflict  between Kasavubu (a  conservative)  and his  Prime Minister  Patrice
Lumumba (a nationalist) (Vanthemsche, 2000). With Kasavubu and Lumumba of the national
government  in  conflict,  the United Nations flew in a  peacekeeping force (Wrong,  2000).
However, Kasavubu who had the support of the West, staged an army coup d’état and handed
Lumumba over to Katangan forces (led by Tshombe) in November 1960. It is argued that
Tshombe’s army killed Lumumba in January 1961(UN Investigation Commission, 1961).
The demise of Lumumba made the DRC to become a major Cold War theatre. This is because
Lumumba had enjoyed the backing of the Soviet Union. After his death, the Soviet Union
halted  their  peacekeeping  troop’s  contributions  to  U.N.  As  a  result,  the  UN  became
financially constrained for years (UN Investigation Commission, 1961). 
There were several efforts that were put in to build peace in the DRC. At this stage, most
peacebuilding efforts  were led by the UN. The UN started to initiate reconciliation plans
between  Tshombe  and  Kasavubu.  However,  Tshombe  rejected  the  UN-led  national
reconciliation  plan.  This  made  the  UN to  send  its  troops  to  intervene.  On  the  contrary,
Tshombe saw the UN troops as  enemies  of  the DRC and declared  war against  them. In
January 1963, Tshombe’s troops were defeated by the UN. As a result, there was a period of
peace that prevailed in DRC for a short while till 1964.
In 1964, the U.N. troops were withdrawn. This was after the UN felt that the DRC was now a
united country (all secessionist movements had been thwarted). Despite a united DRC, the
country was politically divided. Still,  there were secessionist threats in the key regions of
Katanga,  South  Kasai  and  Kivu.  In  order  to  fight  rebellion  from the  preceding  regions,
Kasavubu (the then the head of state) named Tshombe as a premier. Tshombe (an ally of the
west) used foreign mercenaries and Belgian paratroops airlifted by U.S. planes, to defeat any
serious opposition to Kasavubu. In 1965, Kasavubu abruptly dismissed Tshombe. This made
Colonel  Joseph-Desiré  Mobutu,  army  chief  of  staff  to  oust  Kasavubu  out  of  power
(Crawford, 1965).
4.3.2 The era of Mobutu Sese Seko 
During mid-1950’s, Mobutu belonged to Lumumba’s nationalist movement, a movement that
had helped DRC to attain  independence.  Although Mobutu  re-echoed popular  nationalist
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sentiments  during  his  presidency,  it  is  claimed  that  he  played  a  role  in  the  killing  of
Lumumba.  When he became the president in 1965, he renewed Lumumba’s nationalistic
campaign that was meant to bring ‘national authenticity’. He changed the country’s name to
Zaire and his own to Mobutu Sese Seko kuku Ngbendu  wa za Banga – the all-powerful
warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to
conquest  leaving  fire  in  his  wake’(Hochschild,1999:  303).  Due  to  Cold  War  politics,
president  Mobutu  enjoyed  the  support  of  the  capitalist  countries  -  USA and  the  United
Kingdom.  Although  he  violated  human  rights  during  his  tenure,  he  was  unconditionally
supported by the mentioned countries. This is because the US and some parts of Europe were
interested in the rich mineral resources which through Mobutu, they had easy access to. For
decades, the United States propped up Mobutu, who was obviously an autocratic dictator,
allowing him to get away with gross human rights violations and corruption, so long as he
served the interests of the United States as a bulwark against Soviet Communism during the
Cold War. This allowed Mobutu to rule the DRC with an iron fist, murdering opponents and
ruthlessly stifling dissent.
Mobutu reignited the Belgian governing systems that promoted politics of tribal exclusion
and ethnicity. He also exploited the Congo as if it were his personal property. His rule opened
up avenues to corruption. Mobutu was involved in siphoning resources and acquiring massive
personal wealth. Under his rule, his country went through a plunge in copper prices, and
mounting debt that led to enormous economic downturns (Arnold, 2005). Hochschild argues
that Mobutu’s ‘national kleptocracy’, made him to become rich by dipping into state-owned
enterprises and sharing with family, friends, generals and others that he needed to keep in
line.  Mobutu  and  his  entourage  helped  themselves  to  state  revenue  so  freely  that  the
Congolese government ceased to function. Extreme disparities existed between Mobutu, his
cronies and the Congolese communities. Mobutu, his Generals and business people close to
him  participated  directly  in  the  disenfranchisement  of  a  growing  underclass.  By  some
estimates, Mobutu was worth some $ 4 billion. 
Mobutu amassed a fortune while his people got poorer in their diamond and mineral rich
nation, as the United States looked on (Gault – Hunter, 2006). Stewart argues that political,
social, cultural and economic inequalities among groups are important catalysts to violent
conflicts (Keen 2008: 757).  At the end of the Cold War, a growing arms trade had enveloped
the DRC conflict zones in which rebel groups due to inequality and greed for power started to
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vie  for  regional  lordship.  According  to  Stewart  (2011)  horizontal  inequalities  between
groups-  ethnicity,  religion,  age  and  gender  may  become  catalysts  for  conflicts  (Stewart,
2011:541). In the DRC, there was an upsurge in ethnic tensions in North-Kivu after Mobutu
attempted to launch a transition to multiparty democracy - in April 1990. The attempt by
Mobutu to bring democracy was viewed as a threat to political office that had been previously
held by the ‘indigenous’ people – the Hunde and Nande. The Hunde and Nande ganged up
against  the  Banyarwanda  whom  they  considered  as  foreigners.  Consequently,  the  Hutu
Banyarwanda reacted by initiating a campaign of resistance to Hunde and Nande political
control. Ethnic-based militias took shape and in March 1993 conflict erupted when Hunde
and Nyanga militias massacred the Hutu and Tutsi (Rwandese coming in as a result of the
genocide) who fought back (Collins, 1997). This led to formulation of new Zairean laws on
nationality in 1994. According to the new laws, Zairean nationality was bestowed to those
who could trace their ancestry within the country to 1885 - the date when the Congo was
established as a Free State. This became a major root cause of civil war as many people
fought to establish their roots in the Congo. 
To date,  the  preceding  ethnic  identity  conflict  has  been  an  edifice  on  which  the  DRC’s
incessant conflict is based. For instance, the present day rebel group M23 is made up of
Congolese Tutsi rebels) and Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo
(maily made up of  Banyamulenge.   The preceding rebel  groups  argue  that  their  identity
within the DRC has been left unattended to in many of the peace agreements. Mobutu’s rule
ended when the Soviet Union collapsed at  the end of the Cold War. He had outlived his
strategic usefulness to the West and the US and was easily overthrown (Collins, 1997). Prior
to his being overthrown, Mobutu had issued an order calling for all Tutsi’s to leave the DRC
or face the death penalty in 1996. However, with support of the Banyamulenge (who were
mostly seen as  Rwandese Tutsis),  Laurent  Kabila  the spokesman of  Alliance des  Forces
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo  started an uprising that led him to overthrow
Mobutu
However, due to the support that Mobutu had received from the US and west, the 1980’s and
90’s DRC’s conflicts attracted little international interventions. This was because Mobutu was
serving the interests of the US and the west global trade circuits (William, 2011). 
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4.3.3 1996-1997; the First DRC war
There are several events that preceded the 1996 DRC first major conflict (first war). In late
1996, the members of the Tutsi community, the Banyamulenge, indigenous to South Kivu
supported by Rwanda started a rebellion (Collins, 1997). For instance, in August 1996, the
media was full of reports on the ‘Banyamulenge’ uprising in the Eastern DRC. The cause of
the  preceding  uprising  was  for  the  group  to  assert  their  identity  as  Congolese  and  not
Rwandese as they had been referred to. It is because of being referred to as ‘Kinyarwanda’
speakers and the orders of Mobutu for Tutsis to leave DRC that made group to take up arms
to claim their ‘confiscated’ Congolese citizenship. They were named Banyamulenge after the
group had been settled near Mulenge Mountains in South Kivu by the Belgians during the
colonial period (Melvern, 2004). In October 1996, the Banyamulenge started to identify with
the  Alliance  des  Forces  Democratiques  pour  la  Liberation  du  Congo  (AFDL)  whose
spokesman was Laurent Desiree Kabila.
The first war Congo began in September 1996. During this war, a coalition of neighboring
foreign armies – from Uganda and Rwanda - invaded the DRC.  President Yoweri Museveni
of Uganda and the Rwandan Minister for Defense, Paul Kagame launched an offensive to
overthrow Mobutu, joining forces with locals who had opposed his rule. The invasion of the
DRC by Uganda and Rwanda ended up attracting more African States and a number of proxy
movements with varying degrees of local mobilization and support. It became to be known as
the First War (Weiss, 2009). There was intense conflict between August 1996 and May 1997.
It resulted into the toppling of the Mobutu Regime by the Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and
Angola-backed AFDL that was led by Laurent Kabila. The AFDL troops crossed the vast
Zaire from the East to the West in seven months. According to Turner and Ngoy (2007),
Kabila with a huge disgruntled group of Congolese marched from the west to Kinshasa and
took over the government (Turner and Ngoy, 2007). 
During the first Congo war, peacebuilding interventions mainly involved the UN invoking
declaratory resolutions demanding an end to the war. At practical level, the UN did nothing to
stop the war. However, there was some “intense international and regional diplomatic efforts
to negotiate Mobutu’s exit” (Shah, 2010: 28). Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria was
appointed in January 1997 as joint UN–OAU Special  Representative for the Great Lakes
region.  It  was  during  the  first  Congo  war  that  South  Africa  begun  to  be  involved  in
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. In 1997, the then South African President, Nelson
90
Mandela volunteered to be a principal mediator in an attempt to end the DRC’s first war.
Moose (1997),  Rice  (1997) and the  US State  Department  (1998)  argue  that  there  was a
meeting  that  heralded  the  DRC’s future  of  peace  agreements.  Mandela  facilitated  a  first
meeting between rebels and president Mobutu in Cape Town on 20 th February 1997. The US
was also in support of the preceding meeting (US State Department Reports, 1998). However,
the  first  efforts  for  Mandela  to  bring  a  peace  agreement  between  Mobutu  and  rebels
collapsed.  Also,  other  future  subsequent  peace  negotiations  failed.  This  was  because  the
rebels faulted Mandela’s mediation efforts that only considered Kabila’s and Mobutu’s forces
and aimed at ensuring a smooth exit for Mobutu. Other groups accused Mandela of failing to
include the non-violent opposition, who were unarmed opposition as opposed to the rebels.
These included Congolese NGOs, churches, and long-time opposition leaders. It was on May
17 1997 when Mandela and Sahnoun were seeking another last minute intervention to include
all parties to the DRC in ending war, that the Mobutu military and government were defeated
by Kabila backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola (Carayannis, Tatiana and Weiss, 2003).
The  ouster  of  Mobutu  by Kabila  through  military  force  internalized  the  use  of  force  in
resolution of any future Congolese conflict (Carayannis, Tatiana and Weiss, 2003). 
 
In Mandela’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, the exclusion of the so called non-
violent opposition meant that armed groups realized that they could fight their way to a peace
table  and  negotiate  for  political  power. It  meant  that  power  lied  in  the  gun  and  not  on
negotiations.  Ignoring  the  unarmed  political  leaders  was  therefore  a  huge  mistake  on
Mandela’s role in the 1997 peacebuilding interventions.
4.3.4 1998-2001; the second Congo war
After Kabila had overthrown Mobutu he proclaimed himself as the new head of the state
newly named the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was at the onset of the Kabila presidency
that the DRC became known for its culture of signing peace agreements that are yet to bring
peace (Gondola, 2002). However, when Kabila ascended to the presidency, the Ugandan and
Rwandan troops were still calling the shots in his government and army. For example, the
Chief  of  General  staff  of  the  DRC  was  James  Kabarebe,  a  Rwandan.  The  control  of
government and army by Uganda and Rwanda made Kabila very uncomfortable. At first he
had thought that after supporting him, Uganda and Rwanda will pull out their troops. Also,
there was huge public discontent among Congolese on the influence of Uganda and Rwanda
over the Kabila regime (Juma, 2006). In 1998, Kabila decided to break ranks with Uganda
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and Rwanda. However, he later on organized new power networks that were based on his
ethnic group the Baluba.  
In July 1998, some of the Rwandan troops that (mainly of Tutsi origin) Kabila had asked to
leave  the  DRC  started  to  reorganize  themselves  and  formed  a  rebellion  known  as
Rassemblement Congolais Pour la Democratie  – Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD).
The foregoing rebel movement earned the support of Rwanda and Uganda - whom Kabila
had  fallen  out  with  (Melvern,  2004).  Rwanda  and  Uganda  became  the  DRC’s  external
enemies.  Internally,  Kabila  faced  opposition  from  the  elites  that  he  had  suspended  and
usurped as he came to power. In the Northern and Southern Kivu province, there were rising
discontent from Rwandan allies (Nderitu, 2013). Due to his fallout with Rwanda and Uganda
in 1998, Kabila’s options to thwart any rebellion were few. Kabila decided to turn to the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) – where DRC had become a member four
months after Kabila took the presidency - for support. Kabila got the support from Angola,
Zimbabwe and Namibia (AZN coalition) (Arnold, 2005). 
According to the Council on Foreign Relations Report (1999) the second Congo war also
known as the Great War of Africa began in August 1998. The actors in the second Congo war
were Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda and twenty-five armed groups
within the DRC. This was the largest war in the history of African conflicts. During this war
external  militaries  from Uganda and Rwanda supported rebels  who wanted  to  topple  the
regime of Kabila. On the other hand, AZN militaries supported the government of Kabila
(Wrong, 2000:29). The war was further exacerbated by the new Tutsi-led Government of
president  Kagame  in  Rwanda.  Through  the  support  of  Kagame’s  military  forces,  the
Congolese Tutsi leaders began to increasingly use the issues of ethnicity and land as a means
of securing their power base and their control over economic resources. In 1998, Kabila’s
allies turned foes, Rwanda and Uganda attempted to oust him through clandestinely backing
RCD. However, with the switching of sides portrayed by Angola - who in the first war had
backed  Uganda  and  Rwanda  -  the  preceding  countries’ efforts  to  oust  Kabila  were  not
successful  (Human  Security  Report,  2009).  At  different  times  the  AZN troops  supported
Laurent Kabila and later on his son, Joseph Kabila, who took over from him when he was
shot dead (Arnold, 2005). 
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As a way of seeking international intervention, Kabila portrayed the second Congo war as a
case of Rwandan and Ugandan aggression towards his government. He denied the existence
of internal rebellion within the DRC. He also publicly denied to recognize the RCD - that was
backed by Uganda and Rwanda - as a belligerent. On the contrary, the RCD claimed that their
cause of fighting was a revolution against Kabila’s dictatorial regime. According to the RCD,
the second Congo war was a fight between them and the Kabila army (Reyntjens, 2009). The
war was further compounded when other rebel forces joined forces with the RCD in 1999. As
a result,  Kabila  too lost  a grip to over half  of the country to the rebels.  Due to  internal
wrangles, the RCD split into two. One movement became to be known as Mouvement de
Liberation (ML) and was backed by Uganda. The other movement became RCD of Goma
and  was  supported  by  the  Rwandan  government.  Another  anti-Kabila  rebel  group,
Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo (MLC) was established in the Northern Province of
the DRC. MLC was supported by the government of Uganda.
Before the end of the second Congo war, there were peacebuilding interventions that came in
two  weeks  into  war.  After  two  weeks  of  the  second  Congo  war,  the  UN  and  OAU
representatives started to prepare a ceasefire draft document that was meant to address, abate
and prevent future conflicts in the DRC. According to the ceasefire, all the conflicting parties
in the DRC were to define and interpret their  issues. However, all  parties to the conflict
interpreted the cause of the conflict differently: they could not agree on who was/were the
belligerent(s). The ceasefire lacked to understand who started the conflict and why.  However,
the ceasefire identified AZN troops, Rwanda and Uganda as external parties to the conflict.
Rwanda and Uganda denied the presence of their military troops in the DRC. On the contrary,
it was ironical for Rwanda and Uganda to protest the exclusion of Congolese rebel groups
from the list of signatories (Reyntjens, 2009). 
More efforts  were put  in as peacebuilding intervention of ending the second Congo war.
South Africa played its role in peacebuilding by supporting the SADC Led-Lusaka Peace
Accord.   For instance,  during the SADC 18th summit  in Mauritius in 1998, South Africa
endorsed the appointment of the Zambian President Frederick Chiluba as the chief mediator
in  the  DRC’s conflict  -  what  is  commonly known as  the  Lusaka  Peace  agreement.  The
European Union appointed Aldo Ajello as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region in the
agreement. Also, the US intervened by dispatching Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the then
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and Howard Wolpe, a former Senator as Special
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Envoys to the Great Lakes Region in the agreement (Spagat, Andrew, Tara and Kreutz, 2009).
According to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, all stakeholders in the DRC war were asked to
end their hostilities, military actions and propaganda within twenty-four hours of signing the
deal. Within the agreement an attempt was made to address the issue of hate speech so as to
avert genocide like the one that had happened in Rwanda: hate speech was seen as the igniter
of violence in Rwanda and DRC. Not only did the agreement call for disarmament, but also
the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from the  DRC.  The  peace  deal  also  called  for  the
exchange  of  hostages  and  prisoners  of  war  between  all  foreign  troops;  AZN,  Uganda,
Rwanda and DRC (Spagat, Andrew, Tara and Kreutz, 2009). 
 The signatories of the agreement were Kabila and most of the internal rebel movements and
the  six  countries  that  were  involved  in  the  war.  According  to  the  agreement,  the  UN
peacekeeping was asked to take a peace enforcement role in the DRC.  Peace enforcement is
the  practice  of  ensuring  that  there  exists  peace  in  an area or  region.  It  is  different  from
peacemaking in that peace enforcement gives peacekeepers an alternative of using force so as
to bring conflicting parties to the negotiations table. The Lusaka Peace Agreement explicitly
authorized  the  Security  Council  to  authorize  coercive  force,  if  necessary,  to  achieve  its
objectives of disarming the various armed groups (Carayannis, 2003). Kabila signed off the
Lusaka Ceasefire Accord which was later supported by other accords. This was the beginning
of subsequent future DRC’s peace deals, accords and agreements. 
However, the Lusaka Accord did not fully stem the war in the DRC. There was still mistrust
and antagonism between the belligerents. Due to the mistrust  between belligerents of the
second Congo war, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in a palace coup in January 2001. After
his death, his son, Joseph Kabila became the new DRC President. Joseph Kabila faced a lot
of  challenges  when  he  took  over  the  war-torn  DRC  (Prunier,  2009;  UNEP:  2007:  89).
However, Joseph Kabila was well versed on how to wage war: a skill which he had learnt
from his father and as “once commander of the infamous army of child soldiers known as
Kadogo’s” (International Crisis Group, 1999:7). 
4.3.5 The Era of Joseph Kabila and the menace of rebels: 2003- To-date
On  paper,  the  second  DRC  war  ended  officially  in  July  2003  when  Joseph  Kabila’s
Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took power (U.N. Office
for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs,  2007).  However,  scholars  like  Carayannis
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(2003) and Olsson and Heather (2004) argue that the second Congo war evolved seamlessly
into the third Congo war that is currently characterized by the menace of rebels in different
parts of the DRC. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002:148) and Clement (2009: a), behind
the celebration of the success of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, war on the ground went on
unabated.  Paule  and  Bomboko  (2004)  Stearns  (2011)  and  Vinci  (2007)  see  this  war  as
competition for minerals  and control of mineral-rich regions by rebels and proxy conflict
groups and that it begun in 2001 after the death of Laurent Kabila.
In order to thwart rebellion, Joseph Kabila reached out to Belgium, France, USA and the
Bretton Woods institutions seeking for support for peacebuilding of the DRC. He also made
an effort of reviving the Lusaka peace agreement process. On 4th May 2001, the Lusaka
agreement signatories met in Lusaka and signed a Declaration on the fundamental principles
of ending the DRC war (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:148; Clement, 2009a). This was just two
weeks before the UNSC visited the region.
On 25th February 2002, dialogue on DRC’s peace re-opened in Sun-City in South Africa. As
the preceding dialogue was in process, battles continued to rage in the DRC. The MLC – one
of  the rebel  movements  -  refused  to  participate  in  the Sun-City peace  talks  arguing that
Joseph  Kabila  had  sent  bogus  civilian  opposition  parties.  However,  later  on,  all  parties
including  the  MLC participated  in  the  talks.  Unfortunately,  52  days  later,  the  mediators
during  the  dialogue  conceded  that  the  talks  were  unsuccessful  in  achieving  a  general
agreement  among  all  conflicting  parties  (Paule  and  Bomboko,  2004).  The  favourable
agreement reached was a power sharing one whereby Joseph Kabila was to be the President
and MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba be the prime minister. Both Kabila and Bemba signed the
preceding power  sharing  agreement  despite  the  RCD – Goma,  a  rebel  group backed by
Rwanda and other opposition parties feeling sidelined and rejecting the agreement. According
Nzongola-Ntalaja  (2002:148),  the  peace  deal  “was  not  wholly  successful”.  However,  it
brought a temporary cessation of violence in the DRC (Stearns, 2011). Events that followed
the  power-sharing  peace  deal  included  the  withdrawal  of  almost  all  foreign  troops.
Afterwards a unified army comprising both government and militia troops was constituted.
Most of militia troops in the unified army willingly joined the MONUC. 
Kabila  and  Bemba  attempted  to  establish  some  form of  democracy that  sustained  some
relative peace in the DRC. This involved the inclusion of unarmed opposition groups in the
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government. However, the attainment of relative peace did not last for long. Weiss (2011) and
Winter (2012: 56) argue that instead of president Kabila and Prime Minister Bemba’s teams
seeking lasting solution for peace, they concentrated on negotiating for plum government
positions  for themselves.  Due to competition for government plum positions,  the country
lapsed into chaos once more. Later on the DRC relapsed into a state of a new armed conflict
(Vinci, 2007). Winter (2012) argues that the root cause of the new war was due to failure of
negotiators  of  the  Sun-City  agreement  in  recognizing  and  including  war  lords  in  the
preceding peace deal. According to Winter (2012:56), the marginalization of the RCD-Goma
during the Sun-City peace agreement meant that the Rwanda backed movement’s underlying
objectives were not addressed. As a result, to-date, this continues to haunt all peacebuilding
processes and intervention in present day eastern DRC (Weiss, 2011). 
 The underlying objectives of the rebels and warlords that were not addressed during the Sun-
City peace deal became evident during the historic democratic election in 2006. Although the
election gave hope for DRC’s stability and peace, its merit was short-lived. In 2006, deadly
fighting between government forces and another rebel group known as National Congress for
People Defense (NCPD)-led by General Laurent Nkunda began in the North Kivu region.
Nkunda  and  NCPD  threated  to  expand  rebellion  beyond  eastern  DRC  and  to  overrun
Kinshasa. The NCPD managed to conquer huge mining territories of the DRC (Nellemann
and Refisch, 2010). The success of Nkunda in defeating the DRC army was because the latter
was largely disorganized and had divisions within its base in Kinshasa. A number of DRC
forces fought alongside rebel troops (International Crisis Group, 2010).  
The intervention into the third Congo war once more involved a number of neighbouring
countries. The countries that were involved were: Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe.
Stearns (2011) argues that all the foregoing intervening states believed that if general Nkunda
was arrested, it was going to be a solution to one of the impediments of restoring democracy
to Eastern DRC. General Nkunda was arrested on January 22, 2009, inside Rwanda. The
Rwandan government imprisoned Nkunda in an undisclosed location and without bringing
any charges against him. However, the DRC government issued an international warrant for
his arrest over allegations of war crimes, insurrection and crimes against humanity. Rwanda
refused to hand him over fearing that the General might be tried and killed on the basis of his
Tutsi ethnicity. However, according to the International Crisis Group (2010), many observers
96
argued that Nkunda formed the NCPD to protect the ethnic Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge)
against the Hutu, who were terrorizing the former in exile after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 
The real reason for the intervention into the ongoing third Congo war by foreign countries
became apparent when the conflict degenerated into a fight for resources. Although Uganda
and Rwanda claim that their  armies have been withdrawn, scholars like Kigambo (2012)
argue that the agents of    the preceding countries are still at large in the DRC. To date,  Arieff
et al (2011) argue that the role of foreign countries continues to feature in the DRC conflict.
For instance, on 25th July 2012, it was reported in the East African Standard (2012) that ‘a
visibly angry’ Kagame president of Rwanda threatened to release General Nkunda. Kagame’s
sentiments  worried  many regional  leaders  who argued that  the  release  of  Nkunda risked
exploding a series of unrest in the DRC and that such war was going to spill over in the
whole of the Great Lakes region (Kigambo, 2012). Also, the UN Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the DRC Government accused Rwanda of backing Bosco
Ntaganda,  Nkunda’s former  chief  of  staff  and  successor  of  the  NCPD  leader.  Ntaganda
recently gave himself up to the International Criminal Court to answer charges of crimes
against humanity (ICC Today, 2014; Arieff et al, 2011). Bomboko (2012) argues that there are
claims  by the  DRC government  that  Rwanda  has  been  backing  the  M23(rebel  group  in
Eastern Congo formed in 2012) so as to establish a sphere of influence in the DRC through
direct military occupation, proxy forces or both.  
To date the DRC has several militia groups like the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC),
Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), National Integrationist Front (FNI), the
Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi
(FDLR-FCA)  and  M23.  As  a  result  of  the  preceding  groups  President  Joseph  Kabila  is
amassing  troops,  ready  to  attack.  On  the  other  side,  rebels  and  militia  groups  are  also
threatening war, saying they have what it takes to mount a battle against the government
(Human Rights Watch, 2014).  Also, there are many international actors that are involved. For
instance,  there  are  a  number  of  multinationals  from Canada,  USA among other  Western
countries  that  are  backing  different  militia  groups  to  support  and  secure  their  business
interests.  The  presence  of  international  actors  and  multinationals  in  the  DRC  has
incapacitated the government, regional international organizations like the SADC, the AU
and  the  UN  in  resolving  the  conflict  (Nyathi,  2012).  As  a  result,  many  crimes  against
humanity continue  to  be perpetuated  against  innocent  Congolese.  Reports  by the Human
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Rights Watch (2014) and Amnesty International (2014:15), show that due to the unending
civil wars in the DRC, over 8 million Congolese have lost their lives, hundreds of thousands
have  become  refuges  and  many  women  and  children  were  raped.  Many  Congolese  are
internally  displaced as  violent  conflict  continues  to  be driven by among others,  trade  in
minerals  and  between  competing  armed  proxy  groups,  militia  groups  and  people  in
government.  Other  effects  of  the  Congolese  conflict  are  the  skyrocketing  inflation  and
plummeting value of the Congolese Franc. There is also spillages of the effect of the third
Congo war to the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa. Nabudere (2014) in Africa’s First
World War, describes the DRC’s civil war as the first ever unending imperialist war. Like
other imperialist wars, Nabudere (2014:3) says that the DRC war is about the distribution of
wealth and power. 
4.4 South Africa’s Interventions in the DRC
The DRC’s conflict is an interesting phenomenon because all three of South Africa’s post-
apartheid  regimes  have  been  involved  in  their  attempts  to  securing  lasting  peace.  Some
analysts argue that South Africa’s intervention or lack of interest in the DRC’s politics and
conflicts  is  leading  to  a  growth  of  a  number  of  rights  groups  and  activists  within  the
Congolese community residing in the country. For instance, in 2012, a group of Congolese
refugees demonstrated at Luthuli House (African Nation Congress Headquarters) expressing
their  dissatisfaction  with  the  Zuma  regime  over  its  disinterest  in  the  DRC post-election
stalemate. They accused Zuma’s regime for supporting the illegitimate re-election of Joseph
Kabila to continue occupying the DRC’s presidency  (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2014).
Nganje (2012) argues that the Congolese refugees who were protesting claimed that president
Zuma was supporting Kabila because of Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse, who has business ties
with Katumba Mwake, a wealthy businessman and Kabila's advisor. 
South Africa became actively involved in the DRC conflict in 1996 (Department of Foreign
Affairs, 1998). To date, the sound of war drums in the DRC is ominous, coming at a time
when regional powers like South Africa are trying to resolve the crisis. South Africa is one of
the country that is bearing the brunt of the DRC’s conflict (Tshiyembe, 2010). For instance, it
is estimated that in South Africa alone, there are over 500, 000 Congolese refugees (UNHCR,
2014).  Most  of  them reside  in  major  cities  of  South  Africa;  Johannesburg,  Cape  Town,
Pretoria  and Durban.  Many analysts  argue  that  due  to  increasing  numbers  of  Congolese
among other refugees in South Africa, the DRC’s conflict is one of the most important cases
of gauging the breadth and depth of South Africa’s commitment towards peacebuilding in
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Africa (NOREF Report, 2015). However, having harbored the worst effects of the DRC’s war
since 1996, South Africa has no option but to reinforce a culture of peace, democracy and
human rights in the DRC.
There are a number of attempts that the regimes of Mandela, Mbeki and currently, Zuma have
made so as to bring lasting peace in the DRC. The first major post-1994 diplomatic initiative
was made by President Mandela (the then chairperson of SADC) in 1997 during the first
Congo  war  (Tonheim and  Swat,  2015:2).  As  it  was  argued  earlier,  the  first  Congo  war
happened as  a  result  of  Laurent  Kabila  and his  rebel  group ADFL fighting  fiercely and
overthrewing President Mobutu. Before Kabila overthrew Mobutu, Mandela had led a strong
South  African  intervention:  initiated  talks  at  Pointe-Noire  (Congo  Brazzaville)  between
Mobutu and Kabila. Mandela wanted Mobutu to leave the DRC for exile after which Kabila
would be the president and was to accommodate other elements of the DRC’s opposition
(Landsberg, 2002: 172). However, Kabila refused to attend the talks. This became a failed
attempt by the first democratic regime of South Africa (Los Angeles Times, 1997). This led to
a distrustful  relationship between South Africa and the DRC for  the whole duration that
Kabila was in power.
 
Another attempt was in the 1998 DRC war (second Congo war; 1998-2003). As discussed
earlier this war was as a result of Kabila turning back on his former allies (Rwandan and
Ugandan) who had helped him to oust Mobutu from power. Having not have learned from his
first failed attempt, Mandela still insisted that dialogue and negotiation were to be the only
means of settling the conflict rather than use of military deployment (Nabishika, 2011). This
did  not  work  out.   Things  changed  when  Zimbabwe’s Robert  Mugabe  took over  as  the
chairperson  of  SADC.  Firstly,  Mugabe  defended  Laurent  Kabila’s  regime  by  deploying
Zimbabwean military forces in the DRC. Mugabe’s strategy was supported by Angola and
Namibia. Angola supported Mugabe’s strategy because it was fighting its own rebels who
were  using  DRC’s  as  their  back  up.  This  angered  Mandela  who  publicly  reprimanded
Mugabe for his action. Mandela led South Africa to call for an emergency summit of SADC
leaders in Pretoria on 23 August 1998 so as to discuss Mugabe’s actions. On the contrary, the
legitimacy of  the Mugabe strategy in  helping  the  government  of  Kabila  and DRC using
military deployment was endorsed (Santoro 1998).
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Mandela’s regime became reluctant in  the DRC’s peacebuilding after  the events  that  had
happened at the SADC summit of 1998. Later on the Kabila regime started to accuse South
Africa of siding with anti-government forces in the DRC (Mangu, 2003). For instance South
Africa was accused of selling arms to Rwandan and Ugandan troops that were fighting the
Kabila  regime (Curtis,  2007).  At  the same time,  while  the Mandela regime was strongly
supporting a non-violent approach to the second Congo war, it opted for a military approach
to end the 1998 Lesotho conflict. South Africa was accused of applying double standards in
its peacemaking approaches by the Kabila regime (Human Rights Watch, 2000).
South Africa’s approach to the DRC crisis changed when Thabo Mbeki became president in
1999. Mbeki contended that “South Africa’s policy toward the DRC was in need of a major
overhaul” (Tonheim and Swat, 2015:2). Mbeki initiated a plan by urging the withdrawal of all
foreign armies  in the DRC. Contrary to Mandela,  the Mbeki  regime contributed SANDF
troops  to  the  UN peacekeeping forces  in  the  DRC.  According  to  Landsberg  (2002:178),
Mbeki’s acts were to avert South Africa from its previous disinclination to the very peace that
it intended to make. It was during the Mbeki regime that calls for increased involvement of
and stronger pressure from international and regional bodies in the DRC’s war was made by
South Africa (Weiss, 2000). However, South Africa did not intervene in the DRC conflict
individually but through SADC, the AU and its  predecessor, the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), and the UN. 
Similarly, it was during the Mbeki regime that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (an initial
step that led to Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was promulgated in 1999.  The ICD led to
the first democratic election in the DRC in 2006 (Rogier, 2004: 27–28). Curtis (2007: 264)
argues that South Africa renewed further its attempt to end the DRC’s war when it hosted the
IICD talks at Sun City (25th to April 19th 2002). Apart from hosting the ICD talks, South
Africa invested a lot of human resource in the peace talks. This became a litmus test for
South Africa’s reputation as the continental peacemaker (Rogier, 2004). During the ICD talks
Mbeki  played a  crucial  role  of  directing the process:   he presented two possible  power-
sharing plans. The first power sharing plan was rejected by rebels as too pro-Kabila while the
second one was rejected by Kabila as too pro-rebel (Mangu, 2003). The failure of these talks
diminished  South  Africa’s role  in  Africa’s peacemaking  process.  However,  South  Africa
entered into a  privileged relationship with  Rwanda (who were  seen as  RCD-Goma rebel
sponsor) to convince the rebels to enter into a deal. This led to the resumption of Sun-City II
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ICD talks  which eventually led to  an all-inclusive agreement  in  December 2002 and the
signing of  a  transitional  constitution agreement  that  led  to  democratic  elections  in  2006.
Mbeki continued to play a key role in ending the Congolese conflict. According to Kabemba
(2007: 537), Mbeki was “omnipresent throughout the transition, jetting into the DRC every
time peace [was] threatened and taking part in all the important events”. Mbeki’s regime also
led to increased contribution of SANDF in the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission  in  the  DRC  (MONUSCO).  Also,  Mbeki  initiated  the  signing  of  a  General
Cooperation Agreement (Bilateral relation) between South Africa and the DRC. This healed
the mistrustful relationship that had been there since the Mandela regime (SAFPI, 2012).
However, South Africa’s peacemaking initiative in the DRC had expectations of getting some
returns after the election of Joseph Kabila in 2006. Surprisingly, “instead of doing business
with South Africa, who had helped him to find peace, Kabila turned to China” (Tonheim and
Swat, 2015:3). This made South Africa to quickly withdraw from the Congolese scene. The
relationship between the DRC and South Africa became unclear and distant. For instance, in
2009, South Africa did not take part in the signing of the peace deal between the National
Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the Congolese government.
Jacob  Zuma  took  over  the  Presidency  in  2009.   During  this  time,  due  to  the  DRC’s
association with China, there was reluctance by the West to fund the upcoming DRC’s 2012
general  election.  The  DRC  sought  South  Africa  for  help.  In  2011,  The  Zuma  regime
contributed $ 15 million (R126 million) to assist with the cost of holding the elections in the
DRC.  While  South  Africa  was  contributing  towards  the  cost  of  elections,  a  number  of
bilateral contracts were being signed (The East African, 2013). For instance, in June 2010 the
Lake Albert  Oil Blocks 1 and 2 were allocated to CapriCat and Foxwell,  two companies
linked  to  President  Zuma’s  nephew,  Khulubuse  Zuma  (Moneyweb,  2010).  In  2012,
immediately after elections, a memorandum of understanding on the Inga dam project was
signed between South Africa and the DRC (African Business, 2012). Although the credibility
of the elections was questioned by international observers, the DRC’s main opposition party,
many civil  organisation and countries,  South Africa quickly recognised the re-election of
Joseph Kabila as the democratic (Daily Maverick, 2011). South Africa’s support of Kabila’s
re-election  deepened  the  relationship  between  the  two  countries  but  deteriorated  South
Africa-Rwanda relations.  For  example  South  Africa  granted  asylum to Faustin  Kayumba
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Nyamwasa - former Rwandan Chief of Staff and intelligence of the Rwandan army (Mail &
Guardian, 2010). 
In April 2012, there emerged a rebel group known as M23. In November 2012, the M23
humiliated  MUNUSCO troops and seized  the  control  of  Goma,  the  provincial  capital  of
North Kivu. The magnitude of which M23 operated led UN Group of Experts to suspect
Rwanda and Uganda to be supporting the group (UN Group of Experts, 2013; Reuters, 2013).
To address the M23 menace, there were two peace talks that took place: The Kampala and
Addis Ababa peace talks between M23 and the Congolese government. The Kampala peace
talks broke down in October 2013. However, the Addis negotiations were fruitful and led into
the  signing  of  the  most  recent  Congolese  peace  agreement,  the  Peace,  Security  and
Cooperation Framework (PSCF) on 24th February 2013. Eleven African countries signed the
agreement – the DRC, Angola, the Republic of Congo, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, the
Central African Republic, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and Zambia. Similarly, the UN, the
AU, the ICGLR and the SADC were four main guarantors of the foregoing peace deal. This
was the first time South Africa was a signatory to a peace agreement on the DRC. During the
Addis  negotiations,  “South  Africa  brought  in  the  political  support  that  Kabila  needs  by
creating more of a balance within the parties to the negotiation but also by standing in the
way of the bullying that could have taken place from the Rwandan side” (Tonheim and Swat,
2015:5). Currently, South Africa is deeply engaged in the implementation of the foregoing
peace agreement.  In 2013, the Institute  of Security Studies  (2014) and ACCORD (2014)
reported  that  South  Africa  had  started  to  deviate  from  the  non-violent  approach  to
peacebuilding in  the DRC. ACCORD (2014) argued that  in  2013  President  Zuma sent  a
strong contingent of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to  enforce peace through the
neutralisation of rebel group M23 in the eastern part of the DRC.
 
Furthermore, in 2013, South Africa played a key role in the formulation and constitution of
resolution no. 2098 of the UNSC. UNSC Resolution 2098 authorized the MUNUSCO forces
to  use  ‘offensive’ combat  force  in  dealing  with  rebel  forces  in  the  DRC (UN  Security
Council,  2013).   To date,  South  African  soldiers  form the  backbone  of  the  MUNUSCO
intervention brigade in the DRC. Out of 3,069 MUNUSCO troops, there are 1,345 members
of the SANDF. The rest of the MUNUSCO troops constitute Tanzanian and Malawian forces
(Mail & Guardian, 2013). 
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In  support  of  the  Kabila  regime,  the  Zuma  government  has  been  involved  in  arresting
Congolese  dissidents.  For  instance,  in  February  2013,  South  African  police  arrested  19
Congolese men in Limpopo after they were accused of planning a coup d’état to topple the
Kabila regime. Another show of loyalty to the Kabila regime by the Zuma government is the
2014 deployment of SANDF forces that is achieving some rare victory over rebels in eastern
DRC. In trade, Zuma and Kabila have signed a number of trade agreements and treaties. One
of the major trade deal is the Grand Inga Hydropower Project (Grand Inga 3), the world’s
largest hydropower dam. It is based on the preceding trade deals that President Zuma (2013)
had to sent a strong contingent of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to help root out the
M23 rebel group in the Eastern part of the DRC (ISS, 2014; ACCORD, 2014).  
To date, due to more trustful relationship between Zuma and Kabila, South Africa appears to
be the only African country with some kind of influence in the DRC. Also the influence of
South Africa  on the Kabila  regime has  surpassed  that  of  the  EU and the US which  has
become minimal (Mail & Guardian. 2013). However, other commentators argue that South
Africa  has  influence  on  the  DRC regime  because  the  former  is  playing  a  host  to  many
Congolese  refugees  and  asylum seekers  who  are  anti-Kabila  and  furious  after  the  2011
fraudulent election. As a result, Kabila is alleged to fear that if his regime’s relationship with
South Africa deteriorates, the latter may allow the ant-Kabila refugees to use its territory to
plan seizing power from the former (Tonheim and Swat, 2015). From the foregoing assertion,
based on this view, this study argues that Congolese refugees residing in South Africa may
(not) play a key role in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as it will be
shown in the forthcoming chapters.
4.5 Conclusion 
Bujra (2002) quotes  Adebayo (1999) arguing that  political,  economic,  social  and cultural
factors are the main triggers of conflicts in the developing world. Furthermore, Clover (2004)
sees the causes of intrastate conflicts to be rooted in political grievance, poor governance and
economic and social inequalities between different groups within a state. This chapter has
shown how all indications are that the DRC war will continue to spill in several neighbouring
countries as fighting on different sides continues. This is not a scenario Africa wishes to
experience.   In  the  interest  of  the  innocent  men,  women  and children  of  the  DRC who
continue to die daily and those who are seeking asylum elsewhere,  there is a need for a
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lasting solution to Africa’s greatest war. The question is how to intervene in Africa’s unending
Congo war (The East African, 2012). 
The chapter has been historical in nature. Firstly, the chapter presented a summary of the
DRC conflict. The preceding historical background has established that the several factors
continue to trigger the conflict and will be responsible for its continuity. Among factors that
were established are: the foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and weak systems of
governance,  fights over resources and ethnicity in addition to external influences and the
presence of foreign troops from neighboring countries. This has become the edifice on which
violence was laid for resolution of any DRC conflicts.  To date,  rebel  and militia  groups
continue to hold large parts of the country, subjecting the civilian populations to prolonged
instability  and civil  strife.  In  addition,  poor  methodologies  and intervention  strategies  in
solving conflicts  have fueled the DRC situation further. The chapter also established that
South Africa has been actively involved in the DRC conflict since 1996. This is because all
three  of  South  Africa’s post-apartheid  presidents  have  been involved in  efforts  to  secure
peace. Also, the chapter established that South Africa has successfully used its peacebuilding
intervention to create a trusting diplomatic relationship that has led to lucrative trade deals
between the two countries. In the end, South Africa is the chief beneficiary of bilateral trade
pacts with the DRC. 
The next chapter is an exploration of the views of participants (Congolese refugees) of this
study on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s unending conflict.
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CHAPTER FIVE
VIEWS OF CONGOLESE REFUGEES ON SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEBUIDING
INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC
5.1 Introduction 
Initially, as stated in the background chapter, this study sought to explore how the views of
Congolese refugees may enhance South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s
conflict.  From a survey of literature in chapter two and presentation of data in three, this
study is the first of its kind on the incorporation of views and opinions of refugees within
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC and other African conflicts.  Although
the most recent official government analysis of statistics on refugees and asylum seekers was
done in April 2016, it only comprises statistics on refugees who have been granted or denied
asylum status  in  South  Africa.  The  DHA (2016)  statistics  do  not  give  statistics  on  how
refugees have participated in South Africa’s peace missions on the continent.   
Within the history of peacebuilding interventions (as shown in the foregoing chapter) in the
DRC, it can be argued that the views and insights of the Congolese refugees are yet to be
incorporated in the past or ongoing peacebuilding interventions in that country. Therefore, it
can be argued that, this study is among the few attempts (as far as is known) exploring how
the views and insights of the Congolese refugees in South Africa, may bolster South Africa’s
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peacebuilding interventions in the DRC conflict. This chapter bases most of its arguments on
responses given by participants of this study. 
5.2 Congolese awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC
The first major concern of the researcher was to establish whether Congolese refugees in
Durban were cognizant of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.  During the
study,  38  out  of  54  participants  interviewed,  were  cognizant  (in  broad  terms)  of  South
Africa’s ongoing peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. At this point, a note on the profiles
of respondents on the awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is
instructive.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  majority  of  the  respondents  were  aware  of  South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC for the following key reasons: Firstly, it is
worth mentioning that most participants in this study were academics, activists and former
soldiers and rebels as presented in the methodology segment of this study. Therefore, their
level of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC was relatively
high. The academics22 (especially social scientists), activists and former soldiers and rebels -
although living in South Africa - have been concerned with issues that relate to governance,
violence and poverty in the DRC. Secondly, former soldiers and rebels argued that they knew
well that South Africa was sending its troops to the DRC for peacekeeping. This gave them
the awareness that South Africa was intervening in the DRC23. Most participants in this study
were  interested  in  seeing  a  more  stable,  peaceful  and  a  better  DRC.  As  argued  in  the
background,  Congolese  right  activists  have  been  vocal  on  the  role  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC since 2012 (Kets and De Vries). For instance,  in
2013, Congolese refugees accused the South African Defence Force (SANDF) of training a
Congolese  Battalion  whose  aim was to  crack  down Kabila’s dissidents  and post-election
protesters in Kinshasa (Abegunrin, 2014). From there active involvement in protest against
South Africa’s support of the Kabila regime since 2012, it can be said that most Congolese
right activists are aware of South Africa’s interventions in the DRC. 
22 For instance, I found out during my interview with a lecturer that there were some studies
that had been conducted at that particular university in relation to war and mineral resources
in the DRC. The lecturer argued that research on DRC has made many scholars richer due to
international funding. 
23 It is instructive to note that during my field work, I established that former soldiers-cum
rebels were generally opposed to granting face-to-face interviews for their security reasons.
Given the sensitive nature of this study, this set of participants apparently felt that phone
interviews protected their anonymity than face-to-face interviews or focus group discussions.
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Figure 3.  Informants' awareness of SA peacebuiding interventions in the  the DRC
Aware Not aware
As figure 3 shows, from the data collected, it  can be argued that there is a high level of
awareness among Congolese refugees on South Africa’s interventions in the DRC. Although
this study  purposively targeted the educated category among the Congolese community in
Durban  (academics,  ex-military  and  activists24),  it  was  established  that  the  question  of
understanding the refugees’ awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC  is  a  complex  one.  There  were  different  levels  of  awareness  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC among academics and activists. For instance, most
ex-military and ex-rebels argued that they were aware that South Africa was using SANDF to
fight rebels as a way of building peace25. One activist argued that South Africa was building
peace in the DRC by funding infrastructures such as roads, airports and Inga Dam project as a
way of improving livelihood in the DRC. “By constructing our roads, airport and the Dam,
South Africa is addressing unemployment and poverty in the DRC”26. There were also views
that South Africa was involved in electioneering and political events of the DRC so as to
determine who succeeded Kabila. “South Africa is funding many political institutions so as to
determine who becomes the next president.  This is a way of ensuring that bilateral  trade
between Kabila and South Africa are maintained”27. From the varying views of the educated
category,  it  can  be  argued  that  awareness  of  the  Congolese  refugees  of  South  Africa’s
24 For  instance,  during  interviews  most  Congolese  scholars,  rights  activists  and  former
soldiers  argued  that  it  was  ideal  for  South  Africa  to  be  impartial  in  its  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC since the latter is part of the SADC.
25 Views of a Congolese ex-soldier 
26 Views of a Congolese lecturer in Durban 
27 Views of a Congolese student in Durban 
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peacebuilding interventions depends on the conceptualization of what can bring lasting peace
or what breeds war in the DRC.    
 
Scholars  such  as  Kadima,  Denis  and  Kalombo  (1995),  Smit  and  Rugunan  (2014)  and
Tonheim and Swart (2015) had restricted their studies on the humanitarian assistance that
Congolese refugees should be accorded by South Africa. However, from the different levels
of  awareness  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC  as  narrated  by
participants,  the  issue  of  refugees  remains  an  important  one  within  the  under-researched
scenery in conflict transformation and peace studies.  For instance, it was from the different
levels  of  awareness  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  as  narrated  by  the
participants that this study established that most views of the Congolese refugees had been
shaped by their region of origin in the DRC. Based on the different levels of awareness of
South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC,  this  study  established  that  the
majority of the participants are from the eastern parts of the DRC: this is considered by many
scholars as the heart of the DRC’s conflicts (Autesserre, 2012; Nderitu, 2013; Whetho, 2014;
Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016).  
5.3 Origin of Participants and their Support of the DRC’s Government 
As  argued  from  the  preceding  subsection,  this  study  revealed  that  most  of  participants
originated from the eastern part of the DRC and predominantly speak Kiswahili28.  In this
study, it was established that most participants were indigenes of the four provinces in the
eastern part of the DRC; of Sud-Kivu, Nord-Kivu, Katanga and Maniema as shown in figure
4.  According to Geenen (2012), the eastern part of the DRC is endowed with rich mineral
resources and has been the centre of resource conflicts.  
Figure 4. The map showing administrative provinces of the  DRC(Global Maps, 2015)
28 Kiswahili (or Swahili) is an African language spoken mainly by the people of eastern and
central  Africa.  That  is,  people  who live  in  Tanzania,  Kenya,  Uganda,  Rwanda,  Burundi,
eastern Zaire, northern Zaire, nothern Malawi, northern Mozambique, northern Zambia and
Somali Republic (Marshall, 2015). 
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According to Cuvelier, Diemel and Vlassenroot (2013), since 1960s, competition for minerals
by  both  local  and  external  actors in  the  eastern  DRC  has  given  the  region  continuous
instability.  As a result, the region has become the highest contributor of Congolese refugees
who have sought  refuge in  east  and Southern Africa (Nderitu,  2013).   As table  6 below
shows, in Durban, most participants of this study originated from the eastern part of the DRC
Table 6. The origin of participants in the DRC













The findings of table 6 above corroborate  Bariagaber’s (2016) argument that  regions that
experience high levels of instabilities are the highest contributors of refugees in the world.
Most of the participants in this study come from the war-prone eastern parts of the DRC.   
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The realization that most of participants originated from the eastern parts of the DRC led the
study to inquire whether most Congolese refugees in Durban were pro-government or anti-
government as shown in table 7 below.
Table 7. Participants’ support of the DRC government 





One of the reasons as to why many participants expressed strong anti-government sentiment
can be traced from their provinces of origin.  According to Titeca and Fahey (2016), due to
seclusion from the government, the eastern part of the DRC has remained rebellious to the
regime of president Joseph Kabila. For Mushi (2013) the eastern part of the DRC is mostly
considered a rebel-prone and an opposition stronghold which is characterized by strong anti-
government  sentiments.  For  instance,  one  participant  argued  that  there  was  no  need  for
people from the eastern part to support the current government of President Joseph Kabila
because since independence, their region had been sidelined in development29. Similarly, an
ex-military commander argued that while the eastern part of the DRC was rich in minerals, its
residents remained poor. “our region benefits outsiders and not us. The government cares
about investors who loot our minerals”30 
Most of the participants’ anti-government sentiment endorse Vogel and Raeymakers’s (2016)
view that despite its rich minerals, poverty levels are high in the eastern parts of the DRC.
This is an indication that most post-colonial regimes in the DRC have neglected the region
(Mamili, 2015). As a result, Parker, Vadheim, and Economics (2016) argue that the high level
of poverty among the population of mineral-rich provinces of Sud-Kivu, Nord-Kivu, Katanga
and Maniema has  exacerbated  the  formation  of  some militia  and rebel  groups that  have
sought  to  protect  this  region  from both  government  and  international  exploitation.  Still,
militia and rebel groups have used poor infrastructure and lack of presence of governance in
29 Interview with a Congolese activist in Durban 
30 Interview with a former military commander
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the eastern part of the DRC to enrich themselves by engaging in illegal mining31. Nabudere
(2014:3) adds that due to government negligence of the region, eastern DRC has harboured
the existence of many rebel movements like the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), Patriotic
Force  for  the  Liberation  of  Congo  (FPLC),  National  Integrationist  Front  (FNI),  and  the
Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi
(FDLR-FCA) and M23. It is for the foregoing reason that the researcher saw as a cause of
strong anti-government sentiment among participants of this study: most Congolese refugees
interviewed in this study were anti-government.
There  are  other  scholarly  arguments  that  vindicate  why  most  participants  of  this  study
expressed  strong  anti-government  sentiments  as  shown  in  table  7  above.  According  to
Bomboko (2012), the two most mineral rich provinces of Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu border
Uganda and Rwanda (see the map of DRC). The historicity of the DRC’s conflict has shown
that Uganda and Rwanda have been supporting selected rebel actions in the eastern Congo so
as to establish a sphere of influence. In some cases, Uganda and Rwanda have directly used
their military to cause conflicts in the eastern DRC (Bomboko, 2012). One participant argued
that  Uganda and Rwanda provided some sort  of security to  their  region which the DRC
government has failed to do so32. Also, another participant argued that “the only way that the
eastern part of the DRC can mount pressure to the government was through the support of the
Ugandan and Rwandan armies or rebels”33
Jones and Naylor (2014) argue that just like other post-colonial African states, the practice of
negative ethnicity and politics of favouritism has justified the DRC presidents to use their
offices to build patronage. In doing so, most presidents appoint elites from tribes that are
affiliated to them to hold senior government posts at the expense of other communities. In
this case, despite the eastern part of the DRC being rich in natural resources, it has been
excluded in participating in the politics and governance of the country (Whetho, 2014). 
31  A key former rebel soldier argued that the reason why he became a rebel was to protect
his territory from government sponsored foreign exploitation. 
32 Interview with a Congolese trader
33 Interview with a Congolese businessman in Durban 
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5.4  Participants’  support  and  views  on  the  Role  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC
While the finding reveals that most participants are anti-DRC government, it is under the
regime of Joseph Kabila that South Africa-DRC relations has flourished. According to the
Mail & Guardian (2015), South Africa has become the biggest supplier of goods and services
to the DRC, providing more than 21% of the country’s imports. At the same time, it is under
the regime of President Kabila that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC has
increased.  The participants’ anti-Kabila regimes sentiments and his relationship with South
Africa  underpinned  another  study’s  quest  of  finding  out  the  support  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC as narrated by the Congolese refugees.  In this study,
most of the participants of this study were concerned with seeing a better and peaceful DRC.
The  majority  of  participants  (31)  supported  the  efforts  that  South  Africa  was  making in
seeking lasting peace in the DRC as shown in table 8 below. One participant argued that since
South Africa is the leading trading partner with the DRC, it has no option but to end conflicts
in the DRC34.  Another participant argued that since the DRC was part of the SADC region,
problems that faced it were also affecting other countries in the region. “Since South Africa is
the most developed in SADC, it has the capacity address problems of war in the DRC”35. 
Table 8. Participants support of the SA peacebuilding interventions in the DRC 
SA peacebuilding in the DRC No. of Participants 
in Support 31
Against 19
Not concerned  8
Total 58
Most participants who were against South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
argued that South Africa was supporting the corrupt regime of President Joseph Kabila. “Why
would I support initiative that favour corruption and poor governance in the DRC?”36 Some
participants questioned the motive of South Africa of increasing its imports to DRC while at
the same time carrying out its peacebuilding interventions. 
However, from the findings, most participants agreed that South Africa had a role to play in
ending war in the DRC. After finding out that most of the study’s participants supported
34 Interview with Congolese right activist. 
35 Views of a Congolese medical doctor 
36 Views of Congolese Ex-rebel in Durban 
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South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, the study sought to explore some
aspired role of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC.   This  became  an  epitome  on  which  the  researcher  sought  to  find  out  why  the
scholarship on the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions has been less documented.
There  were  a  number  of  views  that  participants  narrated  as  the  role  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. Most of the participants’ view on the role
of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention were that South Africa should address the root
causes of war in the DRC. Participants’ views varied on root cause of war. For instance, all
former  military  and  rebels  that  the  study  interviewed  argued  that  media  superficially
portrayed the causes of war in the DRC. One ex-rebel argued, “on television, I see simplistic
reporting of war in the DRC. Some media reported that rebels were causing war so as to
enrich themselves.  What  is  not  known is  that  rebels  were working in  collaboration  with
government soldiers who they share looted proceeds”  37. An ex-military commander added
that by working with the Congolese army in its peacebuilding interventions, South Africa is
unaware that the government could not lead an offensive against rebels38. 
 Most views of participants on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the
DRC were based on their awareness of the dynamics of what breeds war in Congo.  To get
more insights, the study ensured that participants identified specific peacebuilding roles that
they thought South Africa’s was playing in the DRC. Each participant to the best of his/her
knowledge, could identify the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
as shown in Figure 5 below 
Figure 5.  participants' view in the role of SA peacebuiding intervention in the DRC
Positive peace in DRC Support of Kabila 
Protect SA businesses Thwart Kabila dissidents 
Creation of hegemony in SADC
37 An interview with a Congolese ex-rebel in Durban
38 An interview with a former government soldier 
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According  to  figure  5  above,  most  participants  argued  that  the  role  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC was to support the government of President Joseph
Kabila. The second largest category of participants argued that the role of South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention was to protect businesses owned by South Africans in the DRC.
Most  of  the  participants  who  saw South  Africa’s peacebuilding  as  either  the  support  of
President Kabila or protection of the South African businesses argued that such action had
dangerous impacts on the stability of the DRC. A Congolese civil right activists with Abahlali
BaseMjondolo argued that “South Africa’s support of the DRC government and protection of
business owned by South Africans was perpetuating the conflict further. This is because, such
actions  were  angering  rebels  and  militia  groups  especially  in  the  eastern  parts  of  the
country”39. A former military officer argued, “since many people in the eastern provinces of
the DRC were dissatisfied with the current government, South Africa support of the regime of
Kabila was going to  prolong the conflict”40.  Geenen (2014),  Prunier (2004) and Beswick
(2009)  argue  that  since  the  second  Congo  war,  the  eastern  part  (which  is  argued  to  be
harbouring rebels from Uganda and Rwanda) has been in resistance to both Laurent  and
Joseph Kabila’s rule. Therefore, by supporting the government of Joseph Kabila, as narrated
by participants, South Africa’s peacebuilding was fuelling rebels’ anger; thus, abetting new
forms of conflicts in the eastern DRC. 
The study linked some of the above views of the participants on the role of South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC to Congolese protests and demonstrations that took
place in 2012 at  Luthuli House (African Nation Congress Headquarters). During the 2012
demonstrations,  the  Congolese  community  registered  its  discontent  with  South  Africa’s
support  of  what  they  considered  an  illegitimate  re-election  of  President  Joseph  Kabila
(Institute for Global Dialogue, 2014). This explains the reason as to why most participants
narrated anti-Kabila sentiments. It can be argued that although most participants are away
from the DRC, they have not legitimatized the re-election of Kabila. Therefore, according to
these participants, by supporting the current government, South Africa was sustaining and not
averting  war,  especially  in  the  eastern  parts  of  the  DRC -  a  disgruntled  and anti-Kabila
region. 
39 Interview with a Congolese civil rights activist.
40 Interview with a member of Congolese civil right group in Durban.
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Some informants  held views that  South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s
conflict was an instrument of thwarting Kabila’s critics and civil rights organizations. This
category  of  participants  argued  that,  rather  than  South  Africa  being  impartial  in  its
peacebuilding interventions, it was in support of the Kabila government. This was considered
as perpetuation of the culture of immunity in the DRC. One key informant argued, “SANDF
forces were not only fighting rebels in the east but were also training a Congolese police
force  that  was  used  to  quell  any  anti-government  demonstration  organized  by  civil
societies”41.  The preceding participant’s view can be linked to the demonstration that was
done by Congolese refugees in Johannesburg in 2013. During, the 2013 demonstration, most
Congolese accused SANDF of training a Congolese army battalion that was being used to
crack  down President  Kabila’s critics  and  dissidents  in  Kinshasa  (Human  Rights  Watch,
2013). The views from this category of participants was that South Africa’s peacebuilding
was another instrument of sustaining Kabila’s regime which many Congolese, according to
participants, are dissatisfied with.   
 
There were also participants who argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention has
helped to root out some rebels in the eastern DRC. One participant argued “the most tangible
success of the South Africa’s interventions in the DRC is the disbandment of the M23 rebel
group in 2014”42.  “By weakening the activities of M23, South Africa was creating room for
positive peace in the DRC”43.  The views of the preceding participants were re-echoed during
president Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation address in 2014. According to President Zuma
(2014), peace in the DRC can only be realized if rebel groups were eliminated. Similarly,
Sandole  (2010)  argues  that  the  elimination  of  armed  rebel  groups  and  militias  (violent
groups)  necessitates  negative  peace  which  is  a  starting  point  of  positive  peace  (conflict
transformation).  Zuma  (2014)  and  Sandole’s  (2010)  views  were  re-echoed  by  some
participants  of  this  study.  For  instance,  a  Congolese  lawyer  in  Durban  argued,  “the
elimination of rebel groups like M23 by SANDF was going to create non-violent conditions
in the eastern parts of the DRC. This is going to allow peace programs to be implemented by
both local and international peacebuilders”44.
41 An interview with a civil rights activist who is a volunteer at BaseMjondolo in Durban. 
42 Views of a Congolese lecturer in a Durban based University 
43 Views of a Congolese lecturer
44 An interview with a Congolese lawyer in Durban.
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As a way of protecting its interest in the DRC, this study established two intertwined roles of
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions as narrated by the participants. Firstly, there were
participants who narrated that South Africa was using peacebuilding interventions to expand
its trading interest in the DRC. This was by protecting South African-owned business in the
DRC. Secondly, another category of participants narrated that since it began its peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC,  South  Africa  has  increased  its  bilateral  trade  in  the  DRC.
According to the Mail & Guardian, in 2015, the DRC accounted for 21% of all South Africa’s
exports in Africa.   For instance, a Congolese lawyer argued that he considered the role of
SANDF  as  a  security  to   South  African  business  elites  or  for  creating  a  conducive
environment  for South African companies45.   According to Gbaya (2015),  the Inga Dam,
agriculture and the abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies
own mining rights, are some of the interests of South Africa peacebuilding’s interventions in
the DRC. In a realist view, Gbaya (2015:15) emphasizes that “South Africa determines its
policies towards the DRC according to its national interest or its role as a champion of Africa
in the handling of the DRC’s conflict”. Gbaya’s (2015) view was re-affirmed by a participant
who argued that “there were a number of business, especially in the mineral and construction
sectors  that  were  owned  by  South  Africans.  Therefore,  the  quest  for  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding  interventions  was  to  protect  South  African  businesses  and  not  to  protect
Congolese”46.  
The table below shows South Africa’s economic interest in the DRC in the form of imports
and exports. The table covers six years in which South Africa became extensively involved in
peace  keeping  missions  in  the  DRC.  The  figures  in  table  9  below   stand  as  numerical
evidence of the extensive interest of South Africa in the DRC that could be prompting it to be
involved in peacebuilding.
Table 9. South African import and exports to the DRC
Year Imports  to  SA from
DRC
Exports  to  DRC
from SA
Total Trade Balance
2006 47 768 011 2 479 644 104 2 431 876 093
2007 54 034 126 4 369 539 310 4 315 505 184
45 An interview with a Congolese scholar in Durban. 
46 Interview with a Congolese economist lecturer in Durban.  
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2008 43 239 861 9 203 936 291 9 160 696 430
2009 72 354 386 4 829 931 726 4 757 577 340
2010 72 354 386 6 318 722 965 6 218 211 954
2011 106 500 768 8 040 664 774 7 934 164 006
2012 67 436 251 12 141 678 103 12 074 241 853
Adapted from Gbaya (2014:58)
The link  between South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  and businesses  in  the  DRC
prompted one participant to argue that the actions of South Africa were providing a recipe for
disaster.  The  preceding  views  of  participants  led  the  researcher  to  see  some  deleterious
connections between South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention, business and conflict in the
DRC. From the views of most participants, it can be argued that South Africa is providing
grounds for (re)occurrence of conflicts in three ways. Firstly, “by involving itself in mineral
businesses, South Africa was interfering with the interests of some MNCs and Congolese
mining companies”47.  As a  result,  another  informant  argued that  “some of South African
mining companies could be involved in funding rebels to destabilize the DRC for their profit
maximization”48. On the other hand, “South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
endangers  underpinning  rebels’  source  of  livelihood  (mineral  money)  which  the  current
government cannot offer”49.  As a consequence, “South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
were eliciting more rebel-like actions other than peace”50.  
The views of participants on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions re-affirm
the second and the third hypothesis of this study.  As argued in chapter one, South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict is a function of the interplay of interveners’
specific factors and variables in the local, national and international environments in which
they operate. Therefore, some of the views of the preceding informants on the role that South
47 Interview with a Congolese civil society activist.
48 Arguments of one informant during focus group A discussion in Durban – 
49 Arguments of one informant during focus group B discussion in Durban 
50 Arguments of one informant during focus group C discussion in Durban
117
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in DRC  rest  on the link of what the interveners will
benefit and not for the benefits of the Congolese (hypothesis two of this study). Still, some of
the participants’ views in this study vindicate the assumption that South Africa is using its
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict so as to consolidate its position in Africa
and in the world: to build its hegemony (hypothesis three of this study). 
5.5 Participants’ view on the importance of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention 
After exploring different views of the participants on the role of peacebuilding, the study saw
it worthwhile to find out how participants of this study rated South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC.  During  the  study,  41  participants  argued  that  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC were very significant.17 participants termed South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as of no significance or importance. 
41 participants argued that there was value in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention as it
was step forward in  addressing the protracted DRC conflict.  For  instance,  in most  focus
groups the majority of participants said that since 2013, when SANDF dismantled the M23
rebels, there has been some relative peace in the eastern DRC51. Similar views were reported
in  the  Guardian  Newspaper  of  Tuesday 5th November,  2013.  According  to  the  Guardian
(2013)  the  SANDF  under  the  MUNUSCO  mission  backed  by the  Congolese  army had
captured and forced M23 rebels to declare a ceasefire of disarming and demobilizing and to
start pursuing a political settlement with the DRC government. This vindicates participants’
views that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict were of great
value.  
51 Focus group discussions of February, 2016
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There were 17 participants who felt that the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC were of no importance simply because, they are not all-inclusive.   For instance,  an
activist with Abahlali BaseMjondolo argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
favoured one party to the conflict at the expense of other disgruntled actors52. By sidelining
other  actors  to  the  Congolese  conflict,  the  preceding  participant  added  that,  “the  South
Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  were  prolonging,  complicating  and  perpetuating  the
DRC’s conflict further”53. In addition to complicating and prolonging conflicts, an ex-rebel
argued  that  “since  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  were  one-sided,  they  were
producing  other  deleterious  complications”54.  “By neglecting  rebel  and  other  disgruntled
groups in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa was setting new grounds
for future conflicts in the DRC” , argued a former Congolese ex-rebel  55. According to the
views  of  the  ex-rebel,  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC  were
undermining the influence of the rebel groups in the eastern parts of that country56. 
According to Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011), neglecting other parties to the
conflict risks exacerbating conflict. This is because, when conflicts arise, no party recognizes
the  other  as  having  legitimate  claims  (Lambourne,  2014).  In  this  context,  a  Congolese
professor in a Durban university argued that “conflicts in the DRC are due lack of recognition
of political regimes since 1996. Therefore, by recognizing and negotiating with the Kabila
government (which is considered illegitimate), South Africa was fostering warlodism57 in the
DRC”58.  A Congolese human rights lawyer argued that by favouring Kabila, South Africa’s
peacebuilding initiative was paying a blind eye to the role being played by Rwanda and
Uganda in the DRC’s conflict59.  Scholars such as Nderitu (2013) argue that Rwanda and
Uganda have been accused of supporting the actions of the rebels in the DRC since 1998.
According  to  Sadiki  (2014),  Rwanda  and  Uganda  have  been  accused  by  international
peacebuilders of arming and financing different rebel groups in the DRC. Therefore, from the
views  of  some  participants,  by  exclusively  supporting  the  government  of  Kabila,  South
52 Interview with a civil society activist in Durban
53 Interview with a Congolese activist in Durban
54 An interview with a former rebel soldier.
55 An interview with a former rebel soldier.
56 An interview with a former rebel soldier.
57 Warlodism is a situation whereby there is an emergence of leaders and groups of militias 
that are accountable to nobody when the central government is weak (Prunier, 2010)
58 Interview with a Congolese Professor at a Durban university 
59 Views of a Congolese human rights lawyer in Durban 
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Africa’s peacebuilding interventions can be argued to be resuscitating the effects of Rwanda
and Uganda in the DRC’s conflict.  
5.6  Aspired  contributions  of  the  of  Participants  to  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC
This  sub-section explores  aspired contribution(s) of Congolese refugees to  South Africa’s
peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC as  narrated  by participants.  The section  answers
questions on what participants consider to be the proxy and immediate causes of war in the
DRC and what their aspired contributions to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC are.  Asked on what participants considered to be the causes of war in the DRC, a
number of reasons were given as shown in table 10 below 
Table 9. Participants’ view on the causes of war in the DRC
Cause of war No. of Participants Participants  contribution
to SA PCB
Communal deprivation   15 Identify tribal barons
International  actors  and
MNC
   7 Identify  MNC’s  and
companies  that  funded
rebels
Corrupt  Weak  DRC’s
government institutions
 14 Identify  corrupt
individuals  and
institutions  in DRC
Poverty and inequality  18 Elaborate  how  poverty
recruited  youth into  rebel
groups 
Other factors   4 Identify  factors  such  as
illiteracy  and ignorance
According  to  table  10  above,  15  participants  argued  that  it  was  deprivation  of  some
communities to participate in politics of the DRC60 that was the root cause of war in the DRC.
This category of participants further argued that their aspired role within the South Africa’s
peacebuilding could be to identify different forms of deprivations that some communities
were subjected to in the DRC. This included deprivation of basic needs, security and political
participation. There were 7 participants who argued that it was the actions of international
60 The fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition 
(Lonsdale, 2014).
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actors and MNCs that were precipitating war in the DRC. This group of participants added
that  their  aspired  role  in  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  would  be  to  name
companies and MNCs that were financing and arming rebel groups for their own interests. 14
participants argued that it was the DRC’s weak and corrupt government institutions that were
causing  conflicts.  According  to  the  preceding  group,  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
intervention could benefit from their identification of corrupt elites and institutions in the
DRC that were diverting money meant for development to fund conflicts. 18 participants
argued that poverty and inequality were main causes of war in the DRC. According to the
preceding participants, South Africa could reap from their views that poverty and inequality
made many Congolese youths to join rebel groups. Still, they argued that violence was the
only means of addressing inequalities and poverty in the DRC. Only 4 participants saw other
factors like illiteracy and ignorance as the causes of war in the DRC. They argued that due to
ignorance  of  their  rights,  many Congolese  were unable  to  hold  government  accountable.
Ignorance  among  Congolese  was  perpetuated  by  illiteracy.  To  the  last  category  of
participants, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions could be beneficial if South Africa
launched peacebuilding educational programmes that fought ignorance and illiteracy. 
A  number  of  inferences  and  plausible  explanations  can  be  made  from  the  result  of
informants’ arguments  on the  causes  of  war  in  the DRC and their  contribution  to  South
Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions.  Firstly,  it  is  possible  that  informants  who  saw
‘tribalism’ and ‘ethnicity’ as  a  cause  of  war  could  have  lost  some of  their  relatives  and
properties in a tribal conflict. As such, they linked tribalism with war. However, it may be
conjectured that the 15 informants who saw tribalism as a cause of war in the DRC were
affiliated to tribes from the eastern parts of the DRC that had been marginalized and secluded
within the realpolitik of the DRC. Secondly, it can be argued that 18 informants who saw
poverty and inequality as causes of war could be indigenes of the mineral-rich part of DRC;
despite the eastern part  of the DRC having been endowed with rich mineral,  most of its
population remains poor.  The preceding argument can also be linked to the assertion of the
first  category  of  15  informants  who  saw greed  for  ‘mineral  money’ as  a  cause  of  war.
According to one participant “if most Congolese could benefit from their rich minerals, then
it  is  likely that no one will  become a rebel due to  greed or access to mineral money”61.
Thirdly, “it is corruption and weak governance that has made specific individual and external
61 Interview with a Congolese businessman in Durban
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to compete for rich minerals in the DRC while leaving the majority of the population poor”62.
The foregoing reason is a plausible explanation for the second category of the 14 informants
who saw the weak DRC’s government institutions and infrastructure as a cause of war in the
country. Poverty and exclusion, tribalism and ethnicity, greed for mineral money and weak
government can be plausible explanations of why 7 informants argued that some international
actors - including peacekeepers and MNCs abetted the DRC war so as to maximize profit
from illegal minerals.
It is pertinent to state here that the majority of participants originated from the areas that are
plagued with resource-related conflicts. Therefore, it can be argued that most of informants
provided information based on their personal experiences and understandings of the strong
links between natural resources and conflicts in these areas as well as the involvement of
government and foreign actors in conflicts and in the peacebuilding process.
5.9 Presuppositions on views of Congolese refugees 
The foregoing sub-sections  presupposes  that  Congolese refugees  in  Durban are aware of
South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC.  Having  said  that,  an  objective
analysis of their views in relation to this study challenges a number of scholars’ assertion on
the role of refugees in peacebuilding. From the foregoing data, it is worth stating here that
recognizing the voice of Congolese (as transnational subalterns) allows one to see that there
are levels of subaltern agency as a response to being forcibly uprooted, including having
legitimate opinion/s on what is happening back home. It is due to bias and lack of gaining
vital insights and perspectives from the subaltern Congolese in South Africa, that has made
many scholars  not  to  cast  a  more  ‘grounded  gaze’ on  the  motivations  propelling  South
Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the DRC’s conflict. Therefore, an exploration of views of
Congolese  refugees  presented  in  this  chapter  reveals  that  while  extant  of  scholarship  on
refugees and conflict transformation is extensive (as presented in literature review segment),
it  is  also myopic,  and short-sighted in not  interrogating the attitudes  of refugees towards
peacebuilding interveners in the refugees’ home countries.
In ending this subsection, it is vital to mention that the preceding views of the Congolese
refugees  towards  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC’s conflict  have
challenged a number of scholars’ assumption. The first assumption that has been challenged
62 Interview with a Congolese student in Durban 
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is  the  scholarly view that  there  is  a  homogeneous  Congolese  refugee  community that  is
concerned with only seeking a humanitarian assistance from South Africa.   As this chapter
has revealed (preceding data), the Congolese refugee community in Durban is heterogeneous
in all  aspects including those who are concerned with seeing a better  DRC (gender, age,
education,  marital  status, political  affiliation and their stand on the role of South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC). Therefore, the explication of the views of Congolese
refugees  in  this  chapter  has  challenged  some  sections  of  scholarship  for  being  one
dimensional in their assumptions.
The preceding qualitative data  has challenged the view Kadima (1993),  Amisi(2004) and
Rugunan and Smit (2014) that  Congolese refugees are people who are only concerned with
immediate  concerns  of  supporting  themselves  like  eking  out  their  daily  living.  On  the
contrary according to Table 5.8, most Congolese refugee, street vendors, businesswo/men and
intelligentsia, academia and activists among others are aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC. From table 5.8 it can be argued that most of the concerns of the
informants was to see a better DRC and an all-encompassing South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention.
A  third  assumption  that  has  been  challenged  through  the  exploration  of  the  views  of
Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, is  the
argument that  Congolese refugees  have come to South Africa to  earn a  living and are a
liability to the government. Scholars such as Chimni (2002) and Tonheim and Swart (2015)
contend that  most South Africans stereotype refugees as dependents and parasites. On the
contrary, figure 7 reveals the high level of education and skill that Congolese refugees in
Durban are endowed with. According to figure 7 Congolese refugees are highly qualified
academically. However, due to their disadvantaged position in South Africa, most of them
have been rendered jobless or employed in the informal sector.
5.10 Conclusion 
In line with this study’s hypothesis,  this  chapter underscored the idea that  South Africa’s
interventions in the DRC may/not be edified on an assumption that peacebuilding is a means
of addressing the high influx of Congolese refugees. In doing so, this chapter contends that
there is a lot that Congolese refugees can contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC.  Therefore,  the  chapter  foregrounds  the  view  that  an  in-depth
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analysis and examination of different views, attitudes and perceptions of Congolese refugees
residing in Durban towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC holds key
as opposed to simplistic or reductionist explanations, and engenders a holistic understanding
of how the national interests of South Africa can be realized through conflict transformation.
The question that merits attention is: how can the analysis of the views of the Congolese




AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIEWS AND ATTITUDES OF THE CONGOLESE
REFUGEES TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEBUIDING INTERVENTIONS IN
THE DRC
6.1 Introduction 
Gschwend  and  Schimmelfennig  (2011)  argue  that  whether  qualitative  or  quantitative  or
mixed  method,  social  science  research  becomes  relevant  when  a  balance  between  the
apparent  competing values  of science (theory)  and human relations (practice)  is  reached.
Broomhall purports that the relevance of social research is subjective. Despite Broomhall’s
assertion, it is imperative that a researcher takes into account both the social and the scientific
relevance  in  any  study  (Laher,  2013:10).  Therefore,  theory  and  practice  have  to  be
intertwined so  as  to  come up with an  interpreting  paradigm of  a  particular  phenomenon
(Gibson 1986:143). 
In an attempt to apply theory into practice, this chapter contextualizes the apparent competing
values of theory (what so far has been argued in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) and practice (the
qualitative data  presented in  chapter  five) -  an analysis  of the views and attitudes of the
Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Firstly,
while the theoretical chapters of this study aided in understanding scholarly arguments, the
qualitative  data  segment  probed  the  actual  views  of  the  Congolese  refugees  residing  in
Durban on the subject under investigation. As it was mentioned in chapter five, some of the
scholarly arguments were challenged by the views and attitudes of the Congolese refugees
towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. 
Secondly  by  linking  theory  and  practice  (in  this  chapter)  this  study  explicates  why
scholarship  in  the  context  of  Congolese  refugees  within  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions  in  the  DRC is  extensive  yet  myopic  in  not  including  the  actual  voices  of
Congolese refugees in South Africa. Accordingly, the chapter argues that it is due to short-
sightedness of scholarly works on not gaining vital insights and perspectives of attitudes and
views of Congolese refugees in  South Africa, that has limited from casting a more ‘grounded
gaze’ on the motivations propelling South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the DRC.
 Therefore, this chapter analyses the attitudes and the perceptions of the Congolese refugees
towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC on one hand, and on the other
hand, it explicates the capacity and the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in
the DRC. By drawing on the experiences, insights and arguments of the empirical realities of
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Congolese refugees residing in Durban, towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in  the  DRC,  this  chapter  contributes  new  knowledge  on  peacebuilding  in  the  DRC.
Additionally, by drawing on the experiences, insights and arguments of the empirical realities
of  Congolese  refugees  residing  in  Durban,  towards  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC, this chapter is helpful in probing some scholarly assumption on
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: if  it  is  to consolidate its  position
among  the  world’s  powers  or  maintaining  hegemony  (as  espoused  within  the  tenets  of
realism) or for positive peace in the DRC (as espoused within the tenets of cosmopolitan
conflict transformation). It is based on these analyses that the researcher fills in the dearth in
literature  on  the  role  of  refugees  in  exile  and  their  contributions  to  peacebuilding
interventions in their country of origin. As such, this chapter moves this study from being
merely descriptive to a more dynamic one. 
6.2 Arguments of the Congolese refugee on the causes of war in the DRC
As mentioned in the literature review, research on conflict transformation has narrowed much
work on the efforts of peacebuilding by focusing largely on how to ‘use short, medium and
long-term processes of either averting or rebuilding war-affected communities so as to reduce
the likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war and/or violence’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011:
199).  Lambourne  (2004)  suggests  that  if  one  is  to  reach  the  desired  goal  of  conflict
transformation,  focus should be on building and rebuilding the political,  security, justice,
social and economic fabric or institutions of a society in war or those emerging from conflict.
Other  peace  scholars  suggest  that  the  root  cause  of  conflict  needs  to  be  addressed  by
promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place institutions of governance
and  rule  of  law, which  will  serve  as  a  foundation  for  peacebuilding,  reconciliation  and
development (Nkhulu 2005; Botes 2001: 43). Similarly, cosmopolitan conflict transformation
theory  argues  that  there  is  a  need  for  an  all-encompassing  intervention  strategy  in
warring/post-war countries so as to necessitate the actual transformation of attitudes of parties
to the war. In this case, interveners should incorporate all parties to the conflict: conflicting
parties, non-combatants, civilians, refugees and IDPs in peacebuilding by use of bottom-up
and top-down strategies. However, according to realism,  by choosing to intervene whether
diplomatically or militarily in a conflict state, an intervener (whether a regional body, state or
individual)  does  so  in  pursuit  of  its  objectives  and  policies  which  may include  foreign,
economic and security interests.
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In most of the preceding arguments, there is the perception (by scholars and interveners) of
refugees from countries ravaged by war as powerless agents in contributing to building and
rebuilding peace in their countries. In the context of this study a number of scholars have
contributed  to  the  knowledge  of  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC
(Smith and Rugunanan, 2014; Gordon, 2014; Lakika et al, 2015; Tonheim and Swart, 2015).
As such, the preceding scholars’ works depict how the DRC is still a gauging capacity for
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Coupled with different labels and
misconceptions  that  refugees  in  South  Africa  are  associated  with,  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC  are  still  an  important  component  of  conflict
transformation  on  the  continent.  However,  there  is  a  dearth  on  empirical  studies  that
interrogate the attitudes, perceptions and views that Congolese refugees (residing in South
Africa) have towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. 
This  sub-section  highlights  and  explicates  the  seemingly  scholarly  forgotten  role  of  the
Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC by focusing on
the  views,  attitudes  and  arguments  of  the  Congolese  community  residing  in  Durban  (as
expressed in chapter five). As such, this section foregrounds a new type of empirically based
research that is  needed in understanding South Africa’s role in conflict  transformation in
Africa.
6.2.1. Poverty and inequality as the causes of war in the DRC
As argued in chapter one, peacebuilding is a long term process whereby all parties to the
conflict (armed and non-armed) have the independence to create an environment that will
eradicate the root causes of violence. According to McAskie (2006: 18) lasting peace can be
achieved when interveners become sensitive to the needs of locals and not for the sake of
interveners’ interests.  One way of being sensitive to the needs of the locals is to allow them
to voice out what they consider to be the root cause of war within their society. In the case of
this study, analsying the root causes of war in the DRC from the perspective of the Congolese
refugees in South Africa (Durban), holds key to understanding the root causes of the DRC’s
conflict.  One challenge to peacebuilding has been the quest for interveners  to address the
antagonisms between top conflicting elites and militant groups’ leaders without addressing
the  root  cause(s)  of  war  -  frustrated  basic  human  rights  and  needs  (Sandole,  2010:9).
Therefore, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions can harness a good starting point if
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they pay attention to the views of the Congolese refugees on how they view poverty and
inequality as the root causes of war in the DRC as shown in table 5.13 in chapter five. 
According  to  table  5.13  the  majority  of  Congolese  refugees  argued  that  poverty  and
inequalities are the key root causes of war in the DRC. Such arguments correlated with most
literature  on  the  DRC’s  general  economic  situation.  For  instance,  the  April  2016  IMF
statistics show that the DRC’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person has shifted from
2,389.50 in  1980 to 489.796 in  2016.  This  DRC’s GDP is  reported  to  have  been worse
between 2001 (121.345 USD) and 2005 (196.635usd). These were years close to the end of
conflict (2003). According to the Global Finance Magazine (2015), the DRC was the poorest
country in the world between 2009 and 2013. The DRC’s GDP between the preceding years
placed it among 19 poorest countries situated in Africa. This reiterates Keen’s (2008: 757)
view that political,  social,  cultural and economic inequalities among groups are important
catalysts for violent conflict. According to Keen (2008:757), inequalities between groups -
ethnicity, religion, age and gender that may lead into problems with poverty reduction in turn
lead to violent conflict (Stewart, 2011:541). Similarly, the views of Congolese refugees that
poverty  and  inequalities  are  the  root  causes  of  war  in  the  DRC resonate  with  Walter’s
(2003:371) assertion that conflicts are evident where ‘the first is a situation of individual
hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s current situation (poverty due to inequality). The
second is the absence of any nonviolent means for change’. These differences are not as a
result  of  a  difference  in  an inherent  profitable  quality but  a  form of  a  forced  inequality
between different groups living in the same society. In the context of the DRC, due to politics
of reward, nepotism and seclusion, the elite from other parts of the country and foreigners
have accumulated  wealth  for  themselves  in  mineral-rich  provinces  at  the  expense  of  the
indigenes  of  those  regions.  Most  of  the  indigenes  of  mineral-rich  provinces  have  no
alternative non-violent means of advocating for change of their situations. As such, many of
them resort to violence as their last option.  This makes the DRC like in other conflict cases
to vindicate many scholarly arguments that violent conflicts arise as a result of inequality and
poverty. 
To further vindicate the Congolese views that the root causes of conflict  in the DRC are
poverty and inequality is the situation in the eastern provinces of the country. Although rich
in minerals, the eastern provinces of the DRC are not immune to poverty. In fact, the eastern
parts  of the country are considered the poorest  provinces in the DRC.  According to the
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UNDP (2009),  the  eastern  part  of  the  DRC  has  the  highest  rate  of  poverty  at  84.7%.
According to the result of the 1-2-3 survey in 2005, the eastern part of the DRC had a 58.2 %
rate of unemployment. The eastern part of the DRC also has a weak education rate of 53.3%
at primary level,  only14.8% and 2.5% of household have access  to water  and electricity
respectively. There is poor healthcare system in the eastern parts of the DRC; a hospital of 16
beds serves about 100,000 habitants. Similarly, the ratio of a doctor to patient is 1: 24,699.
80% of the population do not have toilets (UNDP 2009).  To cope with this situation, the
UNDP’s (2011) statistics show that 9 out of 10 (90%) indigenes of the eastern parts work in
the informal sector. This is contrary to the vast rich-minerals that the region is endowed with.
According  to  a  key Congolese  refugee  informant,  “at  the  expense  of  the  poverty of  the
Congolese indigenes in mineral rich east, the government has allocated vast majority of the
mining sector the elites and powerful  civil  servants from other  parts  of DRC, MNC and
entered multilateral deals with other countries”63.  Furthermore, a civil right activist argued
that the elites from the east, “due to corruption have also colluded with the government in
allocating  the  rich  mining  industry  to  the  preceding  groups  who  have  pre-occupied
themselves with creating wealth for themselves, at the expense of the poor locals”64. This
assails the argument that although the eastern parts of the DRC is the economic hub of the
DRC, its wealth is controlled by elites, MNCs and bilateral  agreements with other states
(Whetho, 2014). Since independence, most regimes in the DRC have used the eastern part of
the DRC to reward their cronies, tribeswomen and men, MNCs and other countries while
depriving citizens of basic needs such as such as security, food and shelter.  The increasing
poverty level and the indigenous Congolese has been identified by scholars as a root cause of
establishment of rebel groups like the M23 (ISS, 2012). In one of his argument a former M23
soldier  now  residing  in  Durban  argued  that  “due  corruption  and  politics  of  reward,  the
government  has  allowed  the  mineral  resources  of  the  eastern  DRC to  be  dominated  by
outsiders”65. Furthermore, the former M23 soldier argued that he decided to join the group as
his  best  way of reclaiming and protecting his region against  the government  decision of
allowing foreign based MNCs from stealing their mineral wealth. 
Most of the arguments of informants assailed Edward Azar’s (1992) argument that protracted
social conflicts are vibrant in most post-colonial African societies that have been dominated
63 An interview with a former rebel soldier in Durban.
64 An interview with a Congolese civil rights activist.
65 An interview with a former M23 Soldier in Durban 
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by a particular or a coalition of groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups.
According to Azar (1992) in most post-colonial societies, conflicts arise due to some groups
or parties demanding political access, autonomy, secession or control due to contemporary
resentment against socio-cultural, economics and political constraints. As it was argued in
chapter  two,  the  DRC  has  an  abundance  of  resources.  However,  due  to  exclusion  and
divisionary  politics,  many  Congolese  especially  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  country  are
disappointed with their region’s exclusion in political power, access to development funds,
under representation of their region/ethnic group in the government and administration and
allocation of their land to other ethnic groups (of the ruling ethnic group). This has made the
region an epicenter of war for decades. Different militia and rebel groups led by elites from
mineral rich east (with the aid of rebels and national armies of Uganda, Rwanda and foreign
actors)  and  the  government  scramble  to  control  the  extraction  of  minerals.  The  elites,
individuals and rebels in the eastern part of the DRC see the accessibility to abundant mineral
resources as equivalent to their sustainability and eradication of their poverty situation for
their families66. 
A number of scholars have argued that most previous and current peacebuilding initiatives
seek to end the DRC war at a superficial level (negative peace).  However, according to a
Congolese scholar67 poverty and inequality which he describes as the edifice of all conditions
that lead to violence in the DRC are still at large. According to the same scholar, this is still a
reason why South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC may not  address  the
conditions  that  underpin  war  in  the  DRC.  “Since  South  Africa  has  favoured  a  liberal
mechanism of addressing the DRC war, electioneering and protecting the legacy of President
Joseph Kabila, poverty and inequality among the Congolese will be left as a lingering effect
to peace by dividing and polarizing Congolese even further68.” Many informants were of the
view that external peace negotiators and policy makers in regards to the DRC war have not
involved  or  considered  the  needs  of  locals  in  coming  up  with  a  constructive  way  of
addressing poverty and inequality. As a result, their   peacebuilding and recovery efforts have
failed to avert violence in the country.
Another key informant argued that although poverty and inequality (despite mineral richness)
can be seen as sufficient in understanding the root causes of DRC’s war, the situation has
66 Views from a Congolese rights activist residing in Durban. 
67 Views of a Congolese lecturer at a Durban University. 
68 A former Congolese military rebel. 
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been compounded by external factors (international actors) that have escalated the violence.
The emergency of China and India as new economic powers within the international system
has led to unfair competition for DRC’s minerals. Due to poverty, many Congolese have been
easily “bought and bribed to become rebels so that they may protect the interests of Chinese
and Indian mining companies. This does not exclude European and American MNC that have
easily funded rebel actions for their own survival”69. Non-governmental organizations have
been  in  the  forefront  in  peace  education  in  the  DRC.  However,  for  their  survival  and
continuous existence, “NGOs have given handout to poverty stricken Congolese. As a result,
they  have  failed  to  empower  Congolese  to  be  self-reliant”70.   Other  than  alleviating
Congolese from war and poverty, external actors (MNCs and NGOs) have promoted war
economics.  According  to  economics  of  war  theorists,  war  is  a  profitable  investment  for
MNCs and peacebuilding NGOs and industrialized and powerful states (Ostby, 2008: 143). 
The proceeding arguments of informants assails Stewart’s (2011) argument that poverty and
inequality coupled with actions of external actors are a mixture of factors that promote war in
most  post-colonial  African  states.  The  DRC is  not  an  exception.  For  instance,  Hoebeke
(2010)71 argues  that  the  first,  second  and  third  Congo  wars  were  premised  on  ethnic
disgruntlement due to politics of exclusion,  division and reward.  The exclusion of other
ethnic groups by the ruling one has created a speculation that the ruling group is the sole
beneficiary of the mineral wealth at the expense of their poverty. This has made the DRC war
to eventually turn from ethnic animosity to resource curse. In the end, poverty and inequality
(amid  the  abundance  of  natural  resources)  has  resulted  in  negative  economic  and  social
politics in the DRC. This has become a recipe for incessant violence in the Congo (Auty,
2001:346)72.  As  one  Congolese  engineering  graduate  -  now a  street  vendor  in  Durban  -
argued, “War in the DRC is sectorally done by some groups of Congolese (both elite and
individuals) who are discontent with most of post-colonial regimes”73. Summed up well with
a Congolese human rights activist,  “the DRC war is  as a result  of ethnic,  economic and
political inequalities between different groups”74.
69 An interview with an upcoming Congolese economist 
70 Interview with a Congolese rights activist in Durban 
71 Hans Hoebeke,” The politics of continuity?”African.Org, February 2010. 
72 10Richard Auty, how natural resources affect economic development.’’ Journal of policy 
review 18(oxford:
Oxford (2001) pp.346- 367. 
73 An interview with a Congolese electronics repairer.
74 An interview with a Congolese rights activist working with Basemjondolo in Durban.
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6.2.2 Weak government institutions and corruption 
Le Billon (2001) and Auty (2001) argue that the weakness of institutions within a state is
more  likely  to  fuel  conflicts.  According  to  Le  Billion  (2001:  562),  states  with  weak
institutions are more likely to have unending intra and inter-state conflicts while those with
functioning strong institutions with good governance are less likely to go to war. When a state
has poorly laid down institutions and structures, it triggers the formation of social classes in
the society.  It is the social classes formed that become an obstacle to development: weak
institutions lead do different forms of injustices (political, social and economic). A number of
informants justified the incessant DRC war as the only option for finding justice. According
to Musa75 “the only way that the current international community and the Kabila regime can
attend to deprivation of basic human needs to the Congolese civilian-especially those in the
eastern parts of DRC, is through incessant violence”. For Musa, continuation of war in the
DRC is the only means that will free most of the Congolese from the oppression that they
have faced from all post-colonial regimes. Musa’s arguments resonate with Azar (1992) who
claim that  deprivation of basic  human needs such as security, communal  recognition and
distributive justice due to weak government institutions is a major precondition for protracted
social conflict: hence, conflicts are the only means whereby those who feel deprived can get
access to their basic needs. 
Underlying  structures  and  institutions  that  deprive  some  group  justice  catalyze  conflicts
(Galtung, 2001). In the DRC, war due to natural resources is attributed to weak and poor
government institutions that are easily manipulated by elites and external actors. This denies
Congolese access to justice in their own country. While many efforts have been put in place
to avert  the DRC war, they have been left  at  negative peace-ceasefire  and peace deals  -
without transforming weak institutions that continue to breed injustices that are root causes of
war.  This is a re-affirmation of Sandole (2010:9) who argues that ‘negative peace might be a
necessary condition for positive peace …but falls short of transforming deep-rooted causes
and conditions of conflict’.  One informant argued that the efforts of international bodies to
end war in the DRC always culminate in negotiating and addressing antagonisms between top
conflicting parties. Apparently, “the efforts of the international community fail to address the
unjust  and  weak  DRC institutions  and  structures  that  frustrate  basic  human  needs  of  a
75 An interview with a Congolese lecturer at a Durban university. 
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common Congolese”76.  This being the case, one civil rights activist argued that war in the
DRC is justified as the only means of facilitating creation of just structures, institutions and
good governance in the country. A former M23 rebel soldier argued that the international
community has been aware that there were no structures and institutions in the DRC that can
hold those who violate the constitution. However, their efforts for peacebuilding in the DRC
have promoted immunity for most elites. This being the case, war in the DRC continues to be
abetted77. 
The  incessant  DRC war  is  attributed  to  poor  institutions  and  weak  governance.  This  is
contrary to countries like United Arab Emirates (UAE) which like the DRC are rich in oil but
have strong institutions that promote good governance and just distribution of resources to all
(Fearon,  2004).   The presence of good institutions and governance in UAE contradicts  a
famous scholarly argument that abundance of resources triggers conflict, the resource course
narrative  (Collier  and  Hoeffler,  2004;  Stewart,  2011).  In  fact,  the  presence  of  good
governance  in  oil  rich  UAE shows how abundance  of  diamond,  oil,  gold  among others,
should reduce the occurrence of conflicts if such resources benefit all (Le Billion, 2001). In
the context of the DRC, Le Billion’s (2001) argument is inapplicable. It does not offer an
explanation as to why the abundance of mineral resources in the DRC has promoted presence
of  weak  and  unjust  institutions  that  do  not  promote  good  governance.  On  the  contrary,
abundance of resources in the DRC has promoted both internal and external strife in the
country.  One  informant  argued  that  “if  the  DRC  government  can  set  up  industries  and
structures to process its mineral, it can create employment for majority of Congolese who are
languishing  in  poverty  due  to  unemployment”78.  The  preceding  argument  shows  that
industrialization  and infrastructure  development  has  remained minimal.  Although mineral
resources in the DRC have occupied the centre of power in the Congolese realpolitik, most of
the minerals are extracted as raw material and processed elsewhere in the world. This has
continued to hamper industrial and infrastructure development. As it was argued earlier, the
DRC has a poor transport  network.  Some parts  of the country are not  accessible.   Since
independence, all governments have made mineral resources the centre of power. Those who
have felt left out by the government have promoted the occurrence of civil wars in two ways.
Firstly, they have promoted or funded civil wars as a way of toppling the ruling regime so as
76 An interview with a Congolese  business owner in Durban 
77 Telephone interview with a former M23 rebel in Durban. 
78 Interview with a former DRC government employee. 
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to get access to power. Secondly, the centre of power is located in Kinshasa. Due to poor
transport network parts that have been neglected by the government despite being rich in
minerals  continue  to  experience  war  lordship:  rebels  have  taken  control  of  such regions
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).
Weak institutions, lack of good governance and poor infrastructure provide opportunities for
unjust regimes, individuals and organizations to accumulate wealth corruptly. According to
one informant, due to lack of institutions that hold those who committed crimes in the DRC
accountable, both government and rebel leaders have used ordinary Congolese as instruments
of their enrichment (Nazli and North, 1993). They have directly or indirectly supported the
efforts  of  warlords.  For  instance,  a  former  M23  soldier  argued  that  the  “installation  of
Mobutu Sseseko was an attempt by the international  community to disregard weak DRC
government institution. It was also a way of using poor leadership that the country is known
for to strip off DRC its abundant natural resources”.
 Institutions and governance have further been weakened by inter-governmental institutions
like the International  Criminal  Court  (ICC),  African Union (AU) and the United Nations
(UN). For instance, in April 2004, the government of Joseph Kabila referred the DRC conflict
to the ICC so as those who were suspected to have violated human rights to be investigated
and prosecuted.  According to Hanson (2008), the ICC responded to the DRC request and
announced the opening of investigations in June 2004. Unfortunately, only rebels and militia
group leaders were indicated by the ICC for committing crimes against humanity. The ICC
did  not  call  for  prosecution  of  senior  government  officials  who had been implicated  for
committing crimes against humanity. The ICC, AU and the UN argued that prosecution of
government official was going to destabilize the DRC further (Clark (2007). Implicitly, the
action of the ICC, AU and the UN inculcated a culture of impunity. In this sense, to be in
government is the only way of escaping crimes. Clark (2008) and Xinhua (2009) argue that
President  Joseph  Kabila  and  other  senior  government  officials  ought  to  have  been  held
accountable for abuse of human rights in the DRC conflict. The non-indictment of Kabila and
other senior government officials makes Clark (2008) and Xinhua (2009) to argue that to be
in government is to be immune from the laws of the DRC. 
Some of  the views of  participants  of  this  study assail  a  number of  scholarly arguments.
According Pruner (2010), the DRC conflict like is characterized by accessing government
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positions as immunity to any form of prosecution against any form of abuse of public office.
For instance,  a Congolese professor at  a Durban university argued that “holding a public
office or being a senior state official meant access to the DRC’s national “cake”79. Still, to be
a senior government official,  means lack of accountability. “This is the reason why many
development  plans  in  DRC cannot  be sustained”80 .Additionally, “instead  of  investing  in
physical,  human,  economic,  political  and  social  infrastructure,  those  who  hold  senior
positions  in  the  government  use  the  weak  judicial  system  and  spent  mineral  revenues
sumptuously without  any form of accountability”81.  Similarly, another  civil  rights  activist
argued,  “the DRC government has spent a  fortune of the mineral wealth buying military
equipment instead of investing in infrastructure and strengthening institutions. This is the
reason why the entire country has a poor road network that enables rebels to carry out their
mission with easiness”82. 
From the preceding arguments, most participants in focus group A, B, C and D concurred that
the  best  peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  DRC  needs  to  strengthen  weak  institutions,
governance and infrastructure so as to improve service delivery in the DRC. There are a
number of participants who argued that constructive peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
needs to be directed towards addressing structural injustices that abet continuation of violence
in the country.  However, there were participants who also raised reservations with ongoing
South  African  peacebuilding  interventions.  For  example,  an  ex-rebel  argued  that  South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions are modelled on liberal peace which focusses on the
“use of military to stop belligerents from fighting. At the end of fighting, most interveners
have failed to address the causes of war in the DRC”83. Most participants argued that South
Africa needs to learn from the history of peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. As it was
argued in chapter four, most peacebuilding efforts in the DRC have failed to address the issue
of weak institutions and poor governance as both a proxy and immediate cause of conflicts in
the DRC. For instance, one Congolese rights activists blamed South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions  for  weakening  government  institutions  further.  According  to  the  preceding
participant, weak institutions have failed to promote sustainable development84. 
79 Interview with a Congolese professor at a Durban university 
80 Interview with a Congolese professor 
81 Interview with a Congolese lawyer 
82 Congolese activist with BaseMjondolo in Durban. 
83 Interview with a former M23 rebel.
84 Interview with a Congolese human rights activists 
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6.2.3 International actors and MNCs greed for ‘mineral money’
A number of scholars argue that since the end of World War II, there has been enormous
expansion  of  MNCs  in  mineral  rich  African  countries  (Guenther,  2005;  Richani,  2005;
Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006; Patey, 2006a). This is because many third world mineral
rich countries offer generous tax incentives, low costs of factors of production and low labour
costs that enable them to pay low wages: thus, they maximize profits in third world countries
unlike in the developed ones.  However, there is evidence that MNC’s activities continue to
expand in conflict-prone African countries. For instance, Kanagaretnam and Brown (2006:2)
argue that operation of MNCs in conflict-prone zone strategizes them to access cheap natural
resources that enable them to maximize their commercial interests. “Recent history of several
conflicts has shown that access to lucrative economic resources with the active participation
of MNCs has played an important role in fomenting and sustaining conflicts” (Kanagaretnam
and Brown, 2006: 1).
During this study, a number of informants argued that due to availability of strategic and rare
minerals in the DRC, many MNCs and other international actors have participated in fueling
the conflict.  Although some informants argued that there are MNCs that have focused on
initiating peacebuilding projects in the DRC, most of them argued that most MNCs were
initiating and sustaining the DRC conflict in two ways. Firstly, most informants argued that
due to weak institutions in the DRC, MNCs as powerful non-state actors wield enormous
influence on the government. Due to corruption of most senior government officials, MNCs
have  taken  advantage  of  state  incapacity  and  political  instability  to  easily  buy out  their
resource-extraction and trading with the support of the government in conflict zones of the
DRC.  As  a  result,  government-protected  activities  of  the  behaviours  of  the  MNCs  have
elicited grievance from the local artisanal miners, militias, rebels and traders in the form of
war. In the end, it has turned up to be a conflict between government forces - who are meant
to protect MNCs - and rebels. In the end, the DRC government has lost out on the revenue for
funding basic services and infrastructure. At the same time, this has abetted a cycle of poverty
among locals who have in turn joined militia and rebel groups as the only means of protecting
their  wealth.  The beneficiaries  to  the  violence  between government  and rebel  forces  are
MNCs; they have escaped to pay taxes due to ongoing war. 
Secondly, a lecturer at a Durban University argued that some MNCs have directly funded
some action of rebels. “Some MNCs use rebels as protectors of their mines in exchange for
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money  and  arms”85.  Still,  another  participant  argued  that  the  “support  from  rebel  or
government  forces  offered  some  “protection”  for  corporate  investment  and  activities  in
conflict  zones. Resource entrepreneurs typically rewarded armed protection with financial
incentives,  which  provided  warring  parties  with  economic  and  military  arsenal”86.  For
example, during the focus group C discussions, a number of participants narrated how MNCs
were accorded security by the army or rebel commanders with the latter obtaining personal
favours in return. Some of the views of participants on the role of MNCs in earning the
support  of  the  rebel  and the  army are  assailed  by Luadati  (2013).  According to  Luadati
(2013), some MNCs assist rebels to procure arms, acquire uniform, to carryout international
financial transactions and settling the wage bill of officers. Similarly, Vogel and Raeymaekers
(2012) argue that there exists a “symbiotic relationship” between some corporate actors and
rebels/some members of the national army. For Vogel and Raeymaekers (2012) the preceding
relationship between some MNCs and rebels or army commanders suggests that there is some
form of complicity of mining companies in the DRC’s conflicts. 
During the focus group D discussions, a number of participants narrated that it is only in the
eastern part of the DRC (mineral rich) that was experiencing war while most parts of the
country were  experiencing relative  peace.  During the  preceding focus  group discussions,
many participants linked war in the mineral rich eastern part of the DRC with the presence of
some  MNCs.  Additionally,  some  participants  claimed  that  neighbouring  countries  like
Rwanda and Uganda were funded by some MNCs to cause instability in the eastern DRC so
that they can loot lucrative minerals with ease. Due to funding that they receive from MNCs,
“Rwanda and Uganda have been used as breeding and training ground for some rebel groups.
Such MNCs do not want to see an end in the DRC’s war87. From the view of the preceding
participant, Geenen (2012) view’s that an end to war in DRC would mean an end to some
MNCs mining business becomes understandable. For instance, as it was argued in chapter
four,  according  to  McKinley  (1997:  i.d,),  less  than  two  days  after  the  AFDL captured
Lubumbashi,  executives  of  MNCs “were already flying  into  the  city aboard  private  jets.
They could be seen meeting at poolside and over meals with the rebels’ finance minister and
the newly appointed Governor of the province” (McKinley, 1997:1.d). It is reported that the
America Mineral Fields (AMF) was among the first MNCs to do business with the AFDL
85 Interview with a Congolese lecture in Durban
86 Interview with a Congolese lawyer in Durban 
87 Interview with a former Congolese army commander in Durban
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rebel  group.  According  to  McKinley  (1997),  the  AMF signed  a  contract  worth  US$885
million with Laurent Kabila- former leader of the AFDL in return for exclusive mining rights
(at that time) to copper and zinc in the DRC (McKinley, 1997: i, d)
From the arguments in the foregoing paragraphs, it can be argued that the increasing global
demand for rich minerals resources is increasing MNCs’ competition in the DRC. In order to
satisfy the growing mineral demand, many MNCs have been found in a trap of collaborating
with conflicting parties that are involved in the DRC’s conflict: this includes financing both
the rebels and the government. In doing so, the collaboration between rebels and companies
(which were viewed as “international actors”) somewhat legitimizes the rebel groups and
undermines  the  national  government,  thereby exacerbating the  crisis  of  legitimacy in  the
DRC.  Therefore,  from  the  views  of  participants,  it  can  be  argued  that  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding  interventions  need  to  pay  attention  to  the  economics  of  war  and  MNCs.
According  to  Coulomb  and  Dunne,  2008:46)  war  and  economics  are one  thing.  This  is
because all actors, be they local or international, seek to protect their interest in a conflicting
state. From some views of participants of there are claims of changing economic behaviour of
MNCs.  The  changing  social  and  economic  behaviours  of  the  MNCs  in  the  DRC  are
prompting some instances of negative efforts towards state building and peacebuilding in the
DRC. It can be argued that the views of participants on the role of MNCs in war present one
of the most important opportunities for South Africa to promote peace and rule of law in the
DRC. Still, the views of participants of this study, provide South Africa a different approach
on the  inventory of  actors  that  are  involved in  the  DRC’s conflict  and in  answering the
research questions on whose interest should peacebuilding interventions serve.
6.2. 4 ‘Politics of Communal deprivation and Identity in the DRC’
According to Mills (1997:89), tribalism, race and ethnicity are forms of identity injustices
that are committed when a “superior” race, group or community stamps a contract with itself,
allowing no input from other races, groups or communities.  When understood through the
views of Congolese refugees residing in Durban, Mills’ argument can help to clarify the role
of  communal  deprivation  in  the  DRC.  The realpolitik  of  the  DRC is  characterized  by a
shifting (re)alignment of communities around a communal political elite or leader. In doing
so, politics of identity- whereby particular groups of people/communities align and re-align in
support  of  a  particular  leader-  has  justified  the  exclusion  of  other  communities  from
participating  in  the  DRC’s political  process.  “In  the  DRC, politics  of  rewarding specific
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community leaders  has justified the acts  of President  Kabila  building patronage.  In  most
cases  President  Kabila  has  appointed  leaders  from communities  that  support  his  political
ideology”88.  As a result, one Congolese rights activist added that, most of the aforementioned
elites and individuals use their power to create wealth for themselves and their communities
and  not  to  objectively  serve  most  of  the  Congolese”89.  Leaders  are  powerful  enough  to
interfere with the functioning of institutions that are meant to hold them accountable (as it
was earlier discussed).  When faced with criticism from other communities or civil society,
most leaders may recruit members of their community to defend them. In most cases, they
incite their supporters or communities to use violence as a tactic of keeping them in power.
For such individuals, war is the only means of keeping retaining power.  In the DRC, “war is
politically expedient  for  the  elites  to  foster  ethnic  and tribal  disunity so as  to  ascend to
power”90.  “Poverty and inequality has provided a gap in which political elite bribe youth
from their communities to cause violence in the DRC”91.  In doing so, it has been taken as a
given that communities that support or are affiliated to the president should produce senior
government officials to hold key government institutions. “Communities that are “perceived”
to be in opposition are subjected to unemployment or junior positions within key government
institutions. This is what fuels violent revenge from the secluded tribes”92 
The views of Congolese refugees in this sub-section show how power held by presidential
appointed tribal and community barons has been at the heart of the  first, second and third
Congo wars. For instance, in chapter one, it was argued that  the first years of the DRC’s
independence were awash with tribal wars; the main reason being that tribal leaders/rulers
had more power than the central  government (Nderitu,  2014).  Still,  most if  not all,  post-
colonial presidents have been influential in buttressing tribal stratification in DRC so as to
keep  power  and  privilege.  Similarly,  the  views  that  were  expressed  by most  informants
during this study proved that there still exist similar notions of power to construct tribalism in
a  way  that  privileges  particular  ethnic  groups  and  tribes  over  others  in  the  DRC.  One
informant argued, “It is due to awarding privileges to particular groups or communities over
others, that is one of the key causes of war in the DRC”93. Another informant94 argued that
88 Interview with a Congolese businessman in Durban
89 Interview with a rights activist.
90 Interview with a former M23 soldier.
91 Interview with a Congolese street vendor in Durban 
92 Interview with a Congolese lawyer in Durban 
93 Interview with a Congolese street barber in Durban. 
94 Congolese scholar at a Durban university. 
139
tribal  exclusionary  strategies  of  successive  post-colonial  government  in  addressing  the
poverty in  DRC has led to marginalization and deprivation of the basic needs and rights of
majority of the DRC’s population. According to the preceding informant, “since the dawn of
independence  in  1961,  the  presidency  has  continued  with  divisionary  politics  that  were
exercised by colonial masters: fostering tribal superiority and inferiority politics”95.  This is a
similar practice that is practiced in most post-colonial African states. However, in the DRC
“politics of exclusion have failed to adequately address the problem of poverty, land, security,
unemployment and development”96. As a cause of war in the DRC, divisionary politics have
created inequalities that have bolstered the notions of inferiority among the tribes that are
denied  access  to  the  political  processes.  Most  communities  that  are  marginalized  and
excluded from the political processes in the DRC have ganged together and developed an
identity grievance to fight the domination of the tribes that are considered “superior”. During
the focus group discussion, most participants expressed that communal deprivation grievance
has been responsible for development of identity categorization that causes war in the DRC.
This explains why the eastern part of the DRC continues to experience war. In these parts,
war is considered as the one means of some communities rooting out foreign tribes from
dominating  their  rich  mining  industry.  According  to  one  Congolese  scholar,  “most
communities from the eastern parts of the DRC are poor. This is despite the fact that their
region  is  rich  in  minerals”97.  The  presence  of  communities  whom  they  consider  as
beneficiaries of the government in their region makes them see them as oppressors. In the
long run, they justify “killing, evicting and destruction of oppressors who also act in self-
defense. This causes incessant violent conflict”98. In this case, “most communities from this
region support the action of militia and rebel groups whom they consider as protectors of the
regions’ riches”99.
From the interviews and focus group, it became evident that poverty and inequality among
Congolese  communities  -  an  obvious  act  exercised  by  consecutive  post-colonial  DRC
regimes -  are key triggers of the DRC’s conflict. Some informants accused peacebuilding
interveners of paying no attention to the tribal aspect of Congolese politics. One Congolese
scholar argues that “if interveners in the DRC’s conflict do not implement a strategy that
95 Views of a Congolese scholar at a Durban University.
96 Views of a Congolese rights activist.
97 Interview with a Congolese lecturer at a Durban university
98 Views of a Congolese street vendor in Durban 
99 Interview with an ex-M23 soldier in Durban 
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addresses tribal inequalities in the DRC, there is no guarantee that their  efforts  will  bear
fruits”100 .  According  to  the  foregoing  scholar,  “understanding  inequalities  created  by
communal deprivation is one step close to understanding some of the triggers of the DRC’s
conflict”101. For instance, the recent acts of the DRC parliament to extend the forthcoming
2016 presidential election till 2017 has already started to raise both the pro and anti-Kabila
sentiments  among  different  communities  in  the  DRC.  This  study  notes  that  communal
division among supporters and those who are opposed to the rule of president Kabila will
exacerbate the already existing tension and divisions in the country. Those who are affiliated
to the rivalling political parties have started to use ethnic and tribal cards to win the populace.
Others are using the existing inequalities in the DRC to have a political mileage (Aljazeera,
2016).
The preceding sub-section has  deliberated on how Congolese refugees  view poverty and
inequality,  international  actors  and  MNCs,  weak  government  institutions  and  tribal  and
ethnicity as the three key triggers of the DRC’s conflict. From the views and insights of this
study’s participants  it  can  be  deduced  that  the  three  triggers  of  war  in  the  DRC are  so
intertwined: one leads and feeds into the other. For instance, by summoning the influence of
inequality,  communal  deprivation  and  divisions,  poverty,  weak  and  discriminatory
governance, from the refugees’ perspective, it is worth noting that the DRC’s conflict and
realpolitik is vitally influenced by those in power, both locally and internationally. Following
the interrogation of cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory, some of the views of the
participants of this study on the causes of the DRC’s conflict point to loopholes in the ways
past and current peacebuilding interventions are being carried out in the DRC. Some insights
and views of the participants concur with Larmbourne’s argument that most interveners and
peacebuilders do not go beyond the interest of elite conflicting groups in their analysis of an
ongoing  or  previous  conflict  (Lambourne  2010:34).  Through  the  tenets  of  cosmopolitan
conflict  transformation theory, most  of  the views of  the Congolese refugees  in  this  sub-
section point to the fact that the root causes of the DRC’s conflict are more serious than the
political cupidity that peacebuilding interveners pay attention to. As found in the literature
review (chapter two), the views and the insights of the study’s participants bring the view that
peacebuilding intervention has  been narrowed to ideological  misunderstanding of  the  top
conflicting elites. In the context of the DRC’s conflict, the participants’ views indicate a need
for South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention to pay attention to the acts political exclusion,
100 A Congolese lecturer in a Durban university. 
101 An interview with Congolese lecturer in a Durban University.
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ethnic inequality and other structural injustices created by extensive networks of patronage
and nepotism. 
From the  views  and  insights  of  participants,  this  study makes  an  assumption  that  many
strategies used by peacebuilding interventions pay less attention to root causes of war in the
DRC.  Based  on  the  foregoing  assumption,  the  study  sought  to  find  out  the  views  of
participants in regard to strategies that South Africa was using to build peace in the DRC.
This is discussed vividly in the next sub-section.
6. 3 Characteristics of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
Peacebuilding is a long term procedure that takes place after conflict has stopped and marked
by a cease fire or peace agreement (McAskie2006:18). Through the lenses of cosmopolitan
conflict  transformation,  the  most  views  of  this  study’s  participants (as  discussed  in  the
previous sub-sections of this chapter) show that  most interveners and peacebuilders in the
DRC have been striving for a possible quick-fix and a band aid solution to a complex and
deep-rooted conflict. There is a need to rethink on issues, approaches and theories that inform
strategies that South Africa is using in its interventions in the DRC’s conflict. As an attempt
to establish exactly how South Africa is building peace in the DRC, the study went further to
find out how participants could contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in the DRC’s conflict: this was one of the research questions. 
In chapter five, it was established that most informants were aware of the presence of South
Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  their  country.  During  interviews  and focus  group
sessions, the researcher posed the question asking what strategies participants thought were
the  best  in  addressing  the  complexity  of  the  DRC’s conflict.  It  became  clear  that  most
participants  were  dissatisfied  with  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  strategies  in  the  DRC.
According to the views of a Congolese professor, “South Africa was not doing enough in its
peacebuilding role in the DRC.  If indeed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions were
contributing  to  the  DRC’s  conflict  transformation  process,  then  it  is  likely  that  the
performance  of  such  roles  was  devoid  of  the  input  of  those  who bear  the  brunt  of  this
unending war”102. Still, “there is a possibility that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in the DRC’s war were somehow secretive”103, added another participant. In some instances,
participants were sharply divided into two contrasting groups; pro-South African and anti-
South African peacebuilding intervention camps. Another division was that some participants
102 An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer.
103 An interview with a Congolese rights activist in Durban
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were  in  support  of  the  use  of  the  continuous  contribution  of  SANDF in  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC while other were opposed it and therefore, expressed
diametrically opposing views. The key lesson that the diametric and opposing views of the
study’s participants provide is for the formulation of cross-informant understanding of what
constitutes  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention  and  what  does  not.  The  cross-
informants understanding of the peacebuilding by participants helped this study to obviate
claims and counter-claims about the nature of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in
the DRC’s conflict.
During focus group A and B discussions, two key distinct narratives on the strategies that
informants would prefer South Africa to use in the DRC emerged. There was a group of
participants  that  were  pro-military  while  another  one  was  anti-military  interventions.
Participants who were pro-military intervention were in support of the ongoing contribution
of the SANDF in the DRC. On contrary, participants who were against the use of any military
interventions argued that if South Africa was to find a lasting solution to the DRC’s conflict,
it has to use a political initiative: one that can address the lingering causes of war in the DRC
and not to use the SANDF.   
6. 3. 1 Pro-SANDF intervention in the DRC
According to Ogola (2012) intervention scholar Rosenau (1990) highlights two reasons as to
why military intervention takes place: 1) when the intervening state set aside the existing
relations with the target state and put all its efforts towards changing the political structure
and authority of that target state. 2) Intervention may also take place when the intervening
state seeks to preserve the existing political structure and authority of the target state. Most
participants who supported the SANDF interventions in the DRC based their arguments on
the level of armed threat that rebel and militia groups like the M23 pose to any peacebuilding
interventions.  One street barber argued, “dawa ya moto ni moto”104: translated to English
means medicine for fire is fire. Put simply, the preceding Congolese street barber argued that
“you cannot use diplomacy on someone who is ready to shoot you with a gun. You have to
shoot in self-defense”105.  According to another Congolese scholar in a Durban university -
who  sought  to  protect  his  identity  -  “SANDF  intervention’  follows  considerable
developments of security instability as a result of the militia and rebel prone nature of the
DRC crisis”106.  He added that the “chronic volatile militia and rebel situation and DRC’s
104 An interview with a Congolese street barber in Durban 
105 An interview with a Congolese street barber in Durban
106 An Interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban university. 
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conflict  was  posing  a  direct  impact  on  the  already  complex  South  African  refugee  and
national  socio-economic situation”107:  As argued in the background to this  study (chapter
one), South Africa is the leading host to most refugees and migrants from war-torn African
countries. According to Tereva (2013), most of the refugees and immigrants continue to face
threats of violence and hatred from South Africans. Smit and Rugunanan (2015) adds that the
ongoing deprivation of basic human needs to some disadvantaged South Africans is  as a
result  of  the  increasing  numbers  of  refugees  and  migrants  from warring  African  states:
competition for basic needs such as security, food and shelter between refugees and South
Africans has been identified to be playing a role in xenophobic violence. As this study is
being completed, the newly elected mayor of Tshwane Mashaba has been reported in the
media arguing that he is going to arrest all illegal immigrants and foreigners in the Metro
(ENCA, 2016). From Mashaba’s claim, it can be argued that there is a high influx of migrants
in South Africa from war-torn countries like Sudan, DRC and CAR.
Mashaba’s view on immigrants in Tshwane re-affirms the findings of Langa and Kiguwa’s
(2016) study on the perception given to immigrants by a section of South Africa. According
to Langa and Kiguwa (2016), there are some South Africans who see refugees and other
migrants  from  warring  African  countries  as  an  external  threat  to  South  Africa’s  socio-
economic  development.  To be  secure  from the  preceding  threat,  pro-SANDF Congolese
refugees argued that the South African government has an obligation to militarily intervene in
the  DRC to  avert  the  increasing  numbers  of  Congolese  asylum seekers.   A similar  pro-
SANDF strategy was held by a number of former DRC Defense Force members. According
to a former colonel in the former Laurent Kabila regime, “if South Africa is to resolve its
refugees and migrant crisis, it needs to extend its search for a solution beyond its national
borders”108. Furthermore, the colonel added that the 2013 SANDF intervention in DRC was
undertaken on the basis that the M23 was a launching pad for military attacks on government
forces which was going to cause a continuous influx of refugees in South Africa109. From the
views of the former colonel, it can be argued that the armed nature of the DRC’s conflict
since  1991 has  caused the  influx  of  Congolese  refugees  in  South  Africa.  From a  realist
perspective, the effect of spill overs from war-torn countries (problem of refugees) is among
some of the national interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC and
107 An Interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban university.
108  An Interview with a former colonel in the Laurent Kabila regime now residing in 
Durban. 
109 An Interview with a former colonel in the Laurent Kabila regime now residing in Durban
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other war-torn African states.  From the views of the pro-military intervention category of
participants,  at  this  point  of  the  study,  it  can  be  argued  that  although  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC has not incorporated the Congolese refugees, it has
some level of their support. 
Furthermore, according to South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry (2016), the DRC
is  a  huge investment  destination  and  market  for  South  African  agriculture,  construction,
energy, ICT, transport  and  retail  companies.  Still,  South  Africa  exports  over  21% of  its
exports to the DRC. One civil rights activist argued that the effects of the DRC’s conflict was
impacting negatively on South African companies in the DRC. At the same time, the armed
nature  of  the  conflict  was  dwindling  the  market  for  South  African  exports  in  the  DRC.
According  the  activist,  SANDF actions  in  the  DRC were  premised  on  protecting  South
African interests. According to the views of one informant, the main aim of SANDF in DRC
is to create conditions for economic growth and prosperity so that most of the Congolese can
go back home110. From the preceding participants’ view, it can be argued that for the sake of
its economic interest, South Africa has no option but to use its advantaged position to bring
an end to incessant conflicts in the DRC. 
Other pro-SANDF informants argued that there was a need for South Africa to protect the
refurbished infrastructure (road and air) in the DRC. According to a Congolese student in a
Durban  university,  rebels  and  militia  in  the  DRC  destroy  road  networks  and  other
infrastructure so as to easily carry out their mission: controlling the mineral rich eastern part
of the country. South Africa being one of the country that was a signatory to the Addis Ababa
Accord  that  brought  some  relative  peace  in  the  DRC  after  2004,  agreed  to  help  train
Congolese military, refurbish military infrastructure, and in planning and implementation of
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process111. Although SANDF actions in the
DRC have been criticized for being partisan (supporting government forces), South Africa’s
military intervention is premised on the needs of the MUNUSCO; to facilitate conditions
favourable  for  disarmament,  integration,  dialogue  and  peacebuilding.   The  preceding
Congolese views are re-echoed by Pillay (2013) who asserts that the positioning of the DRC
within the Great Lakes region as neighbour to Uganda, CAR and Rwanda is a “trigger” of the
metaphorical  African  gun.  According  to  Pillay  (2013),  if  South  Africa  cannot  militarily
110 An interview with a Congolese businessman.
111 An Interview with a Congolese student at a Durban university.
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intervene, the DRC risks probably becoming a safe haven for a number of both local and
neighbouring  countries’ militant  groups.  For  Pillay  (2013)  the  DRC’s stability  is  a  key
success of the SANDF peace operations in neighbouring countries. Put simply, the coercive
methods are meant to affect the modus operandi of the political, military and even economic
as well as social structures of the DRC by South Africa (Belloff, 1968).
Furthermore,  among the pro-SANDF informants,  a  number  of  Congolese identified  three
major peacebuilding initiatives that South Africa was involved in. One of them was financial
support to the Congolese government. One informant argued that “if it was not South Africa,
the DRC government  had no enough resources to fund the 2012 general  elections”112.  In
funding the general election, another informant argued that South Africa was interested in
seeing Congolese exercising their democratic rights by choosing leaders that they would want
to lead them113. The second peacebuilding initiative that Congolese refugees identified was
the support for a local and national reconciliation forum. For instance, a Congolese professor
at  a  Durban  university  argued,  “although  reconciliation  processes  has  involved  the  top
conflicting political elites and rebel leaders, South Africa has been interested in reconciling
the opposing parties in the DRC’s conflict”114. In seeking reconciliation, South Africa has
been seeking to mend the severed relationship and willingness to accommodate differences
without  violence  in  the  DRC’s  conflict  (Ramsbothams  et  al,  2011).   This  is  because
negotiations and destruction of structural injustices are the first steps which must be taken
towards reconciliation as the former opens door for settlement and the latter is a foundation
upon which ending peace process can be achieved (Mani, 2002).
The third step that the pro-SANDF category of participants identified was South Africa’s
logistical support for MONUC/MONUSCO. A number of informants argued that despite the
fact that the interests of South Africa were unknown to them, South Africa was the highest
contributor  of forces to the MUNUC/MUNUSCO. Although in support  of South Africa’s
contribution to MUNUC/MUNUSCO, a civil right activist argued that the country’s efforts
can do better if it would provide financial support towards dialogue at community level so as
to  avert  tribal  and  ethnic  antagonisms  that  breed  the  DRC’s  war115.  Similarly,  another
informant  conceded  that  the  presence  of  SANDF  facilitated  MUNUSCO’s  interests  of
112 Interview with a Congolese civil rights activist in Durban 
113 Interview with a civil rights activist in Durban
114 Interview with a Congolese professor in Durban 
115 Interview with a Congolese civil rights activist in Durban
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rehabilitating  the  DRC’s  public  infrastructure.  The  UN  and  other  actors  rely  on  this
infrastructure. “Although SANDF actions in the DRC have not been “angelic”, their presence
in the DRC has become an edifice for peace”116. For instance, the large contingent of SANDF
in the MUNUSCO was helping in the rehabilitation of and reintegration of ex-combatants as
a post-conflict trajectory in areas that had been ridden with conflicts. According to Nabudere
(2014),  in the DRC, ex-combatants constitute a group that, if not managed properly, could
easily orchestrate the recurrence of conflict.  “By seeking to rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-
combatants, the presence of SANDF was becoming instrumental in nurturing peace in the
DRC”117. From the views of the preceding participants, it can be argued that South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC were becoming more significant and important.
6. 3.2. Anti-SANDF intervention in the DRC
The  informants  who  were  anti-SANDF  intervention  argued  that  South  Africa  should
prioritize a political route in finding a solution to the DRC’s crisis. Most of the informants in
this category opined that despite the presence of SANDF, conflict continued to be unending
and South Africa is still facing a need to grapple with the effects of the influx of Congolese
refugees. A civil rights activist argued that the current actions of SANDF were exacerbating
the armed retaliation and guerrilla tactics of the rebels and militant groups in the DRC. She
argued, “the 2014 SANDF target of the M23 mutated the group into a guerilla one; it started
to target unarmed locals, rape women, destroy crops as a way of striking a balance to the
action  of  South  African  forces”118.   The  foregoing  activist’s assertion  can  be  equated  to
Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle’s (2011) view that the September 11, 2001 terror attack
was a way of the Al Qaida striking balance between the fundamental Jihadist and the United
States of America (U.S.A).  
Instead of committing troops in the DRC, one Congolese lawyer119 argued the South African
government must primarily take a diplomatic route in addressing the country’s conflict. The
aforementioned Congolese lawyer criticized South Africa for seeking to use SANDF to boost
South  Africa’s  widely  reported  but  publicly  undeclared  hegemony  and  dominance  in
establishing its business interests in the DRC120. The lawyer cited the report by International
Crisis Group (2015) that in 2014 the SANDF were being used selectively to protect mining
116 Interview with a Congolese student at a Durban university.  
117 Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer in Durban.
118 An Interview with a Congolese rights activist in Durban.
119 An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer during the World Social Forum in 
September 2015.
147
areas that had been earmarked for South African elites by the regime of Joseph Kabila. Thus
the attack on M23 was a reward to Kabila for signing a number of business deals with South
Africa and not to protecting the interests of the Congolese. This view was amplified by the
South African government when it sought to arrest anti-Kabila activists in Limpopo accusing
them of wanting to topple the current DRC regime (ENCA News, 2015). According to views
of  some  informants  during  focus  group  sessions,  SANDF  intervention  in  DRC  risks
discriminating and alienating pro-Kabila from anti-Kabila supporters: as a result, it may fuel
more ethnic tensions in the DRC. 
Some of the views of the anti-SANDF Congolese refugees in Durban are well highlighted by
Davies’ (2013) criticism of the presence of SANDF in DRC as a shadowy business deal of
protecting business interests of ANC personalities and the now-regime of President Kabila.
According  to  Davies  (2013),  there  is  no  distinction  between  the  SANDF  duties  in
peacekeeping and the narrower interests of the ANC elites in the DRC. The leadership of the
SANDF has been overtly politicized to protect private businesses in war-torn Congo. Davies’
(2013) views are further assailed by more anti-SANDF Congolese scholars who argued that
by deploying SANDF in the DRC, South Africa was failing to learn from the Congolese
history  of  conflicts.  According  to  one  scholar,  most  previous  peacebuilding  intervention
efforts have failed because most interveners failed to understand the realpolitik of the DRC
before committing their troops in the country. As argued earlier, conflict in the DRC has a
foundation in colonialism, tribalism, ethnicity and questions of land, among others.
According to the views of Congolese refugees, the preceding factors are still the causes of
war  in  the  DRC.  One  of  the  causes  of  conflicts  in  the  DRC  is  weak  governance  and
corruption.  A professor  at  another  Durban university argued that  due to  divisive politics,
tribalism and  corruption,  most  post-colonial  regimes  have  been unwilling  to  provide  the
essential human needs like adequate food, clean water, health care, and education. As a result,
rebels and militant groups have taken control of some regions of the country so as to protect
the collective and communal interests of such regions. This made the preceding professor to
argue that for the interest of the Congolese, South Africa should learn from history and use a
political route in addressing the conflict121. There are several current events that threaten to
raze the DRC that South Africa needs to consider. One such event is the selected run-away
120 An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer during the World Social Forum in 
September 2015
121  An Interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban university. 
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massacre and rape that have targeted supporters of the opposition parties (BBC, 2016). This
is  threatening  political  tolerance  that  the  DRC  is  struggling  to  build.  Still,  the  current
campaign and the agitation for referendum to increase the term of president Kabila is another
cause  of  foreseeable  political  turmoil  in  the  DRC.  Due to  the  politics  of  ethnic  benefit,
communities that are affiliated to Kabila are pro extension of Kabila’s term while those that
are affiliated to the opposition do not want any extension of the presidential two term limit. 
Some  of  the  views  of  anti-SANDF  Congolese  informants  during  the  study  desired
constructive peacebuilding in the DRC. According Lambourne (2004), the desired goal of
peacebuilding is to build and rebuild political, security, justice, social and economic fabric or
institutions of a society in war. One way of doing this is to address the root cause of conflict.
In  the  case of  the  DRC, one informant  argued that,  South Africa cannot  use SANDF to
promote socio-economic justice and institutions of governance and rule of law122.  From a
realist perspective, by contributing the highest number of SANDF within the MUNUSCO,
South Africa is showing an exercise of military power in Africa. In this context, some views
of Congolese refugees in Durban are affirming that SANDF actions in the DRC are affirming
the realist notion that military intervention is used to realize and achieve the national goals
and the interests of the intervener and not those of the target state (Dougherty, Robert and
Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84).
By being anti-SANDF, most informants in this category termed South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions as insignificant. For instance, a business owner in Durban argued that “even if
South Africa forces remained in the DRC to “eternity”,  conflicts will  continue to emerge
unless  a  political  route  that  recognizes  the  politically  excluded  ethnic  groups,  fights
corruption and all structural injustices”123. The argument here was the juxtaposition on what
SANDF could offer  with what  the root causes  of  the DRC’s conflict  were.  Furthermore,
another  civil  society activist  argued that  the activities  of SANDF such as  supporting the
government  in  training  DRC’s army who later  thwarted  Joseph  Kabila’s dissidents  were
weakening peacebuilding processes.124
In other words, the anti-SANDF informants argued that the use of military intervention in the
historicity of the DRC’s conflict has rarely produced positive or transformative peace in the
122  An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer during WSSF in Durban 2015.
123 An interview with IT businessman in the Durban.
124 An interview with a Congolese civil society activist.
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country. Rather than bringing positive peace in the DRC, it has straddled negative and status
quo ante. External military intervention in the DRC has facilitated both peace and war at the
same time. To sum up, another Congolese anti-SANDF informant argued, “Just like other
military  interventions  have  failed  to  bring  peace,  the  SANDF  as  a  South  African
peacebuilding strategy will hardly facilitate peace process but will continue to support peace
process as well as weapons to the rebels or government”125.   
From the preceding informants’ presuppositions (both pro and ant-SANDF), there is a need of
an objective analysis of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. One clear
critique is that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention may become culpable in the DRC’s
conflict just as other foreign military interventions have historically performed. 
6. 4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the analysis of the views of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. It was a further exploration of views of Congolese
refugees that were presented in chapter five providing insights into the broader contextual
perspectives of the study participants. This was against the backdrop of the main trends in
peacebuilding intervention strategy and behaviours in conflict zones.
The chapter begun by presenting the root causes of war in the DRC from the perspective of
the  participants.  During  the  course  of  this  study, participants  had  identified  poverty  and
inequality,  weak  government  institutions  and  corruption,  international  actors  and  MNC’s
greed for money and tribalism, nepotism and ethnicity as key triggers of the DRC’s war. 
The  chapter  presented  the  characteristics,  strategies  and  behaviours  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC.  Although  there  were  a  number  of  intervention
behaviours, participants identified SANDF as a key strategy that South Africa was using in its
interventions in the DRC’s war. South Africa’s interventions strategy elicited two opposing
narratives among participants: those who were pro and ant-SANDF intervention in the DRC.
The section discussed the rationale behind participants’ opposing view on the use of SANDF
in the DRC. 
125 Interview with a former M23 soldier in Durban
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The  section  also  made  some  logical  deductions  on  South  Africa’s  use  of  SANDF  in
transforming the DRC’s conflict. In doing so, the chapter has set a scene for the rationale and
interest of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in addressing the root causes of the
DRC’s conflict. Therefore, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict
needs to be analysed within the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism.
What, then, do the study’s findings suggest? The next chapter addresses this question. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
LOCATING SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC
WITHIN THE TENETS OF COSMOPOLITAN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND REALISM
7.1 Introduction 
Perusing through the review and comparison of literature in  chapter  two,  theoretical  and
paradigmatic perspectives in chapter three and survey findings presented in chapter five and
six, this  study emphasizes the point that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC’s conflict require more than the use of SANDF and funding electioneering processes
among other infrastructural projects   According to the tenets of CCTR, it can be argued that
by  not  incorporating  Congolese  refugees  (who  were  able  to  identify  the  root  causes  of
conflict in the DRC), South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions fail to see refugees as party
to the DRC’s conflict - as people who understand the dynamics of the conflict.  Deliberating
on why lack of inclusion of Congolese refugees within the South Africa’s interventions in the
DRC poses threats to peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, this chapter analyses the rationale
and interest of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions within the tenets of CCTR and
realism from what the study’s findings suggest. According to this study’s findings, it emerged
that a number of variables were responsible for precipitating the DRC’s conflict. While the so
called  ‘ethnic  or  tribal’ factor  plays  a  minimal  role,  other  factors  such as  nepotism and
corruption are said to have a strong bearing on the nature of the DRC; poverty and inequality,
presence of natural resources (their social construction, geographic distribution, and revenue
management  system),  the  role  of  local,  regional  and  global  actors,  and  state  deflation
(including  its  associated  variables  for  example  weak  state  institutions,  patronage  and
corruption) determine the success/failure of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in that
country.  Writing  in  the  context  of  South  Africa’s intervention  in  the  DRC and Burundi,
Hendricks (2015:27), states, “South Africa's engagement in conflict management has shown
that in theory its approach is located within the human security paradigm and that this does
filter into the peace agreements it brokers. In practice the implementation has been centred on
warlord pacts and state-building, largely ignoring local level concerns, conflicts and Track
Two and Three peacemakers and peacebuilders”. Therefore, this reality underscores a rethink
of  the  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  DRC  in  particular,  and  the
peacebuilding interventions thesis in general.
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This chapter analyses South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC within the tenets
of realism and CCTR.  It reiterates the data presented in chapter five and its broader analysis
in chapter six. 
7.2 The role of peacebuilding interveners/interventions
As this study shows, a number of factors attract peacebuilding interventions in a conflict state
like the DRC. According to the CCTR paradigm, ending war and transforming the conflict by
bringing positive peace should be the bottom line of any peacebuilding intervention, be it
local or external. However, although the need for restoring peace may be the intention of any
peacebuilding interventions, the tenets of realism see factors such as satisfying the interest of
the intervener- be they economic, social or political- over those of the locals as some key
drivers of most interveners’ actions in a conflict. Historically, peacebuilding interventions in
the DRC show that external interveners have been entangled in the country in the following
ways:  Firstly, some interveners with the support of local rebels and opposition launched their
offensive powers in overthrowing the ruling regime. For instance, during the 1996 Congo war
Rwanda,  Uganda,  Burundi  and  Angola  backing  Laurent  Kabila  launched  an  offensive
overthrowing the then President of the DRC, Mobutu Sese Seko (Turner and Ngoy, 2007).
Secondly, some interveners have used the DRC conflict as an exercise of their mediatory or
diplomatic  powers.  For  instance,  during  the  first  Congo  war  South  Africa  represented
facilitated  a  first  meeting  between  rebels  and  president  Mobutu  in  Cape  Town  on  20 th
February 1997. However, the initiative failed because South was faulted for being considerate
of the two key conflicting parties - that is the Kabila and Mobutu forces - but failed to include
the non-violent opposition, who were unarmed opposition as opposed to the rebels.  Thirdly,
depending with the ruling regime and the political economy, some interveners have decided
to take up peacebuilding intervention in the DRC so as to benefit from the trade deals and
agreements that come with such efforts. One interviewee argued that since 2012, the Zuma
regime has been in the forefront supporting President Joseph Kabila’s government  in the
DRC  because  of  the  lucrative  trade  deals  that  South  Africa  is  benefitting  from  in  the
process126. The preceding views can be contradicted with the exit of South Africa from the
DRC conflict in 2006 when the regime of Kabila decided to do business with China. As it
was argued in chapter two, in 2006 South Africa’s hopes of benefitting from its participation
in peacebuilding in the DRC were thwarted when “instead of doing business with South
Africa,  who had helped him to find peace,  Kabila  turned to  China” (Tonheim and Swat,
126 Interview with a Congolese Scholar at a Durban University. 
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2015:3). This made South Africa to withdraw from the DRC conflict. In 2009, South Africa
contributed  towards  funding  for  the  2012  DRC’s  general  election  and  re-entered  the
peacebuilding scene. Since then, a number of bilateral deals between South Africa and the
DRC have been signed: The Lake Albert Oil Blocks 1 and 2 (Moneyweb, 2010), the Inga
dam  project  (African  Business,  2012).  Also,  South  Africa  has  maintained  its  cordial
relationship with President Joseph Kabila at the expense of deteriorating its relationship with
Rwanda which was once a key ally (Daily Maverick, 2011).
 From this perspective, the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC - as
findings suggest - is a significant factor in the escalation, prolongation and duration of the
DRC’s conflict(s). For instance, historically, South Africa has been inconsistent in choosing
whether to exit or remain relevant in the peacebuilding processes of the DRC. It is evident
both in theory and practice -  as shown in the findings -  in situation where South Africa
predicted  some sort  of  trade  deals,  it  chose  to  remain within the arena  of  peacebuilding
interventions by responding to the ebbs and flows of the conflict through its deployment of
the SANDF and funding of electioneering processes.  On the contrary, in situation where
South Africa lacked trading benefits from its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, it chose
to exit the conflict arena. 
As this study argues, from a realist point of view, the level and the intensity of South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is dependent, not on the what conflict transformation
entails - according to CCTR - but on a number of economic and political variables, including
the number of bilateral deals that the former will benefit from its peacebuilding undertakings.
From some of the views of the Congolese refugees in Durban, there exists a relationship
between South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC and economic benefits that
the latter offers the former.  For instance, since 2009, South Africa has provided the regime of
Joseph Kabila with SANDF, infrastructural resources and logistical support. In turn, Joseph
Kabila has enabled unrestricted trading expansion of South African companies in the DRC.
As  such,  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC  have  typified  the
commercialization  and  economics  of  peacebuilding  that  does  not  burgeon  the  tenets  of
CCTR. In this  case,  South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC highlights the
realist complicity in conflicts.
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Despite search for economic and political interests in its peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC,  South  Africa’s  contribution  has  facilitated  a  minimal  peace  environment  that  has
enabled  the  DRC  and  other  interveners  to  implement  conflict  sensitive  programmes:
programmes that can prevent or alleviate factors that continuously precipitate or exacerbate
conflicts.  By seeking a conducive environment  for its  companies to  operate  in the DRC,
South Africa has contributed to the reduction of the magnitude of the DRC’s conflict. This
has enabled programmes that support dialogue, disarmament and infrastructure development
to be carried out in conflict-prone parts of the DRC. Although realist in their orientation, as
the study depicts, the preceding programmes are consistent with the tenets of the CCTR.
In  unpacking  the  role  of  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention  in  Africa,  the  study
emphasises its contradictory behaviour in the DRC’s conflict. South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions  have  overlooked  the  role  of  Congolese  in  re-building  peace  in  a  war-torn
country.  According to Schirch (2008:8), overlooking or underestimating any stakeholder in
any peacebuilding initiatives is contrary to the objective of CCTR. Galtung (1996:112) says
that peacebuilding should be an attempt of overcoming contradictions that lie at  the root
cause of conflicts. In the DRC’s case,  research findings suggest that lack of inclusion of
Congolese refugees residing in South Africa - who understand the root causes of the conflict -
underpin the specifics of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The fact that
most of the DRC’s peace accords have failed before or within the first two years of their
implementation highlights that there is need for any South African peacebuilding intervention
to address the root causes of conflict  in order to prevent its  recurrence (Cannolly, 2012).
Overall, the dialectics of its realist behaviour in the DRC’s conflict underscore a nuanced
analysis and understanding of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention on the continent. 
7.3. Peacebuilding intervention in mineral rich yet divided and poor society
According to the historical overview of peacebuilding interventions, different regimes with
the help of external interveners have used different strategies to stamp their control over the
DRC’s rich minerals from 1996 to date. Hence, the views of Congolese refugees support the
notion  that  despite  the  abundance  of  rich  natural  resources,  poverty,  ethnicity, tribalism,
nepotism, corruption and weak governance fuel the DRC’s conflict. While recognizing the
existing  methodologies  and  practices  that  South  Africa  has  used  in  its  peacebuilding
interventions,  one  interviewee  argued  that  there  is  a  need  for  implementing  sustainable
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development programmes if the DRC’s conflict is to be averted127. What is logical from the
preceding  view  is  the  significance  of  South  Africa  as  a  “realist-seeking”  peacebuilding
intervener  in  the  DRC’s  conflict.  One  criticism  of  contemporary  liberal  peacebuilding
interventions has been its exclusive focus on the top warring armed parties while excluding
unarmed and non-state  actors  like  refugees  among  others  (Galtung,  2001;  Knight,  2010;
Ledarach,  1993;  Fisher,  1997).  According  to  Reychler  &  Colorado  (2001),  during
peacebuilding processes most efforts involved the armed groups, political actors and civil
society. The exclusion of non-state and unarmed actors such as refugees, women and children
who bear the brunt of conflict  may have unnoticed but decisive influence on ongoing or
future conflict. In regard to  the DRC’s conflict, the role of South Africa in recognizing non-
state  and  unarmed  actors  could  have  a  decisive  and  positive  impact  on  the  country’s
peacebuilding process. So far, the realist perspective has been used to examine how South
Africa  can  draw from the  views  of  Congolese  refugees  so  as  to  promote  its  economic,
security and hegemonic interest. In doing so, South Africa could potentially reposition itself
among global powerhouses in terms of addressing conflicts.
 Given the  role  that  poverty, ‘ethnicity’,  ‘tribalism’,  inequality, nepotism,  corruption  and
weak governance play in abetting the DRC’s conflict,  there is a necessity that South Africa
incorporates Congolese refugees and their views and insights (residing in South Africa) in its
peacebuilding interventions in the country. Drawing from the views of Congolese refugees in
Durban, this study argues that although South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions display
the tenets of realism, implementing strategies that can address poverty, tribalism, inequality,
ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and weak government-structural violence - holds key towards
attainment of positive peace in the DRC, this is what CCTR seeks to achieve. 
From CCTR perspective, the views of the Congolese refugees in Durban see the efforts of
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC to be concentrating on safeguarding
its economic interests - deploying SANDF and signing of bilateral trade deals -  other than
eradicating structural violence - poverty, tribalism, inequality, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption
and weak governance. When the preceding root causes of war are addressed (the wellbeing of
all  Congolese),  they  could  reduce  resource-related  conflicts  in  the  DRC.  According  to
Schwarz (2005), when the structural injustices, security and people’s welfare are observed
during peacebuilding interventions, there is no fear of citizens to involve themselves in any
127 An interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban University
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political participation.  As a result of freedom of participating in the political process, it will
bring unity and peace amongst conflict ethnic communities in the DRC. By incorporating the
articulated  views of  the Congolese  refugees  -  as  shown in  the research  findings  -  South
Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  will  be  able  to  identify  mechanisms  through  which
excluded Congolese locals can be engaged in resolving their country’s conflict. It is the focus
of the CCTR that all concerned parties should accommodate each other in advocating for
prevention,  proactivity, human needs,  and eradication of oppression and inequality in our
societies (Lederach, 1995: a&b). It is tenable to suggest that by excluding the views of the
Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding process, the motive of the South African government
without  any intention  of  oversimplification  can  be  said  to  be  spurred  by South  Africa’s
economic and other interests and not those of the Congolese. One can draw from Hendricks’s
(2015:11) view that countries in which South Africa has intervened sill remain “fragile and/or
have relapsed into conflict”. This notwithstanding, Hendricks further emphasizes that South
Africa still remains an important interlocutor. The failure of the South African government to
bring  about  peace  and  the  fact  that  it  is  a  key  regional  and  continental  player  should
necessarily  lead  the  country  to  explore  other  means  –  which  could  be  the  inclusion  of
refugees – in its bid to seek lasting peace. The negative effects of communal deprivation,
poverty,  inequality,  nepotism,  corruption  and  weak  governance  in  the  DRC  and  the
deployment of SANDF as peacebuilding strategy by South Africa in resource-related DRC
conflict could be considered as culminating into support of existing structural injustices that
continue to sustain the perpetuation of the DRC’s conflict.  Similarly, by not incorporating
refugees, it could be argued that South Africa is failing to promote a collective initiative of
peacebuilding intervention according to the tenets of CCTR.
This study argues that the quest for an abrupt end to violence in the DRC by South Africa
may show a  commitment  in  peacebuilding  (Cannolly  2012).  However,  an  abrupt  end  to
violence  may not  be considerate  to  the complex reality of  what  structural  injustices  like
poverty, ethnicity, tribalism, nepotism, inequality, corruption and weak governance play in
precipitating the DRC’s resource-related disharmony.  At this point, it can be argued that the
non-inclusion of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the
DRC does  not  sufficiently challenge the culture of  structural  injustices and violence that
characterize  the  nature  of  the  DRC -  a  country  that  is  still suffering  from inequality  in
distribution of national resources and politics of reward and seclusion. Therefore, this study
sees  the  incorporation  of  Congolese  refugees  within  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
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intervention as one of the variegated options for addressing the root causes of war in the
DRC.  
7.4. The character of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention and the nature of the
DRC state
Peacebuilding  in  conflict-prone  states  relies  on  international  actors  as  the  providers  of
material  support  that  facilitates  a  favourable  environment  for  inclusive  peace  processes
(DFID, 2010). Having said that, it is upon the political will of peacebuilding interveners to
ensure that conditions are made favourable for addressing the root causes of war. There are
three  narratives  that  characterize  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  DRCF.
Firstly, South Africa is intervening in DRC while at the same time hosting a large number of
Congolese refugees. Secondly, South Africa’s interventions, as argued earlier, are in support
of president Kabila and anti-Kabila dissidents. For instance,  in chapter one,  SANDF was
blamed for training a Congolese battalion that was meant to thwart the 2012 post-election
protesters in Kinshasa. Thirdly, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC have
facilitated the continuous signing of bilateral trade between Zuma and Kabila. The preceding
contexts of South Africa raise a series of questions on the nature and the character of the
country’s peacebuilding intervention in  the DRC. The views of  scholars  such as Santoro
(1998), Hartley (1998), Liebenberg et al (1997), Cilliers (2013) and Oppenheimer and Nick
(2014)  that  South  Africa  is  using  its  peacebuilding  intervention  capability  to  expand  its
hegemony are re-affirmed in the preceding contexts, nature and character of South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. 
Furthermore,  the  DRC,  like  many African  states,  is  a  product  of  European  colonization.
Colonialism is the occupation and control of a nation over another country, occupying it with
settlers and exploiting it economically and politically (Thomas, 1994). It is the “conquest and
control of territory and resources that belong to others” (Horvath, 1972: 49). Fanon (1961)
argues that colonialism rarely exploits a country in its entirety. However, colonialism sharply
focuses on natural resources that are extracted and exported to ensure that the necessities of
the mother countries’ industries are fulfilled. This causes certain sectors within the colony to
possess wealth, while the remainder of the colony follows a steep path of under-development
(Fanon, 1961).   According to Englebert (1997: 767), although independent, many African
states  “descends  from arbitrary  colonial  administrative  units  designed  as  instruments  of
domination, oppression and exploitation”. Many states in Africa are “human community that
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(successfully) claims the  monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory” (Englebert, 1997: 767). The DRC is not immune to the foregoing assertion. Like
most  other  African  states,  the  DRC  is  a  dubious  community  of  heterogeneous  and
occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities. Like other African states, the
attainment of independence in the DRC “did not fundamentally transform the structure of the
African states. The political class that supplanted the colonial officers were committed to the
protection of the ‘colonial legacy” (Olayode, 2005: 4). The DRC is a state that has retained its
forceful and authoritarian colonial character and nature - serving the interest of the local elite.
As argued in chapter six, most post-colonial regimes in the DRC have been synonymous with
dysfunctionality and weakness.  Due to politics of patronage,  the history of the DRC has
necessitated  misappropriation  of  the  country’s  wealth  by  the  ruling  elite.  The
dysfunctionality, corruption, weak, ethnical, tribal and nepotism nature and other negative
factors that have deprived the Congolese of the benefit of natural resources and basic human
needs. Clearly then, as presently constituted, the Congolese state is severely handicapped in
serving the needs of all despite its rich minerals. To-date, as participants of this study have
narrated,  it  can  be  argued  that  most  Congolese  citizens  have  seen  violence  as  the  only
possible  means  to  upset  this  unjust  status  quo.  According to  Frantz  Fanon (1967:27),  to
liberate  a  system that  was  put  in  place  violently,  violence  is  not  only  a  justified  but  a
necessary means.  While this is but a basic or overly simplified understanding of Fanon’s
position,  the  essential  argument  here  is  that  resort  to  violence  should  be  viewed  as  a
necessary political tool for liberation from any form of oppression. In the DRC’s context, as
argued in chapter six, the rise of most violent rebel and militant groups has been attributed to
a desire for seeking liberation to inequalities, poverty, seclusion and corruption within the
country. 
Within the tenets of CCTR, the presence of SANDF represents an oppressive and violent way
of addressing the root causes of war in the DRC. Contrary to the tenets of the CCTR, a
simpler version of the presence of SANDF as South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in
the DRC would look like this. 1: the causes of war in the DRC are violent rebel groups and
not  structural  injustices  (poverty, inequality, tribalism,  ethnicity, nepotism,  corruption and
external actors; as identified in chapter six). 2: In order for South Africa to bring peace in the
DRC, it has to use violent means - the use of the SANDF.  Hence, South Africa’s intervention
in the DRC is using SANDF - a violent strategy - as a necessary and justified means of
peacebuilding. By not incorporating Congolese refugees within its intervention strategy in the
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DRC, South Africa is in total disavowal of the tenets of CCTR which is   an intervention
perspective that seeks to necessitate transforming attitudes and relationship by incorporating
all parties to the conflict (conflicting parties, non-combatants, civilian, refugees and IDPs by
use of  bottom-up and top-down strategies). By signing bilateral  trade and supporting the
Joseph Kabila regime while carrying out a peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, South
Africa  is  in  pursuit  of  its  interests,  objectives  and  policies  which  may  include  foreign,
economic  and  security  interests  in  tandem with  the  tenets  of  realism.  The  preceding  is
suggestive of the idea that the current trajectory of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention
is upholding the current DRC’s status quo. The underlying assumption is that the support of
the current regime would be a way of bringing about peace in a warring state like the DRC.
However,  the  nature  of  the  DRC  state  as  argued  in  chapter  four  and  six  denies  many
Congolese  their  human  personhood.  The  DRC is  a  state  that  has  historically  condoned
inequality and poverty of masses at the expense of the few ruling elites. In its current support
of the current DRC regime, South Africa is only giving more power to the rebels, militant and
other disgruntled groups to further their violent means of seeking redress to a complex and
multifaceted nature of the DRC’s conflict. Like other liberal peacebuilding interveners South
Africa is vehemently “rubberstamping” reformation and opposing transformation; the former
only serves as an affirmation and acceptance of the dehumanizing oppressive situation, whilst
the latter changes an oppressive system from bottom up. 
7.5. The political economy of the DRC’s Conflict 
Arnson and Zartman (2005) and Hynes (2013) argue that  war and economics is one thing.
According to Arnson and Zartman (2005), war and economics is considered to be one and the
same because most states normally go to war to protect their interests mainly in terms of the
economy. Looking at both actor interests and behaviour in the DRC in the past decade, it has
become obvious  that  the  interests  of  some  social  and  economic  groups  have  changed
considerably over time, prompting in some instances marked changes in behaviour toward
state building and peacebuilding projects. Although the flexibility of interests in the DRC
may present one of the most important opportunities for external actors seeking to promote
peace and rule of law (Coulomb and  Dunne, 2008:46), studies done by Owoeye and Amusan
(2000), United Nations Security Council (2001a), Longman (2002), Moyroud and Katunga
(2002), Rupiya (2002), Noury (2010), Lalji (2007),  Guenther (2008), Cassimon, Engelen and
Reyntjens (2013) and Usanov  et al. (2013) reveal that most external actors have used the
DRC war situation to exploit and traffic the country’s mineral wealth. In the historicity of
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interventions in the DRC’s conflict (see chapter four), national armies, the political elite and
corporate  entities from sub-regional  states,  especially Rwanda,  Angola and Uganda,  have
been implicated in illegal activities in the DRC. Extra-African actors such as MNCs through
the support of their countries have also been accused of using the conflict to their advantage
as a conduit for illicit  resource trade.  Thus, resource-extracting and resource-trading have
made interveners’ to pursue the DRC’s natural wealth and not to bring lasting peace. In this
case, it can be argued that South Africa being the continental powerhouse is using military
capacity to reap the economic benefits (or ‘spoils of war’) from the war-ravaged DRC. As a
result, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions will make the continuation of war in the
DRC  an  attractive  proposition.  Additionally,  from  the  historicity  of  intervention,
peacebuilding in the DRC has provided opportunities for enrichment of elites, MNCs and for
states.  Other  than  building  peace,  actors  in  peacebuilding  have  on  the  contrary  become
spoilers  to  peace  processes.  Therefore,  as  some informants  claimed,  beyond the  national
security concerns of South Africa’s peacebuilding, there are vested economic interests that an
unstable DRC provides for South Africa.
As it was discussed in chapter four, most Peace Agreements signed in the DRC have failed to
compellingly address two issues:  one is ending illegal mining and exploitation of the DRC’s
minerals  by  those  who  are  considered  “international  peace  brokers”.  The  second  is  the
widespread illicit trade in mineral between DRC nationals and the neighbouring states such
as  Rwanda  and  Uganda.    Similarly, South  Africa’s peacebuilding  intervention  is  yet  to
consider  how  to  stop  the  exploitation  of  minerals  in  the  DRC.  Instead,  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions have increased its bilateral trade with the DRC government.
7. 6.  Does South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention hold any promise in the DRC?
After  Nelson  Mandela  took  over  the  presidency  of  South  Africa,  the  ruling  ANC party
became determined to use its resources and influence to end violent conflict all over Africa.
This  was because  of  the suffering  that  many South Africans  had experienced during  the
Apartheid regime. To date,  South Africa is still  using its resources especially through the
SADC and the AU to end wars and conflicts in Africa especially the DRC.  However, the
findings of this study with reference to South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC
suggest that South Africa has failed to incorporate all parties to the conflict. Still, the findings
of this study have shown that South Africa’s intervention has demonstrated the ambivalence
of peacebuilding in the DRC. In this case South Africa’s intervention may show its quest for
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peace in the DRC. However, the lack of inclusion of Congolese refugees (residing in South
Africa) in its peacebuilding intervention is inconsiderate of the sensitivity and complexity of
what breeds war in the DRC. In this case South Africa will fail to foster national dialogue to
overcome contradictions of tribalism, poverty, inequality, corruption and poor governance
that were identified by Congolese refugees as key triggers of war in the DRC. The use of
SANDF as a strategy of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is inconsiderate of the fact
that the DRC is still suffering from inequality in distribution of national resources and politics
of reward and seclusion.
While  the preceding subsections  have discussed the role  of Congolese refugees  in South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions the DRC from the perspective of informants, it is also
worthwhile to note a number of policy and practical issues arising from research findings.
This subsection presents a prognosis for South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC.
As this study has shown, external actors’ complicity in the DRC’s conflicts had ramifications
for  other  interveners  is  included  to  this  category.  Specifically,  interventions  of  Rwanda,
Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Burundi attracted international attention and damaged the
reputation of most international peacebuilders in the DRC. At this point, it can be argued that
the damaged reputation of the preceding interveners has probably harmed the stances of the
majority of  this  study’s participants regarding South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions.
Nevertheless, some participants still argued that South Africa was playing a significant role in
building peace in the DRC through limiting the growth and the effects of M23, infrastructural
rehabilitation, electioneering and funding key institutions. However, conflict transformation
is a systematic, planned, methodical and inter-stakeholder conflict intervention strategy. This
point highlights a key issue arising from South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the
DRC which has neglected the role of other stakeholders. At this juncture, Congolese need to
see South Africa as being involved in actions that support conflict transformation, addressing
the root causes of the conflict, re-building ruined relationships in the DRC and addressing
psychological  traumas  to  victims  and  perpetrators  (Maiese,  2003).  Other  than  deploying
SANDF to the MUNUSCO and supporting the regime of Joseph Kabila,  Mitchell  (2012)
argues that the focus should be firstly, on rebuilding, strengthening and promoting mutual
non-violent relationships between the divided Congolese communities. Secondly, there is a
need to urge conflicting political elites to engage in dialogue on how to address the causes
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and the effects of unending war in the DRC. If the foregoing processes are not taken seriously
by South Africa,  this  study warns that the existing conflicts  in the DRC will  persist  and
conflicting  groups  will  continue  to  label  each  other  as  the  self  and  the  other  (Hiebert,
2008:329) representing the other as the existential threat to the self; as inferior to the self; as a
violator of universal principles; or merely as different to the self’ (Diez 2005:628). 
According to CCTR, peacebuilding interventions in any conflicting society has to be a non-
violently and non-politicized processed and should address the need of the locals and not
interveners. Truger (2001) adds that such initiatives need to be fluid, practical and should
correspond with the sign of the times. Some arguments suppose that the presence of rich
mineral wealth is the sole cause of violence in the DRC. The findings of this study argue that
it  does  not  happen  in  isolation:  it  is  coupled  with  other  forms  of  inequality.  Since
independence, violence has become a tool for political expediency of fostering ethnic and
tribal disunity among the Congolese by the DRC elites so as to ascend to power. For instance,
in 1996 the Banyamulenge tribe whom Mobutu had referred to as outsides – Rwandese -
opposed his rule and supported the Baluba tribe whose leader was Laurent Kabila and the
AFDL. Kabila and his group AFDL later overthrew the regime of Mobutu (Turner and Ngoy,
2007).  However,  after  Kabila  ascended  to  power  he  neglected  the  Banyamulenge  and
organized new power networks that were based on his ethnic group the Baluba referring to
the Banyamulenge as outsiders and asking them to leave the DRC. As a result, Kabila faced
strong opposition from political elites from the disgruntled group - the Banyamulenge who
later formed a rebellion Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Although he had the support
of the AZN Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Arnold, 2005), the RCD had the support of
Rwanda and Uganda. This led to Africa’s greatest war comprising of five external national
armies and twenty-five armed groups within the DRC.
 
From the preceding paragraph, like in many post-colonial African states, to date all post-
independent regimes in the DRC have practised politics of patronage, whereby communities
affiliated to the president benefit at the expense of others.  This has made violence in the
DRC to be a result of socio-political and economic issues that are growing deeper and bigger.
As this  study is  being carried the DRC’s wealth is  gradually becoming a mechanism for
promoting loyalty to the Joseph Kabila regime. This is a residue of Mobutu’s governance
where all the his allies were rewarded with the minerals in the region. Congo continues to be
a theatre for corruption, divide and rule politics and discrimination. This can be vindicated by
163
the current call by tribes, elites and political cronies that are affiliated to president Joseph
Kabila to support his bid of extending his presidential  term limit that is due to expire in
December  2016.   In  this  case,  due  to  ascent  to  political  power in  the  DRC,  the  Baluba
community, Kabila’s cronies and other political elites have dominated the current regime in
the DRC over other communities.  As it happened during the first and the second Congo
wars, in retrospect, as long as tribal politics of reward exercised by those in power continue
as the measure of appropriating privileges and powerful positions - whether (or not) the South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions uses SANDF or supports democratic reforms without
addressing the root causes of conflicts, war will still exist in the DRC. 
Through the tenets of CCTR, there is a need to address the historical injustice and political
convenience that  has been practised in  the DRC since its  independence but  mostly since
1996. However, instead of addressing the causes of wars in the DRC, by using the SANDF,
election reforms and signing bilateral trade agreements with the regime of Joseph Kabila,
South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is using the DRC as a ground for its hegemonic,
political  and  economic  tussle. When  analysed  from  the  CCTR  perspective,  by  not
incorporating non-state actors like Congolese refugees (residing in South Africa) - who from
their point of view have an understanding of what breeds war in the DRC - South Africa’s
peacebuilding  intervention  is  polarizing  and  fuelling  inequalities,  poverty,  communal
deprivation of some sections of Congolese communities and weak and corrupt governance in
the DRC. Similarly, by not incorporating non-state actors whose understanding may point to
under-researched  root  causes  of  war  in  the  DRC,  it  can  be  argued  that  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention is paying a blind eye to why majority of Congolese are refugees in
South Africa. According to Vickers (2012), the interests of any particular intervening state are
complex to be comprehended. This is because at times, what appears as interests of a state are
interests  of  a  dominant  segment  within  a  state  (Laudati,  2013).   Also,  there  are  some
segments within a conflict society and intervening states that benefit from wars (Weiss and
Welz, 2014). However, within the South African policy on conflict resolution in Africa the
interests of dominant South African state actors is to see a stable DRC (Hendricks, 2015).
Therefore,  the  interests  of  the  dominant  South  African  state  actors  are  in  line  with  the
interests of CCTR. 
There are a lot of ways that South Africa can realise its interests of seeing a stable DRC. One
of the approaches of protecting its national interest of having a stable DRC is for it drawing
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from the views of non-state actors like the Congolese refugees. This may aid South Africa in
advancing an all-encompassing peacebuilding strategy on the continent. This study is aware
that the South African green policy on conflict resolution is aware of some factors that breed
war in many African states ranging from foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and
weak systems of governance (Bentley and Southall, 2005). However, this does not rule out
the fact that South Africa can harness more information on dynamics of war from non-state
actors like refugees. For instance, South Africa’s contribution of the SANDF to MUNUSCO
is a positive step. However, South Africa has to be aware that since the first DRC war several
external military attempts have been made towards achieving sustainable peace in Congo
without making much success (Habib, 2009). For instance, in 2008, despite the regime of
Joseph Kabila accusing Rwanda for helping the rebel group CNDP that was led by Colonel
Nkunda, DRC sought for its help. Rwanda helped and the two countries agreed to have a joint
military force against rebel groups CNDP and FDLR. The joint initiative between Rwanda
and the DRC led to the arrest of general Nkunda thus weakening CNDP and uprooting FDLR
from Kivu. However, by not putting in place policies that could avert  the root causes of
conflicts- poverty, inequalities, tribalism, ethnicity and corrupt and weak governance - the
remnants of the FDLR and CNDP continue to cause conflicts in the eastern parts of the DRC.
From the history of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, there is a need for South Africa
to re-think its approach of peacebuilding interventions. From the views and insights of the
participants  of  this  study,  it  can  be  argued  that  non-state  actors  like  refugees  may  be
contributors to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions.
Another  peacebuilding  intervention  was  a  joint  effort  between  the  MONUC  and  the
government of the DRC (Andersen and Ghimire, 2014). It was within the mandate of the
MONUC to provide logistics and military to both the FARDC and the government forces.
The primary objective of the operation was to protect the population; to put an end to the
threat of the FDLR; and to re-establish the authority of the Congolese state (Froitzheim and
Söderbaum,  2013).  From this  mandate,  the  joint  operations  overlooked the  role  of  other
stakeholders  or  conflicting  parties  in  DRC’s war.  As  a  result,  the  operation  failed.  For
instance, in May 2012, the FDLR rebels killed a number of civilians that were supposed to be
protected by MONUC near its base in Kivu. This made locals to protest against the presence
of  MONUC and preferred  that  FLDR and other  militias  protect  them (Murphy, 2016 :).
Similarly, in July 2013, the M23 attacked the city of Goma killing a few people under the
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watch of the United Nations. This again led to a demand by the Congolese for the withdrawal
of MONUC (Howell, 2016). 
 
The failure of the preceding peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is attributed to their
efforts  of  addressing  the  symptoms of  the  conflict  without  rooting  out  their  causes.  For
example, the objectives of the foregoing operations were  “to protect the civilians, remove
negative forces from the population centres, re-establish authority in liberated areas and to
restore state authority and re-establish state authority” (Copeland, 2012:12). Although, the
foregoing peacebuilding initiatives were important in maintaining some relative peace for a
specific period of time, according to CCTR, they targeted  elimination of militant and rebel
groups without addressing the root cause(s) of war which are the frustrated basic human
rights and needs (Sandole, 2010:9). This can be likened to the initiatives of the SANDF that
have helped to minimize the effects of the M23 rebel group. However, from the views of
some participants of this study, it can be argued that inclusion of Congolese refugees - who
the study showed to have some awareness of the dynamics of war in the DRC (like former
soldiers were once involved or connected to rebel or government troops), may strengthen
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This will mean that unlike former
interveners,  South Africa would have rethought  its  peacebuilding intervention strategy of
including non-state actors. 
7.7. The Economic Dimension of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
According to  Partridge  (1963:  235),  power  is  ‘the  ability  for  one  actor  to  do something
affecting another actor, which changes the probable patterns of future events. This can be
envisaged most easily in decision making’. From the study’s findings it is evident indeed that,
like other interveners, South Africa has not incorporated all parties to the DRC conflict. For
instance, by supporting the regime of Joseph Kabila while at the same time carrying out its
peacebuilding  interventions,  one  interviewee  argued  that  Congolese  from  the  eastern
provinces of the Congo were dissatisfied with exclusionary politics of the current regime128.
Therefore by deciding to support trade deals and sign bilateral agreements with Kabila, the
presence of SANDF is partly responsible for prolonging the conflict129. Due to its privileged
economic position, South Africa has had power to finance and to sign deals of putting in
place high-end infrastructures  like the Inga Dam project  in  the DRC. This has deepened
128 Interview with a Congolese Human rights lawyer in Durban
129 Interview with a member of Congolese civil right group in Durban.
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South  Africa-DRC economic  relations.  As  a  result,  many South  African  companies  have
invested heavenly in different sectors of the DRC economy (Daily Maverick, 2011). As a
result, it can be argued that South Africa – through its peacebuilding interventions - is in a
better  position  to  use its  economic  and foreign policies  to  indirectly/directly maintain or
extend its influence over the politics of the DRC. 
The table below shows South Africa’s economic interest in the DRC in the form of imports
and exports. The table covers eight years in which South Africa became extensively involved
in peace keeping missions in the DRC. The figures in the table stand as numerical evidence of
the extensive interest of South Africa in the DRC, adapted from Gbaya (2014:58)
Table 11. Economic interests of South Africa in the DRC
Year Imports  to  SA from
DRC
Exports  to  DRC
from SA
Total Trade Balance
2006 47 768 011 2 479 644 104 2 431 876 093
2007 54 034 126 4 369 539 310 4 315 505 184
2008 43 239 861 9 203 936 291 9 160 696 430
2009 72 354 386 4 829 931 726 4 757 577 340
2010 72 354 386 6 318 722 965 6 218 211 954
2011 106 500 768 8 040 664 774 7 934 164 006
2012 67 436 251 12 141 678 103 12 074 241 853
2013             94, 200, 010 12 142, 720 004 12 05 4 852 186
2014       100, 074 310 12, 335, 321, 012  12 235 710 00 2
Adopted by the Author from SA News Agency (2015)
By having economic power over the DRC and having its peacebuilding intervention in the
very country, South Africa can arguably be said to be vindicating the Marxist assertion that
the  world  is  run  by  the  ideas  and  construct  of  the  powerful  (Marx,  1956:26).  With  its
increasing  economic  investments  in  the  DRC and  hosting  a  large  number  of  Congolese
refugees in  Africa,  there is  no gainsaying that  South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
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have the capacity to force those who disagree with its strategies into submission. Due to
ethicized and tribal political nature of DRC politics, South Africa’s support to the regime of
Kabila  is  an  implicit  way of  justifying  ascendance  to  power  by tribes  and communities
affiliated to Kabila’s presidency. As a result, a prejudice that communities that are affiliated to
the president are superior to others is embedded within the minds of the Congolese. As it was
shown in chapter two and from the views of Congolese refugees, ethnicity is a power that is
used  to  form and run  that  country. Thus,  instead  of  bringing about  lasting  peace,  South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions is viewed as supporting the already existing “superior
and inferior” tribal identity and inequality in the DRC (Mills, 1997). The current shift and
realignment by the tribes, groups, cronies and elites affiliated to the presidency supporting the
extension  of  president  Joseph  Kabila’s term limit  is  a  justification  of  how  in  the  DRC
negative ethnicity is used to build patronage.  As this  study is being analysed (September
2016), there has been sporadic violence in Kinshasa - the capital of the DRC.  This violence
is between the supporters of President Kabila against those who are opposed to him. The
current violence is a justification that in the DRC it is a given that supporters of the president
- tribes, communities and elites affiliated to him - are leaders or holders of power while those
in opposition should be ruled.
Having looked at  the ethicized nature of DRC’s politics, there is no way that the current
South  African  peacebuilding  interventions  that  support  the  regime  of  Kabila  without
addressing  the  misuse  of  power  and  ethnic  disharmony will  be  successful.  One  way of
addressing  this  is  by  South  Africa  incorporating  the  views  of  Congolese  refugees  who
according to chapter five and six have an understanding of the dynamics of the causes of war
in  the  DRC.  As  argued  by  most  Congolese  refugees,  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
intervention needs to facilitate the growth of political and economic access for all Congolese
by advocating for good governance, democracy and inclusive economic development. More
so, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions need to concentrate on rebuilding the damaged
Congolese ethnic and tribal fabric by reconciling the conflicting communities and leaders
(Miall, 2004: 14). From the views of Congolese refugees in Durban, at the heart of the DRC’s
conflict, is a fight for control of public resources due to inequality and poverty that are a
result of exclusionary and divisionary politics in the DRC. 
Most of the views of Congolese refugees contended that misuse of power, poverty, negative
ethnicity and tribal  identity has  been at  the heart  of  the DRC’s conflict  which has  been
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assumed to be mineral related. For instance, after only four days of independence, there was
an open conflict over political antagonism, tribalism, conflict for resources and geographical
diversity (Alan, 1961).  This led to an emergence of regional secessionist movements that
were organised along tribal lines. When Mobutu took over power, he reignited the Belgian
governing systems that promoted exclusion, corruption and ethnicity. He also exploited the
Congo as if it were his personal property. Extreme disparities existed between Mobutu, his
cronies, group and tribes affiliated to him and the rest of the Congolese communities. This
prompted the growth of rebel groups that were dissatisfied with inequality and greed for
power. Due to his exclusionary politics, the Hunde and Nande tribes ganged up against the
Banyarwanda  whom they  considered  as  foreigners.  As  a  result,  the  Hutu  Banyarwanda
reacted by initiating a campaign of resistance to Hunde and Nande political control. Although
the 1996 Congo war involved a number of foreign actors, it was grounded in the need for the
Banyamulenge tribe to assert their identity as Congolese and not Rwandese as they had been
referred to by the regime of Mobutu. For this reason, the tribe identified itself with the rebel
group AFDl led by Laurent Kabila. Similarly, the second Congo war was as a result of troops
that were mainly of Tutsi whom Kabila had asked to leave the DRC. The Tutsi dominated
group formed a rebellion known as Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). From 2003,
Weiss (2011) and Winter (2012: 56) argue that the DRC relapsed into war when President
Joseph Kabila and Prime Minister Bemba sought to reward their cronies, tribeswo/men and
supporters with plum government jobs rather than seeking a lasting solution for peace. 
Although South  Africa’s peacebuilding  intervention  -  through SANDF -  has  managed to
neutralise the efforts of rebel group M23, there still exists a number of organised militia and
rebel  groups.  Most  of  the  rebels  and  militias  are  backed  by  different  ethnic  and  tribal
communities to fight for their ascendency to political power so as to liberate themselves from
the existing inequalities, poverty and exclusion (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Although many
scholars claim that the DRC war is mineral-related, from the preceding discussion, it is the
use of power, negative ethnicity and tribalism in awarding privileges to communities that
ascends to power over the other that are probable root causes of the DRC’s conflict. Having
said that, in line with one of the research questions of this study - What contributions can the
Congolese  refugees  make  towards  the  South  Africa’s intervention  strategies  in  the  DRC
conflict? -  by incorporating the views of refugees as this study has found out, among many
impacts  that  South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention could avert  is  fuelling the already
existing Congolese tribal disharmony and polarization further. It is for this reason that the
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study  argues  that  the  views  of  Congolese  refugees  within  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC are insightful. While reaffirming the traditional tenets of negative-
positive peace, CCTR highlights the importance of the locals in identifying the root causes of
wars  and  in  rebuilding  broken  relationships  other  than  overemphasizing  contemporary
liberal’s conflict resolution methods (Galtung, 1969; Ledarach, 2003; Miall, 2004). In this
context, it can be argued that it is the poor tribal and ethnic  relationship between groups in
the  DRC that  instigates  attitudes  that  lead  to  unending violence in  that  country (cultural
violence). Therefore,  the  identifying  and  addressing  the  root  causes  of  conflicts  and
rebuilding broken relationships among the Congolese should be the core of South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. One way of doing that is by incorporating the views
of the Congolese refugees residing in South Africa
While it is true that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions are crucial as an attempt of
bringing lasting peace, its support of the current regime (one of the party to the conflict) and
its ongoing bilateral trade with that country will leave a stratified and tribal social structure in
the DRC. With the privileges that communities that are affiliated to the Presidency enjoy
from any regime, it is a foregone conclusion that the support of Kabila by South Africa will
make political elites not want to temper with transforming the system. This will keep the
foregoing communities and elites more superior to those that have been denied access to
political power. In the end, ethnic division, polarisation, politics of domination and seclusion,
land  injustices  and  poor  governance  will  continue  to  linger  on  in  the  DRC.  Therefore,
competition  for  power  to  gain  control  by  both  the  “ruling”  and  the  “marginalised”
communities and tribes in the DRC will implicitly legislate violence as a means. By doing so,
a socially and politically constructed ethnic disharmony, polarization and division will be
taken as essential in the DRC’s realpolitik. In this case, this study warns that as long as South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention does not revolve around addressing the root causes of
war, the DRC’s conflict will continue. 
If the views of the Congolese refugees as presented in this study are not incorporated on
CCTR terms, the realist objectives of the South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives will be a
mere band-aid, a quick and impetuous solution to an intractable and convoluted problem in
the DRC. This is because many Congolese amid enormous wealth remain poor and ethnically,
socially and economically divided. By supporting the regime which most Congolese term as
weak and corrupt, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is putting many Congolese in an
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invidious position of claiming to seek lasting peace but still  living under political,  social,
economic and ethnic inequality. By using peacebuilding interventions to seek its realist and
economic hegemony in the DRC, South Africa is furthering divisions among Congolese. This
is not the goal and the objective of CCTR. 
At this point it is fitting to state that addressing peacebuilding in the DRC does not solely
depend  on  the  strategies  and  the  interests  of  the  interveners  (depending  solely  on  the
intervener may imperil social cohesion- ethnic and tribal disharmony and polarization). As
this study shows, there are other parties to the DRC conflicts as well as variables at the local,
national and international level that shape the dynamics of that country. For the success of
South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC,  this  study strongly proposes  the
inclusion/incorporation of the views of the Congolese refugees as shown in chapter five and
six.  Fundamental  to  this,  the  contribution  of  Congolese  refugees  to  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention will aid in understanding the root causes of war in the DRC thus
enabling  South  Africa  to  come  up  with  a  well  encompassing  peacebuilding  intervention
strategy. The role of the other parties to the DRC conflict - rebels, militias, unarmed groups
like  the  opposition,  religious  leaders,  women  and  children  this  regard  cannot  be
overemphasized, as they bear primary responsibility for guaranteeing security and stability,
which are the  sine qua non  for peacebuilding. For South Africa to strive towards effective
peacebuilding in  the DRC in the absence of these prerequisites  is  illusory. The potential
salient  contributions  that  other  Congolese  refugees  residing  in  South  Africa  could  make
towards  effective peacebuilding in  the DRC suggest  that  South Africa has to  realise  and
recognise  the  utility  of  involving  locals  in  the  peace  process  of  their  country.  This
underscores the need for complementarity of initiatives of both Congolese refugees and South
Africa (interveners and the Congolese).
7.8 conclusion 
This chapter presented and analysed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
within the tenets of realism and CCTR. The pith of the chapter was a reiteration of data
presented in chapter five and its broader analysis in chapter six. The chapter was cautionary
in its manner in that it has given no reason for complacency in South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC. This is  so because the mechanisms of successful peacebuilding
intervention from South Africa are embedded in both political and social structures of the
DRC and not the interest of South Africa. Through the tenets of CCTR, the chapter explored
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that the inclusion of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in
the DRC holds key to unlocking the root causes of war in that country. Although CCTR did
not tally with the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, realism
underscored  the  quest  for  South  Africa  to  use  peacebuilding  as  a  show  of  power  and
hegemony.
In its discussion the chapter based its arguments on the theoretical frameworks in chapter
four, data presented and analysed in chapter five and six respectively. The logical deduction
that were made are that the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is a
significant factor in the escalation, prolongation and duration of the DRC’s conflict(s). The
section also discussed that from a realist point of view, the level and the intensity of South
Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention  in  the  DRC  is  dependent,  not  on  the  what  conflict
transformation entails but on a number of economic and political variables. In unpacking the
role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in Africa, this chapter argued that there is
contradiction in the behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC:
South African peacebuilding interventions have overlooked the role of Congolese. This is
against the research findings of this study that suggested that Congolese refugees, since they
have run away from war, are aware of the dynamics of the root causes of war in the DRC.
Identifying  and  addressing  the  root  causes  of  conflict  is  the  main  goal  of  conflict
transformation/peacebuilding processes. In this case, research findings suggest that lack of
inclusion of Congolese refugees residing in South Africa underpin the specifics of South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
One of the issues that emerged in this chapter is that although South Africa’s peacebuilding
interventions manifest the tenets of realism, implementing strategies that can address poverty,
communal  deprivation,  inequality,  nepotism,  corruption  and  weak  government-structural
violence- holds key towards the attainment of positive peace in the DRC. This is what CCTR
seeks to achieve. In view of the stultifying effects, the non-inclusion of Congolese refugees
within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC does not sufficiently challenge
the culture of structural injustices and violence that characterize the nature of the DRC - a
country that is still suffering from inequality in distribution of national resources and politics
of reward and seclusion.
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According to this chapter, in its current support of the current DRC regime, South Africa is
only giving more power to the rebels, militant and other disgruntled groups to further their
violent means of seeking redress to a complex and multifaceted nature of the DRC’s conflict.
As it  was shown in chapter two, this  chapter does not see the difference between South
Africa’s peacebuilding intervention and other  liberal  peacebuilding interveners.  As it  was
discussed  in  the  history  of  DRC’s  conflict,  many  interveners  have  vehemently
“rubberstamped”  reformation  and  opposing  transformation;  the  former  only serves  as  an
affirmation  and  acceptance  of  the  dehumanizing  oppressive  situation,  whilst  the  latter
changes an oppressive system from bottom up. Similarly, due to the political economy of the
DRC conflict, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is yet to consider how to stop the
exploitation of minerals in the DRC. Instead, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions have
increased its bilateral trade with the DRC government.
In  this  regard,  the  inclusion  of  Congolese  refugees  within  South  Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention will be facilitated in unravelling the root causes of war in the DRC so that they
may  be  addressed  and  be  transformed  thus  fostering  a  conducive  environment  for
peacebuilding in the DRC. Although this chapter was exclusive on locating South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, it is also applicable to other interveners in different
conflicting countries. It can be applied to the USA-Russia-China intervention in Syria where
Syrian refugees can provide their views on the root causes of war. It can also be applied to
South Sudan where interveners have paid less attention to the tribal identity causes of the
conflict. Prior to 1994, this chapter could have been used as an early warning in averting the
Rwandan 1994 genocide. Still, the chapter can aid interveners in the Central African Republic
where refugees from that country could be used to identify the root cause of fundamentalist
Christians  who  are  violently  campaigning  for  the  excision  of  Islamic  identities  and
influences.
The chapter concluded that effective South African peacebuilding intervention is possible in
the DRC, subject to the inclusion of Congolese - in this case refugees residing in South Africa
- who may aid in identifying and implementing strategies that can address poverty, tribalism,
inequality, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and weak government-structural violence. The next




SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 Summary of the findings
This study interrogated the views, insights and attitudes of Congolese refugees towards South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The focal point of analysis of this study is
the role  of  refugees in  conflict  transformation -  the role  of  Congolese refugees  in  South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. Its primary analysis is from the
views  of  participants  who  are  Congolese  refugees  living  in  Durban,  South  Africa.
Specifically, this study gained vital views, attitudes, insights and perspectives of Congolese in
South Africa, in investigating what ‘aspired’/hopes for contribution they felt they could add
to  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  in  the  DRC.  Also,  from  the  participants’
perspective,  this  study  investigated  some  of  the  motivations  that  propel  South  Africa’s
continuous peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. In terms of methodology, the
empirical  nature  of  this study  necessitated  a  combination  of  research  methods  and
approaches.  Therefore,  it  adopted historical  and qualitative  approaches  in  explicating  the
subject matter of the research.
The  first  chapter  of  this  study  was  an  introduction.  The  chapter  introduced  the  study’s
background and foregrounded its research problem. It also identified the research task and
outlined  the  study’s  hypothesis.  The  chapter  presented  the  research  objectives  and
corresponding research questions. Furthermore, the first chapter delineated the study’s scope
and limitations. It highlighted the significance of the study, followed by a brief statement of
the research methodology and research design. The chapter also noted that an empirical study
of this nature is bound to grapple with certain methodological and practical limitations, which
the chapter identified.  A section of the first chapter was devoted to the clarification of the key
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concepts  that  underpinned  the  study’s  thematic  concerns.  The  chapter  concluded  with  a
description of the structure of the study.
The second chapter was a review and comparison of relevant literature to the study. Most of
the  literature  interrogated  the  interface  between  refugees  and  other  migrants  in  conflict
transformation.  In  the analysis,  it  was  noted  that  the most  of  contemporary literature on
conflict transformation are limited in narratives that either corroborate, modify or rebut the
role of refugees in conflict  transformation. Through a review and comparison of relevant
literature,  the  second  chapter  highlighted  that  since  refugees  are  considered  as  non-state
actors, most intervening states do not  integrate them into their  peacebuilding intervention
approaches. This a probable reason as to why scholarship (in the review of literature) on the
role  of  refugees  remains  under-researched.  However,  to  a  certain  extend  it  is  true  that
marginalisation of any participant in peacebuilding is a ground for future conflict. Although
under-researched, the review of literature re-affirmed the there is a significant link between
refugees and the initiation, escalation, prolongation and duration of conflicts in their countries
of origin. Given that refugees are also actors in an on-going or previous war, it can be argued
that they need not to be side-lined from peace processes of their countries’ conflicts.  Using
the  example  of  the  role  of  Somalian,  Palestinian  and  South  African  diaspora  in  their
countries’ conflicts, the review of literature in this study established that refugees are linked
either directly or indirectly to the dynamics of conflicts in their countries. By filling in the
gaps  and  building  on  the  already  existing  scholarship  on  the  role  of  refugees  in
peacebuilding, this chapter emphasized that there is a need for a nuanced understanding of
the role of refugees to voice their narratives as constructed, resisted, adopted and experienced
by them in interveners’ peacebuilding interventions.  This was the main aim of the entire
study.  
After  reviewing  and  comparing  literature  on  link  between  refugees  and  conflict
transformation, the third chapter presented theoretical perspectives and research methods for
analysing this study. Firstly, the chapter examined cosmopolitan conflict transformation and
realism as the two relevant paradigms of explicating the views and insights of the Congolese
refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The chapter began by
making a case for CCTR, due to relevance in peacebuilding interventions.  It was noted that
CCTR advocates  for inclusion of all  affected parties to  the conflict  in any peacebuilding
processes. This in contrast to what many intervening states do. It was argued that it is due to
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marginalisation of some parties to the conflict by intervening peacebuilders that sets grounds
or fuels further conflict. It was argued that most contemporary approaches in peacebuilding
interventions –also referred to as liberal peace approaches - serve the interest of the powerful
and in maintaining the status quo in a conflict society. Other than eliminating the root causes
of war, the liberal approach was faulted for creating favourable conditions that endorsed a
culture of violence. 
What distinguishes CCTR perspective from other conflict transformation theories is the idea
that it emphasizes a need for orderly resolution of any conflict. In addition, CCTR advocates
the replacement of structures and conditions that breed violence/war with those that build
sustainable peace. It was argued that a number of interveners, negotiators and peacemakers in
the DRC’s war tend to resolve conflicts by only dealing with conflicting elites (as it was done
during  the  DRC’s first,  second and  third  wars).  As  a  result,  many parties  to  the  DRC’s
conflict were marginalized. This can be the reason why the conflict is unending. As a new
approach to the DRC’s conflict, through CCTR, this chapter argued that the insights and the
views  of  the  Congolese  refugees  (among  other  sidelined  groups),  can  contribute
tremendously and effectively to South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.
Secondly, for the purpose of providing a holistic framework for understanding interest that
shapes  interveners’  peacebuilding  interventions  in  a  conflict  state,  realism  is  a  relevant
paradigm. It was noted that realism views peacebuilding interventions as a continuation of
interveners’ foreign policies or national interests. This chapter acknowledged that national
interests  are  difficult  to  conceptualise.  In  collectives  and  institutions,  what  appears  as
collective  or  institutional  interest  may  be  the  interest  of  a  segment  within  a  state  or  a
collective.  Whilst  literature on the interface between refugees and conflict  transformation
seems to be informed by realpolitik, the realist paradigm established that strong states take
decisions to carry out peacebuilding interventions to serve their geostrategic and economic
interests. 
In this study, the realist perspective was utilized to examine how interests (economic, security
and hegemonic) are the guiding compass for South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. The
chapter argued that it was conceivable that there is a possibility of some segments of South
Africa that are actually benefiting from the conflict in DRC. In this case, it can be argued that
no one will ever be able to convince them otherwise. However, the study argued that the
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dominant interest of the strong South African state actors is to see a stable and peaceful DRC.
Some of the national interests of South Africa are to have economic relations with a stable
DRC, to fight insecurity as a result of the neighbouring warring nations and to reduce the
influx of refugees as a result of war. It is due to the foregoing reasons that this study argued
that South Africa can draw from the insights of the Congolese refugees so as to bring an end
to decades of war in the DRC. In this case, if South Africa is seen as a country that accepts
the views of African refugees on peacebuilding it will earn continental respect (soft power).
As a result, it will be able to use realist economic policies in order to further the interest of
South African business segments.
The third chapter also presented the research design, methodology and methods of analysis
that were employed during the study. By employing the use of the qualitative approach, this
chapter was able to explore amongst other things the different components of the Congolese
refugees residing in Durban in terms of gender, age, educational levels, marital status and
their  different  political  and  ideological  comportments  and  their  views  on  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
The  fourth  chapter  was  historical  in  its  nature.  It  presented  a  historical  background and
established several factors that continue to trigger the DRC’s conflict.  Among factors that
were established are: the foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and weak systems of
governance,  fights  over  resources,  nepotism,  favouritism,  poverty  and  ethnicity.  Other
external  factors  were  the  influence  and  the  presence  of  foreign  troops  and  rebels  from
neighbouring countries  like  Rwanda and Uganda.  This  has  become the  edifice  on which
violence was laid for  resolution of  any of  the DRC’s conflict.  To date,  rebel  and militia
groups  continue  to  hold  large  parts  of  the  country subjecting  the  civilian  populations  to
prolonged instability and civil  strife.  The chapter also established that historically, due to
pursuance  of  their  interests,  most  peacebuilding  interventions  have  played  a  role  in  the
escalation of the DRC’s conflict rather than averting it. In relation to the study, the chapter
established that South Africa became actively involved in the DRC conflict from 1996 to
date. Also, the chapter established that South Africa has successfully used its peacebuilding
intervention to create a trusting diplomatic relationship that has led to lucrative trade deals
between the two countries. In the end, South Africa is the chief beneficiary of bilateral trade
pact  with  DRC  while  at  the  same  time  seeking  lasting  peace.  The  chapter  argued  that
probably it is because of South Africa’s interests as a regional hegemon that it finds itself in
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conflicting positions in  its  peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.  While  many
efforts have been made in peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, the chapter established
that Congolese refugees are yet to be incorporated in the peace processes of their country’s
conflict.  This  set  a  focal  point  of  this  study  and  reason  as  to  why  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding may need to include their views.  
A backdrop for explicating the attitudes of Congolese refugees in Durban (location of this
study)  towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC was set  in the fifth
chapter.  Results from the qualitative data garnered in chapter five revealed that Congolese
refugees are skilled and very heterogeneous. They survive from a wide range of economic
activities in both the informal and the formal economy. From the sample obtained, it can be
argued  that  most  Congolese  refugees  in  Durban  possess  a  tertiary  education  and  that  a
number of them are aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. In line
with  the  study’s  hypothesis,  the  fifth  chapter  underscored  the  idea  that  South  Africa’s
interventions in the DRC are not premised on assumption that peacebuilding is means of
addressing the high influx of Congolese refugees. In doing so, this chapter contended that
probably, South Africa can draw from the opinions,  views and insights of the Congolese
refugees so as to bring it respect as a country that respects the contribution of refugees in
peacebuilding on the continent.  This will earn it respect on the continent and in turn allow
South Africa to  use its  realist  economic policies in order  to further  the interest  of South
African political and business segments. Although the participants of this study are non-state
actors, their views and insights on South Africa’s peacebuilding as presented in chapter five,
engender a holistic understanding of conflict transformation. The data collected in the fifth
chapter was explicated and analysed further in chapter six and seven. 
The sixth chapter presented and analyzed data obtained in the fifth chapter framing it  on
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions  in the DRC from the participants’ perspective.
This was against the backdrop of the main trends in peacebuilding intervention strategy and
behaviours in the DRC. The sixth chapter begun by presenting participants’ narratives on the
root  causes  of  war  in  the  DRC.  Among the  causes  of  war  in  the  DRC that  participants
narrated are poverty, inequality, weak government institutions and corruption, international
actors and MNCs’ greed for Congo’s rich minerals, tribalism, nepotism and ethnicity.
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The sixth chapter also presented the participants’ narrations on the characteristics, strategies
and behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Most participants
argued that South Africa was contributing the SANDF in MUNUSCO, using diplomacy by
urging conflicting parties to use peaceful means to end the conflict and funding infrastructure
like transport  network in the DRC. However, there is  also a segment of participants that
argued that South Africa was using its peacebuilding strategy as a means of increasing its
business ventures in the DRC. 
The contribution of the SANDF in peacebuilding in the DRC elicited two opposing narratives
among participants. One section of participants was in support of the SANDF intervention in
the DRC while the other, opposed it. The sixth chapter also discussed the rationale behind
participants’ opposing view on the use of SANDF in the DRC.  The chapter ended by making
some logical deductions on South Africa’s use of SANDF in transforming the DRC’s conflict:
setting a scene for the rationale and interest of the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in addressing the root causes of the DRC’s conflict. As a result, South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC’s conflict had to be located within the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict
transformation and realism in the seventh chapter of this study. 
The seventh chapter presented and analysed the views and insights of the Congolese refugees
on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC within the tenets of realism and
CCTR. The chapter was cautionary in that it gave no reason for the perceived complacency in
South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. This is so because the mechanisms of
successful intervention are embedded in both the conflicting political and social structures of
the DRC and the interest of South Africa. Through the tenets of CCTR, the chapter explored
that  the inclusion  of  Congolese views of  the participants  of  this  study in South  Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention in the DRC may be one of the ways of bringing an end to decades
of war in that country. Also, as argued in chapter five and six, the inclusion of the views of
this  study’s  participants  on  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  may  be  another
approach  of  South  Africa’s  so  called  ‘soft’  power  approach  in  promoting  its  economic
interests in the Congo. According to Nye (2012) soft power is the  ability to get what one
wants by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment. Great powers try to use
culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their national interests. For instance,
China is spending billions of dollars to increase its soft power through aid programmes to
Africa and Latin America. While chapter five and six insisted that inclusion of the views of
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refugees in its peacebuilding interventions may earn South Africa respect on the continent,
this chapter underscored that it is also one way of South Africa using its soft power and thus
advancing its regional hegemon in peace operations and economic affairs in Africa. It can
perhaps be argued that an inclusion of the views and insights of the  Congolese refugees
within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is an attractive and persuasive way of South
Africa stabilizing the DRC and furthering its economic interest in the latter.
The seventh chapter also argued that the bilateral trade between the two countries is meant to
boost  the  affected  economies  of  both  countries.  However,  the  chapter  cautioned  that  by
entering  bilateral  business  ventures  while  on  peacebuilding  intervention,  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding  intervention  is  to  be  viewed  with  some  suspicion.   As  argued  by  some
participants,  participation  of  South  Africa  in  DRC’s  peacebuilding  while  pushing  for
economic  relations  with DRC can be  termed as  a  predatory and exploitative way of  the
economics of the DRC’s war.  For instance, the Inga Dam, agriculture and the abundance of
mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights, further support
the realists’ view that there is a segment of South Africa’s state and business actors who are
actually benefiting from the DRC’s conflict. If this is the case, no one will ever be able to be
convinced that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions is founded on the tenets of the
CCTR.  This  underscores  a  realist  argument  that  any  intervening  state  intervenes  in  a
conflicting country in pursuit  of its parochial interests (national or even elites).  From the
views of the participants of this study, the seventh chapter revealed that it is the economic,
security  and  hegemonic  interests  that  propel  the  guiding  compass  for  South  Africa’s
intervention in the DRC.
The chapter  concluded that  one way of  having an effective  South African  peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC, is to draw from the views and insights of the marginalised non-state
actors  like  the  Congolese  refugees.  As  narrated  by  the  participants  of  this  study,  the
underlying  rationale  here  is  the  supposition  that  by  including  Congolese  refugees  in  its
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa may undoubtedly be promoting its own
prosperity: that it is advancing its quest to be a continental leader in peacebuilding which will
earn it respect in Africa and the world. Also, by drawing on the views of the marginalised
non-state actors like refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa may
fulfil its desire of avoiding spill-overs from the effects of the war in the form of the incessant
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influx  of  Congolese  refugees.  Still,  the  views  of  Congolese  refugees  on  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC may be one of the way of having a stable DRC, thus,
furthering economic interests of South Africa’s business segments.
8.2 concluding remarks 
Based on the summary above in respect of the views, attitudes and perspectives of refugees in
peacebuilding  interventions,  this  study  makes  the  following  specific  conclusions  and
suggestions with reference to the salient aspects of the DRC’s conflict. Firstly, with regard to
the  study’s  main  hypothesis  –  namely,  that  an  interplay  between  refugees  and  conflict
transformation  (in  peacebuilding  interventions)  underpin  the  strategic  behaviour  of
peacebuilding interveners in any conflict zones – research findings suggest that in most cases
- contrary to CCTR -  interveners are motivated by maximization of their interests (be they
economic, security or economic. As such, it is the interveners’ interests that underscore their
peacebuilding  interventions  in  any  conflict.  As  the  case  study  illustrates,  a  number  of
interveners’ interests  have  predated  or  have  been  subsequent  to  the  onset  of  the  DRC’s
conflict. As argued in the chapter covering the history of peacebuilding interventions in the
DRC, where the interests of an intervener predated the DRC’s conflict (the case of Rwanda
and Uganda), an intervener may be forced to either “exit” or “remain” in the conflict zone. In
this case, although Rwanda and Uganda have exited the DRC’s conflict zone, they continue
to indirectly influence it.  Decisions for many interveners to  exit  or remain in the DRC’s
conflict zone can be argued to have been based on what the intervener will gain with either
course of action. Therefore, although complex, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in
the  DRC’s  conflict  –  whether  in  the  form  of  economic  development,  facilitation  of
peacemaking between conflicting actors or use of SANDF – is contextual and situated and
should be understood and analysed from this prism (national interests of South Africa). 
From these study findings however, there is a possibility that South Africa can draw from the
hitherto marginalised insights and views of Congolese refugees on peacebuilding, to advance
the interests of ending war in the DRC and promoting its national interests (whatever, they
are). In this regard, it  can be argued that, by drawing from the insights and the views of
Congolese refugees on peacebuilding, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
may be bolstered. As this study has established - with regard to the first research question –
the participants’ level of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
was understandably high. The participants’ level of awareness of South Africa’s interventions,
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led the research to seek to understand what participants considered as both the proximate and
immediate causes of war in the DRC. The researcher established that the Draft White Paper
on  South  Africa’s  Foreign  Policy  (2011)  acknowledges  that  it  is  poverty  and
underdevelopment that hinders the attainment of sustainable peace in Africa. From the views
of most participants in this study, poverty and inequality in mineral-rich eastern DRC were
re-iterated as some of the root causes of war. For instance,  most participants argued that
mineral resources in the eastern DRC can economically take care of the needs of its locals.
However, many participants argued that most indigenes of the eastern DRC were languishing
in poverty amid presence of rare and rich minerals that the region is endowed with. Some
participants argued that it was the increasing levels of poverty level and landlines among the
indigenous  eastern  residents  that  promoted  some actions  of  rebels  and  militia  groups  in
causing conflicts.  
Participants also identified the role  of  some local  and international  actors  in fuelling the
DRC’s conflict. At the national level, participants argued that the weak DRC government (the
absence  of  state  authority  in  mineral  rich  regions),  corruption,  nepotism and  politics  of
reward (warlord politics) could be identified as some of the factors that abet war in the DRC.
At  the  international  level,  the  competition  and demand for  the  DRC’s resources  and the
involvement  of  interveners  (especially  neighbouring  countries)  perpetuate  the  DRC’s
conflicts.  From  the  views  of  participants,  this  study  established  that  most  interveners
undertook  intervention  strategies  that  continue  to  exacerbate  and  prolong  conflicts:
historically, most of their peacebuilding interventions have hindered conflict transformation
in the DRC. 
In answering the third research question - regarding the aspired roles of Congolese refugees
within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflicts - this study bears out
the  significance  of  the  participants’  views  and  insight  on  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
intervention in the DRC’s conflict.  During the study, most participants narrated that most
interveners failed to address the known root causes of causes of war in the DRC. Participants
attributed laxity of interveners in addressing the root causes of war in the DRC to the pursuit
of their own interests and not for lasting peace. 
According to Manning (2003), the  root causes that have to be addressed in some instances
include weak institutions, endemic poverty and crippling debt (see Manning 2003). In this
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regard, participants narrated that most interveners in the DRC’s conflict had failed to place
more  efforts  on  long-term  perspectives  of  peace  so  as  to  avoid  intractable  conflicts,
transforming  protracted  conflicts  into  tractable  ones  and  reconciling  former  adversaries
(Wolff and Yakinthou, 2011). It is for this reason that this study’s findings reveal that one way
of addressing the root causes of war in the DRC is for South Africa to draw on  different
views,  attitudes  and  perceptions  of  Congolese  refugees  (in  Durban)  on  peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC. The views and insights of participants of this study are opposed to
historical simplistic or reductionist explanations of peacebuilding interventions that seem to
have marginalized non-state actors like refugees.  
There is no simple way of incorporating the aspired roles of the Congolese refugees within
South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention.  However,  according  to  this  study’s  findings,
drawing from their views of Congolese refugees will engender a holistic understanding of
how an all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention will be another way of
South Africa realizing its national interests in the DRC.
In most cases, many governments are reluctant to invite refugees and exiles to contribute to
their foreign policy making. However, from this study’s findings, participants’ showed a high
level of understanding of the dynamics of war in the DRC. In this case, they can be parties to
conflict  transformation  that  is  embedded  within  South  Africa’s  foreign  policy  on
peacebuilding in showing what works. For instance, they can help South Africa in building
peacebuilding coalitions between local and international organizations in conflict areas on the
continent.  As this  study has revealed,  it  can be argued that  it  is  due to  failures of many
international  interveners to  build  peacebuilding  coalitions  with  Congolese  refugees  that
continue to perpetuate the DRC’s conflict. Therefore, drawing from the views and insights of
the Congolese refugees - as argued by participants - may not only be the means through
which  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  intervention  can  overcome  the  gap  left  by  other
interveners but also one way of creating a platform to build peace and reconstruct the DRC
and other African countries that are ravaged by war.
 Another question that this study was answering was in regard to the awareness of Congolese
refugees of the national interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC and
how their views may inform the South Africa’s national interest. To the foregoing question,
this study argues that  refugees are non-state actors and their inclusion in peacebuilding is a
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relatively a new phenomenon. By utilizing the views and insights of the Congolese refugees
on peacebuilding in DRC - as narrated by participants - South Africa will be recognizing the
important contributions that some non-state actors can make towards building and nurturing
peace in societies that are plagued by war.  At a practical level, the inclusion of the views and
insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
is one way of complementing other contributions of state and inter-governmental actors in
conflict transformation. At the level of analysis, the inclusion of the views and insights of the
Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC presupposes
rethinking peacebuilding paradigms (which focuses on the warring parties and state actors).
From this  study’s  findings,  the  views  and  insights  of  the  Congolese  refugees  on  South
Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  calls  for  introspection,  interrogation  and  analysis  of
contemporary  conflicts  through  more  encompassing  frameworks  that  encapsulate  the
marginalised roles of non-state actors in peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This paper
recommends and stresses the need for studies to include the seemingly forgotten role of the
subaltern transnational refugees in peacebuilding, by focusing on the refugees themselves. As
the next subsection argues, this thesis recommends that South Africa should take cognisance
of  the  roles  played  by  non-state  actors  like  Congolese  refugees  in  producing  specific
outcomes that define the trajectory of conflicts and peacebuilding processes in the DRC. 
8.3 Recommendations/Suggestions 
Based on the research findings and issues that have emerged from participants, this study
makes    recommendations  which  include  suggestions  for  further  studies  on  the  under-
researched subject of refugees and their role in the intervener’s peacebuilding interventions. 
8.3.1 Establishment of South African refugees’ resource centres 
As this study notes, it is in the interest of dominant South African state actors to see a stable
DRC and Africa as a whole.   However, from its  experience of peacebuilding in Burundi
(Hendricks,  2015),  South  Africa  has  a  limited  approach  in  peacebuilding.  According  to
Hendricks  (2015) South  Africa’s peacebuilding interventions  in  Burundi  focused on state
actors leaving out non-state actors. As a result, some non-state actors developed into rebel
groups  fuelling  further  the  Burundian  conflict.  Therefore,  this  study suggests  that  South
Africa embraces new strategies and approaches to peacebuilding on the continent. As this
study argues, many governments are  reluctant to invite refugees and exiles to contribute to
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their  foreign policy making on peacebuilding.  It  was noted that,  as presently constituted,
South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  is  severely  encumbered  with  respect  to
understanding how poverty, inequality and underdevelopment abet war on the continent. 
In its refugees Act, South Africa has earned respect continentally and globally for accepting
refugees from most war-torn African countries. This author believes that central to ensuring
that refugees rights are respected is the inclusion of their views within the framework of
South  Africa’s  peacebuilding  interventions  of  their  countries’  conflict.   One  way  of
actualizing the views and insights of Congolese among other refugees within South Africa is
coalition with a  number of  organizations  that  the government  can work with in  order to
generate peacebuilding policies. One organization that is potentially valuable as a policy site
for future South Africa peacebuilding intervention that is informed by the views of Congolese
refugees is  the Jesuit  Refugees Service (JRS).  The Jesuit  Refugees  Service is  a  Catholic
religious organization located in Yeoville, in the Gauteng province, that provides assistance to
refugees in camps and cities, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, and to those held
in detention centres.  The JSR has  a large number of Congolese refugees  whom it  offers
services  to.  Additionally,  many  activist  Congolese  are  part  of  the  organization.  Another
organization is the Muslim Refugees Relief Association (MRASA). Like the Jesuit Refugees
Service, the Muslim Refugees Relief Association is a non-profit Islamic organization that
seeks to uplift the religious, social, morale and academic standards of refugees and asylum
seekers. They too have many Congolese refugees that they cater to. While the aforementioned
organizations are broad and attempt to assist all refugees, the Cultural Orientation Center in
Gauteng is more specifically a Congolese organization that provides basic information about
Congolese refugee arrivals. In Gauteng, the Cultural Orientation Center acts as a background
service provider to both new and old Congolese refugees. This organization is run by several
Congolese activists and can potentially offer valuable participants for grounded South African
peacebuilding  policy  that  seeks  to  consciously  include  the  perceptions  and  insights  of
Congolese refugees in South Africa.
Therefore, the establishment of the South African national refugees’ resource centres will be a
way in which the government may harness the views of refugees on the causes of war in their
countries and how they can contribute to peace. This will be a new approach of South Africa
becoming  a  continental  leader  in  mitigating  the  forgotten  role  of  non-state  actors  in
peacebuilding processes.
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8.3.2 Clarification of economic interests of South Africa in the DRC
This study upholds that it is in the interest of dominant South African state actors to see a
stable  DRC. However, the  character  of  South  Africa’s peacebuilding  interventions  in  the
DRC has made it difficult to  conceptualise what constitutes the national interests of South
Africa.  As narrated by this study’s participants, it is South Africa’s interests as a regional
hegemon that has led to its  conflicting positions in  its  peacebuilding interventions  in the
DRC.   As  this  study  has  shown,  one  correlation  between  South  Africa’s  peacebuilding
intervention and promotion of interest, hinges on a desire on the part of South Africa to end
war and to further establish its economic interests in the DRC. South Africa has enormously
contributed SANDF personnel to combat the actions of rebels in its desire to avert war in the
DRC. At the same time, South Africa has used peacebuilding to promote the interests  of
South African companies in the DRC.  In doing so, what appeared to be the collective interest
of South Africa (peace interest) has become the interests of a segment of the South Africa and
business  actors  (economic  interest).  Therefore,  the  conflicting  interests  of  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions leaves no doubt in arguing that there is a segment of the South
African state and business actors that is benefitting from the conflict in the DRC. In this case,
that segment will not see the need for ending the conflict. This is a case which proves that
there is an endemic nature of ‘economics of war’ in the DRC. 
In view of the above, it is recommended that although complex in orientation, South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC should be anchored firmly on positive peace process
as a guiding framework that aims to root out both direct and structural violence in the DRC
and not as a tool for economic gain. Clarifying the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding
in the DRC requires much political will and leadership form the side of South Africa.  Clear
political and economic interest of South Africa should focus firstly, on ending war in the
DRC.  Secondly,  on  ensuring  that  there  is  good  governance  in  the  DRC,  South  Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions should promote political participation of all, respect for the rule
of  law  and  the  sustenance  of  accountable,  responsible  and  responsive  effective  public
institutions, and credible political leadership. As the study has argued, the preceding values
have been lacking in the DRC.
8.3.3 Recognition of other non-state actors in DRC’s peacebuilding interventions 
As this study has shown, due to pursuit of their realist interests, many interveners marginalize
non-state  actors  in  peace  processes.  From  the  chapter  on  the  history  of  peacebuilding
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interventions in the DRC, this  study established that  peacebuilding in the DRC has been
characterized by signing of  cease-fires and disarming armed groups. This is because most
interveners have assumed that conflicts in the DRC are between either the DRC government
versus the rebels and the DRC government versus other governments. This assumption has
made peacebuilding interveners to not make conscious efforts of including non-state actors
who  bear  the  brunt  of  effects  of  war  and  human  right  abuse.  Similarly,  the  foregoing
assumption has made interveners to not link the needs of the Congolese on the ground to their
peacebuilding interventions.  
This study recommends that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions should go beyond
what has been the focus of many interveners; that is the cessation of war. Again, this study
recommends that  South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions  should take into account  the
historical issues that inform the root causes of war in the DRC. One way of doing this is for
South  Africa  to  draw from the  views  of  Congolese  refugees  as  articulated  in  this  study.
Shifting  away  from peace  processes  that  have  tended  to  focus  on  location,  parameters,
contexts and content, paying particular attention of the intervener, this study recommends that
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions pay attention to the role and relationships of all
actors (both state  and non-state)  in  the DRC’s conflict.  Marginalizing and neglecting the
relationship of any actor in a conflict, will ensure that peace remains an illusion in the DRC.
 
8.3.4 Paradigm shift in the conceptualization of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
As noted in this study, most interveners in the DRC’s conflict have tended to include an
approach that has been used before, without reflecting on other issues that could not have
been within the interests of the Congolese. Most interveners have been fixated on the shortest
time of ending fighting between rebels and governments. Ending of fighting between key
actors has become more important  for interveners.  This makes  interveners celebrate  their
short term ‘achievement’ in media.  This has made the conceptualization of peacebuilding as
a process that is invested with many vested interests of the international community. These
interests, coupled with the selfishness of interveners takes priority of peacebuilding in the
DRC. As this study has revealed, the DRC conflicts requires not just strong institutions but
locals without external interests involved in the peace processes. The peace processes require
considerably more structural change than ending of wars. 
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Another new approach to DRC’s conflict is the need to align peacebuilding with bread and
butter issues for the Congolese on the ground. While many peacebuilders are aware that lack
of basic need is one of the key triggers of war in the DRC, this awareness is yet to be utilized.
Therefore, there is a need for peacebuilding to shift away from just ending war but to further
address the basic needs of Congolese on the ground. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdille  M.  and  P. Pirkkalainen  2009.  The  Diaspora-Conflict-Peace  Nexus:  A Literature
Review. DIASPEACE, Working Paper No 9.
Abegunrin, O. ed., 2014. Africa in the New World Order: Peace and Security Challenges in
the Twenty-first Century. Lexington Books.
ACCORD, 2014. Informal Peacebuilding in Africa. http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-
issues/informal-peacebuilding-initiatives-in-africa. Accessed 14 December 2015. 
Addo, I.Y., 2016. Refugees’ expectations of durable solutions to their problems: deliberations
from the Buduburam camp in Ghana. GeoJournal, 81(3), pp.427-441.
Addo, N. 2008. West African Network for Peacebuiding Warn Policy Brief.   
http://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/86/pb_ghana_nov08.pdf. Accessed 2 
February 2016. 
Adebajo, A. (2011). UN Peace keeping in Africa: From the Suez crisis to the Sudan conflicts. 
Sunnyside: Fanele, an imprint of Jacana Media. 
Adebo, T. (2005). Post-conflict peacebuilding and prospects for democracy with reference to 
Africa. Occasional Paper: Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala.
188
Albrecht, A. C. M. (2015). Armed Drones in the Global War on Terrorism: A Quantitative
Analysis  of  Attitude  Change  Among  Truman  State  University  Students.  The  McNair
Scholarly Review, 1
Alebo, C. 2010. Paying Back What Belongs To US: Victims’ Groups in Northern Uganda and
their Quest for Reparation. http://justiceandreconciliation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Victims-groups-in-Northern-Uganda.pdf. Accessed 2 February 
2016. 
Aleinikoff, T.A. and Poellot, S., 2013. Responsibility to Solve: The International Community
and Protracted Refugee Situations, The. Va. J. Int'l L., 54, pp.195.
Ali, T. M. A., & Matthews, R. O. (Eds.). (2004). Durable peace: challenges for 
peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Al-Shahi, A. and Lawless, R. eds., 2013. Middle East and North African Immigrants in 
Europe: Current Impact; Local and National Responses. Routledge.
Amna, A, R. 1992. Understanding the role of women in peacebuilding. 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono173.pdf. Accessed on 29 May 2016. 
Amnesty International Annual Report 2014/2015. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2015/02/annual-report-201415. Accessed on 29 
May 2016. 
Amnesty International, 2015. https://www.amnesty.org. Accessed on 20/7/2016.
Andersen, R. and Ghimire, M., 2014. Measures of success and failures of MONUSCO UN
Peacekeeping mission (Doctoral dissertation).
Anderson,  D.M.  and  McKnight,  J.,  2015.  Kenya  at  war:  Al-Shabaab  and  its  enemies  in
Eastern Africa. African Affairs, 114(454), pp.1-27.
Andrews, L. 2003. When is a Refugee not a Refugee? Flexible Social Categories and Host/ 
Refugee Relations in Guinea. New Issues in Refugee Research (Working Paper No. 88), 
UNHCR. 
Arnson, C.J. and Zartman, I.W., 2005. Rethinking the economics of war: The intersection of
need, creed, and greed. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Arrous, M.B. and Feldman, R., 2014. Understanding contemporary conflicts in Africa: a state
of affairs and current knowledge. Defense & Security Analysis, 30(1), pp.55-66.
Arrous, M.B. and Feldman, R., 2014. Understanding contemporary conflicts in Africa: a state
of affairs and current knowledge. Defense & Security Analysis, 30(1), pp.55-66.
ATCWR,  2015.   2014.  www.  resettlement  .eu/.../  annual  - tripartite  - consultations  - resettlement  -
atcr-24-26-june-2. Accessed on 3/12/2015. 
Austin, A., Fischer, M. and Ropers, N. eds., 2013. Transforming ethnopolitical conflict: the
Berghof handbook. Springer Science & Business Media.
Autesserre,  S.,  2012.  Dangerous  tales:  Dominant  narratives  on  the  Congo  and  their
unintended consequences. African Affairs, p.adr080.
189
Autesserre,  S.,  2014.  Introduction  to"  Peaceland:  Conflict  Resolution  and  the  Everyday
Politics  of  International  Intervention". Peaceland:  Conflict  Resolution  and  the  Everyday
Politics of International Intervention, pp.1-19.
Auvinen, J and Kivimaki, T. 2001. Conflict Transformation in South Africa.  Politikon south 
African Journal of Political studies. May 2001. 
Baaz, M.E. and Stern, M., 2013. Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives Negotiating 
Identity among Women Soldiers in the Congo (DRC). Armed Forces & Society, 39(4), 
pp.711-739.
Baldwin, D.A., 1993. Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate. Columbia 
University Press.
Banks, R. 2010. The faults of Liberal peace. . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bariagaber, A., 2013. Conflict and the refugee experience: flight, exile, and repatriation in
the Horn of Africa. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Bariagaber, A., 2016. Conflict and the refugee experience: flight, exile, and repatriation in
the Horn of Africa. Routledge.
Baxter, P. and Jack, S., 2008. Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and 
implementation for novice researchers. The qualitative report, 13(4), pp.544-559.
Bayer, R., 2010. Peaceful transitions and democracy. Journal of Peace Research, 47(5), 
pp.535-546.
Bayer, R., 2010. Peaceful transitions and democracy. Journal of Peace Research.
Beginning Researchers. New York: Teachers College Press.
Bentley, C.A. and Southall, R. (2005) An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and
Burundi, Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Bertule, A., Adamsen, E.S., Bjerg, E., Refshauge, N., Kamara, M. and Niko, S., 2014. 
Conflict Minerals in Congo (Doctoral dissertation).
Beswick, D., 2009. The challenge of warlordism to post-conflict state-building: the case of
Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo. The Round Table, 98(402), pp.333-346.
Betts, A.,  Loescher, G. and Milner, J.,  2013. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR): The politics and practice of refugee protection (Vol. 62). Routledge.
Betts, A.,  Loescher, G. and Milner, J.,  2013. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR): The politics and practice of refugee protection (Vol. 62). Routledge.
Bizos, A. (2011). New-institutionalism and the origins of the African Union (Doctoral 
dissertation).
Boege, V., 2012. Hybrid Forms of Peace and Order on a South Sea Island. In Hybrid Forms 
of Peace (pp. 88-106). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Booth, K., 2005. Critical Security Studies World Politics, New Delhi, Viva.
190
Boswell, C., 2002, September. Explaining European public policy responses to asylum and
migration.  In trabajo presentado en la  unhcr–wider Conference on Poverty, International
Migration and Asylum, Helsinki, septiembre.
Botes, J. 2001. Conflict Transformation: A Debate over Semantics or a Crucial Shift in the 
Theory and Practice of Peace and Conflict Studies. The International Journal of Peace 
Studies, Volume 6 (2).
Botes, J., 2003. Structural transformation. Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention, London, 
Continuum, pp.269-290.
Boulding, K.E., 1978. Stable peace. University of Texas Press.
Boutros-Ghali, B., 1995. An agenda for peace: 1995; with the new supplement and related 
UN documents. UN.
Brandt, R.B., 1972. Utilitarianism and the Rules of War. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
pp.145-165.
Bryman, A., 2015. Social research methods. Oxford university press.
Bussy, J.M. and Gallo, C.J., 2016. The Great Lakes Region of Africa: Local Perspectives on
Liberal Peacebuilding from the Democratic Republic of Congo. In The Palgrave Handbook
of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace (pp. 312-324). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Calland,  R.  (2013). The  Zuma  Years:  South  Africa’s Changing  Face  of  Power.  Random
House Struik.
CARE International, 2010. CARE Humanitarian Accountability Framework(HAF). 
http://www.care-international.org/files/files/publications/CARE-Humanitarian-
Accountability-Framework-Pilot-Version-Feb-2010.pdf. Accessed on 12 January 2016. 
Carling, J., 2016. West and Central Africa. Migrant Smuggling Data and Research, p.25.
Carr, E.H., 1946. The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of 
international relations.
Carter, N., Bryant-Lukosius, D., DiCenso, A., Blythe, J. and Neville, A.J., 2014, September.
The use of triangulation in qualitative research. In Oncology nursing forum (Vol. 41, No. 5).
Charmaz, K., 2012. The power and potential of grounded theory. Medical Sociology 
Online, 6(3), pp.2-15.
Chimni BS 1998. The geopolitics of refugee studies: A view from the south. Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 11(4): 350-370. 
Chimni BS 2002. Refugees, return and reconstruction of ‘post-conflict’ societies: A critical 
perspective. International Peacekeeping, 20(1): 1-21.
Chimni, B.S., 2002. Forum Replies: A New Humanitarian Council for Humanitarian 
Interventions?. The International Journal of Human Rights, 6(1), pp.103-112.
Chingono, M. and Nakana, S., 2009. The challenges of regional integration in Southern 
Africa. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 3(10), pp.396-408.
191
Cilliers, J. and Schunemann, J., 2013. The future of intrastate conflict in Africa-more violence
or greater peace?. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2013(246), p.24.
Clapham, C., 1996. Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival (Vol. 
50). Cambridge University Press.
Clark, P. 2008.  Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Uganda. Courting Conflict, 37-44
Coates, C.A., 2013. The Parenting Coordinator as Peacemaker and Peacebuilder. Family 
Court Review, 53(3), pp.398-406.
Cohen, R. and Deng, F.M., 2012. Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement.
Brookings Institution Press.
Cohen, S.B., 2014. The Challenging Dynamics of Global North-South Peacebuilding 
Partnerships: Practitioner Stories From the Field. Journal of Peacebuilding & 
Development, 9(3), pp.65-81.
Colletta,  N.J.,  2015.  Violent  Conflict  and  Forced  Displacement  in  the  Horn  of  Africa:
Government  and  Donor  Policies  and  Programs  in  Search  of  Durable  Solutions. African
Human Mobility Review, p.273.
Collier, P. and Duponchel, M., 2013. The economic legacy of civil war: firm-level evidence 
from Sierra Leone. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57(1), pp.65-88.
Collier,  P.  and  Hoeffler,  A.,  2004.  Greed  and  grievance  in  civil  war. Oxford  economic
papers, 56(4), pp.563-595.
Collier, P., 2014. Laws and codes for the resource curse. Yale Human Rights and 
Development Journal, 11(1), p.2.
Connolly, L. (2012). Justice and peacebuilding in post-conflict situations: An argument for 
including gender analysis in a new post-conflict model. Occasional Paper Series: Issue 1, 
2012.
Copeland, T.F., 2012. Civilian Protection in the Eastern DRC Evaluation of the MONUSCO
Peacekeeping  Operation (Doctoral  dissertation,  Monterey,  California.  Naval  Postgraduate
School).
Corbin, J. and Strauss, A., 2014. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures
for developing grounded theory. Sage publications.
Coulomb, F  and  Dunne, P. 2008. Peace, war and international security: economic theories. 
In War, Peace and Security (pp. 13-36). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Coulomb, F. and Dunne, J.P., 2008. Economics, conflict and war. real-world economics 
review, (46), pp.147-157.
Crea, T.M., Loughry, M., O’Halloran, C. and Flannery, G.J., 2016. Environmental risk: Urban
refugees’  struggles  to  build  livelihoods  in  South  Africa. International  Social  Work,
p.0020872816631599.
192
Crea, T.M., Loughry, M., O’Halloran, C. and Flannery, G.J., 2016. Environmental risk: Urban
refugees’ struggles to build livelihoods in South Africa. International Social Work, 1, p.16.
Creswell, J. W. and Clark, V. L. P. 2007. Designing and conducting mixed methods research 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Crush, J.,  Chikanda, A. and Tawodzera,  G., 2015. The third wave: mixed migration from
Zimbabwe  to  South  Africa. Canadian  Journal  of  African  Studies/Revue  canadienne  des
études africaines, 49(2), pp.363-382.
Crush, J., Chikanda, A. and Tawodzera, G., 2015. The third wave: Mixed migration from
Zimbabwe  to  South  Africa. Canadian  Journal  of  African  Studies/Revue  canadienne  des
études africaines, 49(2), pp.363-382.
Curle, A. 2010. Radical Peacemaker and Pioneer of Peace Studies.  Oxford: John Carpenter.
Cuvelier, J., Diemel, J. and Vlassenroot, K., 2013. Digging Deeper: the Politics of ‘Conflict
Minerals’ in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Global Policy, 4(4), pp.449-451.
DA 2013. State of Province Address . https://www.da.org.za. Accessed on 15 April 2015.
Daly, K. 2013. ‘The Punishment Debate in Restorative Justice’, in: Simon, J. & Sparks, R. 
(eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Punishment and Society. London: Sage Publication.
De Waal,  A.  (2012) ‘Contesting Visions  of Peace in  Africa:  Darfur, Ivory Coast,  Libya’,
Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration, 2012(1).
Diamond, L, J and Plattner, M.F. 1994. Rethinking civil society. Journal of Democracy, 5(3), 
pp.3-3.
Domegan, C. and Fleming, D., 2007. Market research in Ireland. Gill and Macmillan Ltd, 
Dublin.
Donnelly, E., 2003. The United States–China EP-3 incident: legality and realpolitik. Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law, 9(1), pp.25-42.
Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L., 2000. From realist to neorealist and neoclassical realist 
theory. Contending theories of international relations: a comprehensive survey.
Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L.J., 1981. Environmental Theories. Contending Theories 
of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey, pp.54-83.
Downie, S. and Kingsbury, D., 2001. Political development and the re-emergence of civil 
society in Cambodia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp.43-64.
Doyle, M and Sambanis N. (2011). Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace 
Operations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Doyle, M. and Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis. The American Political Science Review, 94(4), pp. 779 – 801. 
Duncan J 2014. The Rise of the Securocrats. The Case of South Africa. Auckland Park: 
Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd
Fargues, P. and Bonfanti, S., 2014. When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk
their lives crossing the Mediterranean and what Europe is doing about it.
193
Fearon, J.D., 2004. Why do some civil wars last  so much longer than others? Journal of
Peace Research, 41(3), pp.275-301. 
Firchow,  P.  and  Mac  Ginty,  R.,  2013.  Reparations  and  Peacebuilding:  Issues  and
Controversies. Human Rights Review, 14(3), pp.231-239.
Fisher, J., 2005. The role of NGOs in institution-building in Rwanda. Subcontracting Peace: 
The Challenges of NGO Peacebuilding, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing.
Fisher, T. 2007. Negotiation & Conflict Resolution: Conflict Resolution Quarterly Volume 
19, Issue 2, pages 197–214.
Fontana, A. and Frey, J., 1994. The art of science. The handbook of qualitative research, 
pp.361-376.
Foster, H.,  2012.  Xenophobia:  what  do students  think?.  In Acta Criminologica:  CRIMSA
Conference: Special Edition 2 (pp. 47-66). Sabinet Online.
Freund,  B.  and  Padayachee,  V.,  1998.  Post-apartheid  South  Africa:  the  key  patterns
emerge. Economic and Political weekly, pp.1173-1180.
Fritsch,  C.,  Johnson,  E  and  Juska,  A.  2010. The  plight  of  Zimbabwean  unaccompanied
refugee  minors  in  South  Africa:  a  call  for  comprehensive  Legislative  Action. [Online]
Available:http://www.Law.du.edu/documents/djilp/38No4/Juska.pdf  .
Froitzheim, M. and Söderbaum, F., 2013. ‘Building peace from the outside’: The role of the
EU  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo. Arne  Bigsten  (ed)  Globalization  and
Development. Rethinking Interventions and governance.
Fuertes,  A.,  2016.  Karen  Refugees  Describe  Peace  within  the  Context  of
Displacement. Conflict Resolution Quarterly.
Fukuyama, F. 2007. Liberalism versus state-building. Journal of democracy, 18(3), 10-13.
Fukuyama, F., 2007. America at the crossroads: Democracy, power, and the neoconservative 
legacy. Yale University Press.
Galipo,  A.,  2011. Diaspora  and  peacebuilding  in  post-conflict  settings  insights  from
Somaliland. Graduate Institute.
Galtung J. 2001. After violence, reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution. Reconciliation 
justice and coexistence, 3-21. 
Galtung, J. 1969. Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of peace research, 6(3), 167- 
191. 
Galtung, J. 1985.  Twenty-five years of peace research: ten challenges and some responses. 
Journal of Peace Research, 22(2), 141-158.
Galtung,  J.  and  Fischer,  D.,  2013.  Peace  studies  and  conflict  resolution:  The  need  for
transdisciplinarity. In Johan Galtung (pp. 139-149). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Galtung, J., 1964. A structural theory of aggression. Journal of peace research, 1(2), pp.95-
119.
194
Galtung, J., 1964. An editorial: what is peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 
pp.1-4.
Galtung, J., 1969. Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of peace research, 6(3), 
pp.167-191.
Galtung, J., 1990. Cultural violence. Journal of peace research, 27(3), pp.291-305.
Galtung, J., 1996. Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and 
civilization (Vol. 14). Sage.
Gbaya, D.M., 2015. South Africa’s Foreign Policy toward the DRC: From non-intervention 
to intervention 1998-2013 (Doctoral dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand).
Geenen, S. and Claessens, K., 2016. Different faces of access control in a Congolese gold 
mine. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, pp.1-18.
Geenen, S.,  2012. A dangerous bet: The challenges of formalizing artisanal mining in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Resources Policy, 37(3), pp.322-330.
Geenen,  S.,  2014. Dispossession,  displacement and resistance:  Artisanal  miners in  a gold
concession in South-Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo. Resources Policy, 40, pp.90-99.
General Assembly Resolution 66/253 (16 February 2012) (adopted by 137 votes in favour, 12
against, with 17 abstentions).
George, A. and Keohane, R., 1980. The concept of national interests: Uses and 
limitations. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, pp.217-238
.
Global Trends. 2015. www.  unhcr  .org/figures-at-a-glance.html. Accessed on 20/7/2016. 
Goertz, G. 2005. Scope in case study research. The sage handbook of case based methods. 
London: Sage, pp.307-318.
Gordon, E., 2014. Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the 
State or its People? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 8(2-3), pp.126-148.
Gordon, H.C., 2012. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Improving Coherence
and Coordination? (Doctoral dissertation, University of Otago).
Green, B.L., Kaltman, S.I., Roesch, D.M., Zeffiro, T.A. Dutton, M.A., and Krause, E.D., 
2006. Intimate partner violence, PTSD, and adverse health outcomes. Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence, 21(7).pp.955-968.
Habib,  A.  (2009)  ‘South  Africa’s  Foreign  Policy:  Hegemonic  Aspirations,  Neoliberal
Orientations  and  Global  Transformations’,  South  African  Journal  of  International  Affairs
16(2): pp.143-59.
Hancock, L.E. and Mitchell, C.R., 2007. Zones of peace. Kumarian Press.
195
Hancock, L.E., 2008. The Northern Irish peace process: From top to bottom. International 
Studies Review, 10(2), pp.203-238.
Harris, B. (2001) A Foreign Experience: Violence, Crime and Xenophobia during South 
Africa’s Transition, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), Violence 
and Transition Series, Vol 5, August. Available at http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papvtp5.htm.
Herz, J.H., 1951. Political realism and political idealism, a study in theories and realities. 
University of Chicago Press.
Heywood, P. and Wright, V., 1997. Executives, bureaucracies and decision-making. 
In Developments in West European Politics (pp. 75-94). Macmillan Education UK
.
Higashi,  D.,  2015. Challenges  of  Constructing Legitimacy in  Peacebuilding:  Afghanistan,
Iraq, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. Routledge.
Hoffman, A.J., 1999. Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the US 
chemical industry. Academy of management journal, 42(4), pp.351-371.
Hölscher, D.,  2014.  Considering  Nancy Fraser's  notion  of  social  justice  for  social  work:
reflections  on  misframing  and  the  lives  of  refugees  in  South  Africa. Ethics  and  Social
Welfare, 8(1), pp.20-38.
Horst, C. & Gaas, M., 2009. Diaspora Organizations from the Horn of Africa in Norway: 
Contributions to Peacebuilding? PRIO Policy Brief 2/2009. Oslo: PRIO.
Horst, C., Ezzati, R., Guglielmo, M., Mezzetti, P., Pirkkalainen, P., Saggiomo, V., Sinatti, G.
and Warnecke, A., 2010. Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development. A
Handbook for Practioners and Policymakers. Oslo: PRIO.
Howell, K., 2016. The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Peace Enforcement as a
Conflict Management Strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Human Rights Watch. 2012. World Reports: Events of 2010. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2012.pdf. Accesed on 29 May 2016. 
Hussein, A., 2015. The use of triangulation in social sciences research: Can qualitative and
quantitative methods be combined? Journal of Comparative Social Work, 4(1).
Huth, P.K., Wilkenfeld, J. and Backer, D.A., 2016. Peace and Conflict 2014. Routledge.
Hynes, W., 2013. 6 The Economics of War. In Global Challenges: Peace and War (pp. 79-
88). Brill.
Iglesias,  J.C.,  2014.  Conflict  Minerals  Regulation:  Mapping  International  Initiatives  and
Challenges Ahead. Southern African, p.45.
Inaka, S..M., 2014. Congolese immigrant workers in pretoria, south Africa: a sociological 
approach in the age of migration (Doctoral dissertation).
Institute of Global Dialogue, 2014. The fluctuating geo-political reorganisation of the world. 
http://www.ieasa.studysa.org/global-dialogue-2014. 
196
International Alert, 1998. Code of Conduct: Conflict Transformation Work. London:
International Alert.
Isike, C. and Uzodike, U.O., 2011. Towards an indigenous model of conflict resolution: 
reinventing women's roles as traditional peacebuilders in neo-colonial Africa. African 
Journal on Conflict Resolution, 11(2), pp.32-58.
Isike, C. Uzodike, U. and Gilbert, L. (2008). “The United States Africa Command: Enhancing
American security or fostering African development? African Security Review Vol. 17, pp. 1-
19.
ISS, 2014. South Africa’s Peacebuilding and PCRD activities. 
https://issafrica.org/research/papers/south-africas-peacebuilding-and-pcrd-activities. Accessed
on 8 October, 2016. 
Issues with a Focus on Workers”. In: A. D. Chandler, Jr. and B. Mazlish (eds), Leviathans: 
Multinational Corporations and the New Global History. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 135-166.
Jacobsen, D. (2012). The Role of the UNPBF in the Post-war Recovery of Fragile States. 
Europolis, Journal of Political Science and Theory, (6 (1), 43-60.
Jacobsen, K., 2002. Livelihoods in conflict: the pursuit of livelihoods by refugees and the 
impact on the human security of host communities. International migration, 40(5), pp.95-
123.
Jones, A. and Naylor, R., 2014. The quantitative impact of armed conflict on education in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo: counting the human and financial costs.
Joseph, J.,  2014. The EU in the Horn of  Africa:  building resilience as  a  distant  form of
governance. JCMS: Journal of common market studies, 52(2), pp.285-301.
Kadima, D. 2001. “Motivations for migration and character of the economic contribution of 
Congolese emigrants in South Africa” in Morris, A. and Bouillon, A. (eds.) African 
immigration to South Africa: Francophone migration of the 1990s. Pretoria: PROTEA & 
IFAS, 90-110.
Kadima, D. and Kalombo, G., 1995. The motivation for emigration and problems of 
integration of the Zairean community in South Africa. Unpublished paper. Johannesburg.
Kagwanja, P. (2009). Courting genocide: Populism, ethno-nationalism and the 
informalisation of violence in Kenya's 2008 post-election crisis. Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, 27(3), 365-387. 
Kagwanja, P. and Southall, R., 2009. Introduction: Kenya–A democracy in retreat?. Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies, 27(3), pp.259-277.
Kassar,  H.  and  Dourgnon,  P.,  2014.  The  big  crossing:  illegal  boat  migrants  in  the
Mediterranean. The European Journal of Public Health, 24(suppl 1), pp.11-15.
197
Kekana,  M.2016.  Mashaba:  Time  is  running  out  for  illegal  immigrants JHB CBD.
enca.co.za/2016/12/01/  mashaba  -time-is-running-  out  -for-  illegal  - immigrant.  Accessed  on
12/12/2016. 
Keohane, R.O. and Martin, L.L., 1995. The promise of institutionalist theory. International 
security, 20(1), pp.39-51.
Kets, E. and De Vries, H., 2014. Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the
DRC. Institute for Security Studies Papers, (257), pp.16-p.
Khwela, M.N., 2014. A Need to Re-integrate Prisoners to the Community: A Case of 
Polokwane Medium B Prison, South Africa. Athens Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2), pp.145-
155.
Kibreab,  G.,  1993.  The  myth  of  dependency  among  camp  refugees  in  Somalia  1979–
1989. Journal of refugee studies, 6(4), pp.321-349.
Kibreab, G., 2014. Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Politics, Piracy and the Threat of Terror by
Peter Woodward London: IB Tauris, 2012. Pp. 240.£ 14· 99 (pbk). The Journal of Modern
African Studies, 52(02), pp.334-336.
Kriesberg, L., 2004. Comparing reconciliation actions within and between countries. From 
conflict resolution to reconciliation, pp.81-110.
Krippendorff, K., 2004. Reliability in content analysis. Human communication 
research, 30(3), pp.411-433.
Krueger, R.A. and Casey, M.A., 2014. Focus groups: A practical guide for applied research.
Sage publications.
Kumar, S. and Phrommathed, P., 2005. Research methodology (pp. 43-50). Springer US.
Lakika, D., Kankonde, P. and Richters, A., 2015. Violence, suffering and support: Congolese 
forced migrants’ experiences of psychosocial services in Johannesburg. In Healing and 
Change in the City of Gold (pp. 101-119). Springer International Publishing.
Lambourne, W. (2000). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Security Dialogue, 31, 357. 
Lambourne, W. (2004). Post-conflict Peace-building: Meeting human needs for justice and 
Reconciliation. Peace, Conflict and Development, 4(April), 1-24. 
Lambourne, W. 2002. “Justice and Reconciliation: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia 
and Rwanda”, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney.
Lambourne, W., 2000. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Security Dialogue, 31, p.357.
Lambourne, W., 2014. Transformative justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding. Transitional
Justice Theories, pp.19-39.
Lambourne, W., 2014. Transformative justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding. Transitional
Justice Theories, pp.19-39.
198
Lambourne, W., 2014. What Are the Pillars of Transition Justice: The United Nations, Civil
Society and the Justice Cascade in Burundi. Macquarie LJ, 13, p.41.
Landau, L. 2011. Contemporary migration to South Africa: a regional development issue. A.
Segatti (Ed.). World Bank Publications.
Landau, L.B., 2006. Protection and dignity in Johannesburg: Shortcomings of South Africa's
urban refugee policy. Journal of refugee studies, 19(3), pp.308-327.
Langa,  M.  and  Kiguwa,  P.,  2016.  Race-ing  xenophobic  violence:  Engaging  social
representations  of  the  black  African  body in  post-apartheid  South  Africa. Agenda, 30(2),
pp.75-85.
Larmer, M.,  Laudati,  A.  and Clark,  J.F.,  2013.  Neither  war  nor  peace in  the Democratic
Republic  of  Congo  (DRC):  profiting  and  coping  amid  violence  and  disorder. Review  of
African Political Economy, 40(135), pp.1-12.
Lasswell, H.D., 1949. Why be quantitative?. Language of Politics, pp.40-52.
Laudati,  A.,  2013.  Beyond  minerals:  broadening  ‘economies  of  violence  ‘in  eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo. Review of African Political Economy, 40(135), pp.32-50.
Le  Billon,  P.,  2001.  The  political  ecology  of  war:  natural  resources  and  armed
conflicts. Political geography, 20(5), pp.561-584.
 Lea,  J.  (2015).  From the  criminalisation  of  war  to  the  militarisation  of  crime  control.
Criminology and War: Transgressing the Borders, 15, 198.
Lederach,  J.,  2015. Little  Book  of  Conflict  Transformation:  Clear  Articulation  Of  The
Guiding Principles By A Pioneer In The Field. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc..
Lederach, J.P. and Appleby, R.S., 2010. Strategic peacebuilding: An overview. Strategies of 
peace: Transforming conflict in a violent world, pp.19-44.
Lederach, J.P. and Appleby, R.S., 2010. Strategic peacebuilding: An overview. Strategies of 
peace: Transforming conflict in a violent world, pp.19-44.
Lederach, J.P., 1995. Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse 
University Press.
Lederach, J.P., 1997. 2004. Building Peace; Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.
Lederach, J.P., 2005. The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace. Oxford 
University Press.
Lederach, J.P., 2007. The Moral Imagination: the Art and Soul of Building Peace Association 
of Conflict Resolution, Sacramento, September 30, 2004. European Judaism, 40(2), pp.9-21.
199
Lederach, J.P., 2014. Reconcile: Conflict Transformation for Ordinary Christians.
Lee, J.J. and Sehoole, C., 2015. Regional, continental, and global mobility to an emerging
economy: the case of South Africa. Higher Education, 70(5), pp.827-843.
Leech, N.L. and Onwuegbuzie, A.J., 2007. An array of qualitative data analysis tools: A call 
for data analysis triangulation. School psychology quarterly, 22(4), p.557.
Lemarchand, R., 2013. Reflections on the recent historiography of Eastern Congo. The 
Journal of African History, 54(03), pp.417-437.
Lewis, P.M. and Harbeson, J.W., 2015. Coping with Crisis in African States. Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Lichbach Mark, I., 1995. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lockwood, M., 2013. What Can Climate‐Adaptation Policy in Sub‐Saharan Africa Learn 
from Research on Governance and Politics?. Development Policy Review, 31(6), pp.647-676.
Lwambo, D., 2013. ‘Before the war, I was a man’: men and masculinities in the Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Gender & Development, 21(1), pp.47-66.
MacGinty, R. and Richmond, O., 2016. The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: a
reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping, 23(2), pp.219-
239.
Mac Ginty, R. and Williams, A., 2016. Conflict and development. Routledge.
Madden,  F.  and  McQuinn,  B.,  2014.  Conservation’s  blind  spot:  the  case  for  conflict
transformation in wildlife conservation. Biological Conservation, 178, pp.97-106.
Maharaj, V., Tomita, A., Thela, L., Mhlongo, M. and Burns, J.K., 2016. Food Insecurity and
Risk of Depression Among Refugees and Immigrants in South Africa. Journal of Immigrant
and Minority Health, pp.1-7.
Maiese, M. and Lederach, J.P., 2003. Conflict transformation. Retrieved july, 16, p.2014.
Mamdani, M., 2014. When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide
in Rwanda. Princeton University Press.
Mamili, O.W., 2015. The Great Lakes Region Conflict Case Study Of Democratic Republic 
Of Congo (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).
Mansson-McGinty, A., 2013. Negotiating development in Muslim societies: gendered spaces
and translocal connections. Gender, Place & Culture, 20(5), pp.691-693
Maphosa, S.B., DeLuca, L. and Keasley, A. eds., 2014. Building Peace from Within. Africa
Institute of South Africa.
Marindze, A, C., 2010. Diplomatic protection and xenophobic violence in South Africa: the
case for reparation to Mozambican victims (doctoral dissertation, faculty of law, Makerere
University).
200
Marshall,  A.T.,  2015. Kiswaihili  and  decolonization:  The  Inter-Territorial  Language
Committee  and  successor  organizations,  1930-1970 (Doctoral  dissertation,  AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY).
Maystadt, J.F., De Luca, G., Sekeris, P.G. and Ulimwengu, J., 2014. Mineral resources and
conflicts in DRC: a case of ecological fallacy?. Oxford Economic Papers, 66(3), pp.721-749.
Mbeki,  M.,  2009. Architects  of  poverty:  Why  African  capitalism  needs  changing.
Johannesburg: Picador.
Mbeki, M.T., 2013. Africa must Unite! An imperative of our time. The Thinker, pp.12-18.
McAskie,  C.,  2006.  ’Opinion  Piece  by  Assistant  Secretary  General  for  Peacebuilding
Support. Small Arms and Human Security Bulletin.
McDuff,  E.,  2015.  Women’s  Voices  from  the  Zimbabwean  Diaspora:  Migration  and
Change. Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration, (8).
McGill, M., O’Kane, C. and Giertsen, A., 2015. Evaluating Children and Youth Participation 
in Peacebuilding in Colombia, DRC, and Nepal: Lessons Learned and Emerging Findings. 
Young, 11, p.1.
McGinty, R. 2006. No war, no peace: the rejuvenation of stalled peace processes and peace 
accords Basingstoke: Palgrave.
McKnight, J., 2015. Accountability in Northern Uganda: Understanding the Conflict, the 
Parties and the False Dichotomies in International Criminal Law and Transitional 
Justice. Journal of African Law, 59(02), pp.193-219.
Mearsheimer, J.J. and Walt, S.M., 2013. Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis
testing is bad for International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 19(3),
pp.427-457.
Menkhaus, K., 2008. Somalia: Governance vs. Statebuilding. Building states to build peace, 
pp.187-215.
Menkhaus, K., 2010. Stabilisation and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: the Somali
case. Disasters, 34(s3), pp.S320-S341.
Merriam, A.P., 1961. Congo, background of conflict (No. 6). Northwestern University Press.
Miall, H., 2004. Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task. In Transforming 
Ethnopolitical Conflict (pp. 67-89). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Misago,  J.P.,  2016.  Responding to  Xenophobic  Violence  in  Post-Apartheid  South  Africa:
Barking Up the Wrong Tree?. African Human Mobility Review, p.443.
Mitchell, C., 2002. Beyond resolution: what does conflict transformation actually 
transform?. Peace and Conflict Studies, 9(1), pp.1-23.
Monson, T., 2015. Everyday politics and collective mobilization against foreigners in a South
African shack settlement. Africa, 85(01), pp.131-153.
201
Montague,  D.,  2002.  Stolen  goods:  Coltan  and  conflict  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of
Congo. Sais Review, 22(1), pp.103-118.
Morgan, D.L., 2012. Focus groups and social interaction. The Sage handbook of interview
research: The complexity of the craft, pp.161-175.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1940). Positivism, functionalism, and international law. American Journal
of International Law, 260-284.
Moriarty, J., Manthorpe, J., Stevens, M. and Hussein, S., 2011. Making the transition: 
Comparing research on newly qualified social workers with other professions. British 
Journal of Social Work, p.bcr031.
Morris, P.S., 2016. Book Review: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
Yearbook  2014:  Armaments,  Disarmament  and  International  Security. Political  Studies
Review, p.1478929916653519.
Murithi, T., 2012. The African Union and the African Peace and Security Architecture: past, 
present and future. Africa Insight, 42(3), pp.42-52.
Murithi, T., 2012. The African Union at ten: an appraisal. African Affairs, p.ads058.
Murphy, R.,  2016.  UN Peacekeeping  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  and  the
Protection of Civilians. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, p.krv030.
Mushi, F.M., 2013. Insecurity and Local Governance in Congo's South Kivu.
Mutambanengwe, F.A. (2013), “Post migration experiences of Zimbabwean in 
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa”, Unpublished Master of Arts (International Relations) 
dissertation, University Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
Nabishika, L. 2013. All SANDF Back in SA. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=35856:sandf-will-only-go-back-to-car-if-asked-by-
the-au&catid=111:sa-defence. Aceesed on 14 October,2015. 
Naidu, M. and Makanda, J., 2015. Peacebuilding in the Congo: Arguing for Inclusion of the
Subaltern Voice of the Congolese Refugee. J Soc Sci, 45(2), pp.96-102.
Nazli  Chourci  and Robert  North:  Nations  in  Conflict,  National  Growth and International
Violence in D.J.Dand Sandole et al(eds):Conflict Resolution Theory And Practice Integration
Application(Manchester: Manchester University Press)1993.p18.
Nderitu, A.W., 2013. 'Peace on paper?’: assessing the impact of peace agreements on armed 
conflict: the case of the democratic republic of Congo (DRC)–1999-to 2012 (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Nairobi).
Ndikumana,  L.  and  Emizet,  K.,  2003.  The  economics  of  civil  war:  The  case  of  the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
202
Neocosmos, M., 2010. From'foreign natives' to'native foreigners': Explaining xenophobia in
post-apartheid  South  Africa:  Citizenship  and  nationalism,  identity  and  politics.  African
Books Collective.
Newman, S., 2000. Anarchism and the politics of ressentiment. Theory & Event, 4(3).
Nganje, R. 2012. SANDF in DRC. SABC NEWS. http://www.sabc.co.za/news. Accessed on 
9 September 2016.  
Nkuhlu, W.L., 2005. The new partnership for Africa's development: the journey so far. 
NEPAD Secretariat.
Nyathi, D., 2012. Evaluation of Poverty Alleviation Strategies Implemented by Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Zimbabwe: A Case of Binga Rural District (Doctoral
dissertation, University of Fort Hare).
Nye Jr, J.S., Rachman, G., Mead, W.R., Mearsheimer, J., Walt, S., Feaver, P.D., Gelpi, C.,
Berinsky,  A.J.,  Nincic,  M.,  Nelson,  M.  and  Fisher,  L.,  2012. The  domestic  sources  of
American foreign policy: insights and evidence. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Nye, J., 2012. China’s soft power deficit. The Wall Street Journal, 8.
O’Brien, M., and Tolosa, M.X., 2016. The effect of the 2014 West Africa Ebola virus disease
epidemic on multi-level violence against women. International Journal of Human Rights in
Healthcare, 9(3), pp.151-160.
Obiora, C.J., 2014. Agriculture and rural development versus youth rural-urban migration: 
The menace. Journal of Agriculture Economics and Rural Development, 2(2), pp.58-61.
Ogola, G., 2011. The political economy of the media in Kenya: from Kenyatta's nation-
building press to Kibaki's local-language FM radio. Africa Today, 57(3), pp.77-95.
Omondi, E.A., 2013. The effects of resource conflict on sustainable development: the case of
Eastern DRC, ‘1998-2010’ (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).
Onuoha, F.C., 2014. A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone: Boko Harams's Transnational Reach
and Regional Responses. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional Office.
Oppenheimer J, Nick K 2013. An Option of Difficulties? A 21st Century South African 
Defence Review. From. Http//www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org.  Accessed on 4 April, 2016. 
Ottaway, M.,  1991.  Liberation  movements  and transition  to  democracy:  The case  of  the
ANC. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29(01), pp.61-82.
Oyewole, S., 2015. Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism in the Lake Chad
Region. Strategic Analysis, 39(4), pp.428-432.
203
Pan African News Agency, 2002. Kabila Wants occupation of Troops out of the DRC. 
http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/kabila-wants-occupation-troops-out-dr-
congo. Accessed on 4 April 2016. 
Pankhurst, D. 2010. The ‘sex war’ and other wars: Towards a feminist approach to peace 
building. Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives (301–314).
Pankhurst,  D.  ed.,  2012. Gendered  Peace:  Women's  Struggles  for  Post-War  Justice  and
Reconciliation. Routledge.
Parker, D.P., Vadheim, B. and Economics, V., 2016. Resource Cursed or Policy Cursed? US 
Regulation of Conflict Minerals and Violence in the Congo.
Pillay, R. 2013. Our stories: Why SANDF Were Killed in CAR. http://www.enca.com/south-
africa/our-stories-why-were-sandf-troops-killed-car. Accessed on 9 April 2016. 
Pruitt, l., 2013. ‘fixing the girls’ neoliberal discourse and girls' participation in peacebuilding. 
international feminist journal of politics, 15(1), pp.58-76.
Prunier, G, 2009. From Genocide to Continental War. The’Congolese’Conflict and the Crisis 
of Contemporary Africa. London, Hurst, 529p. Journal des africanistes, (79-2), pp.425-426.
Prunier, G., 1995. The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide. Columbia University Press.
Prunier,  G.,  2004.  Rebel  movements  and  proxy warfare:  Uganda,  Sudan  and the  Congo
(1986–99). African Affairs, 103(412), pp.359-383.
Pugh, M., Cooper, N. and Turner, M. eds., 2016. Whose peace? Critical perspectives on the
political economy of peacebuilding. Springer.
Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H. and Woodhouse, T., 2011. Contemporary conflict resolution. 
Polity.
Rana, P.S., 2016. Refugee Resettlement and Peacebuilding: Exploring the Roles of Human
and  Social  Capital  of  Caseworkers  in  Fulfilling  Grassroots  Refugee  Needs. Doctor  of
International Conflict Management Dissertations. Paper 7.
Rempel,  T.,  2013.  The  Right  to  Political  Participation  and  the  Negotiation  of  Durable
Solutions:  Palestinian  Refugees  in  Comparative  Context.  Doctoral  Thesis;  Tempels
University. 
Republic  of  South  Africa,  1998.  www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a  130  -98_0.pdf.  .
Accessed on 3/12/2015.
Reuters, 2013. Congo Signs Peace with M23. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-congo-
democractic-deal-idUKBRE9BB0WZ20131212. Accessed 14 June 2016.
Reychler, L. (2001). From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Concepts and Analytical 
Tools. In, Reychler, L & Paffenholz, J. (eds). Peace-building: A Field Guide. London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, pp. 3 – 20.
204
Richmond, O.P. and Tellidis, I., 2014. Emerging Actors in International Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding:  Status  Quo  or  Critical  States?. Global  Governance:  A  Review  of
Multilateralism and International Organizations, 20(4), pp.563-584.
Rigby, A. (2001). Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management: The View from the 
Non-Governmental Sector. International Affairs 77(4): 957-966.
Roberts, H.L., 2004. " The Public Heart": Urban Life and the Politics of Sympathy in Lydia 
Maria Child's Letters from New York. American Literature, 76(4), pp.749-775.
Rosato, S., 2003. The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. American Political Science 
Review, 97(04), pp.585-602.
Roth, A., 2015. The Role of Diasporas in Conflict. Journal of International Affairs, 68(2),
p.289.
Rugunanan, P. and Smit, R., 2011. Seeking refuge in South Africa: Challenges facing a group
of Congolese and Burundian refugees. Development Southern Africa, 28(5), pp.705-718.
Ruiz,  I.  and Vargas-Silva,  C.,  2013.  The economics  of  forced  migration. The Journal  of
Development Studies, 49(6), pp.772-784.
Ryan, S., 2016. The transformation of violent intercommunal conflict. Routledge.
Sabet-Sharghi, F. 2000. The Social, Economic and Political Circumstance of Congolese 
Refugees in Durban. Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the 
Degree of Master in Social Sciences (Development Studies). Durban: University of Natal 
Durban.
Sandole, D. J. and van der Merwe, H. (eds). (1993).Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice:
Integration and Application. New York: Manchester University Press.
Saunders,  C.,  2014.  South  Africa  and Africa. The ANNALS of  the  American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 652(1), pp.222-237.
Schelling, T.C., 1980. The strategy of conflict. Harvard university press.
Schudin, A., 2015. What Happens in the Forest? Memory, Trauma, Repression and Resilience
amongst Congolese Refugees Living in Durban, South Africa. Memory Studies, 22(2), p.56.
Shillinger, K. 2009. Africa’s Peace Maker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation,
Auckland Park: Jacana.
Shulika, L. S. (2013). Managing the challenges of conflict transformation and peace-building 
in South Sudan. Unpublished. http://libraries.ukzn.ac.za. Accessed: 14/5/2016.
Silverman, D., 2000. Analyzing talk and text. Handbook of qualitative research, 2(0), pp.821-
834.
Silverman, D., 2013. Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook. SAGE Publications
Limited.
205
Simons, G., 2009. The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia Since 1990: Changing
Dynamics of Politics and Religion. Edwin Mellen Press.
Smit, R. and Rugunanan, P., 2014. From precarious lives to precarious work: The dilemma 
facing refugees in Gauteng, South Africa. South African Review of Sociology, 45(2), pp.4-26.
Smit, R. and Rugunanan, P., 2015. Transnational forced migration and negotiating emotional
well-being: the case of women refugees in South Africa. Social Dynamics, 41(1), pp.184-203.
Snyder, A.C., 2015. A Gendered Analysis of Refugee Peacebuilding: Transnational Networks
for Peace. review of social studies, p.1.
Solomon, H. 2010. ‘South Africa in Africa: A Case for High Expectations for Peace’, South
African Journal of International Affairs 17(2): 131-47.
Spence, R., 2004. Befriending the neighbours. Achieving Security in Sub Saharan Africa, 
Cost effective alternatives to military. Pretoria. Institute of Security Studies, pp.58-73.
Sriram, C.L., Martin-Ortega, O. and Herman, J., 2014. War, conflict and human rights: theory
and practice. Routledge.
Stanley, T.D., Doucouliagos, H., Giles, M., Heckemeyer, J.H., Johnston, R.J., Laroche, P., 
Nelson, J.P., Paldam, M., Poot, J., Pugh, G. and Rosenberger, R.S., 2013. Meta‐analysis of 
economics research reporting guidelines. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27(2), pp.390-394.
Staub, E. 2006. Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict: 
Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general 
theory. Political Psychology, 27(6), 867-894.
Stearns, J., 2012. Dancing in the glory of monsters: The collapse of the Congo and the great
war of Africa. Public Affairs; Google Books.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook 2012. Armaments, Disarmament 
and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 108.
Stola,  D.,  1992.  Forced  migrations  in  Central  European  history. International  Migration
Review, pp.324-341.
Sutton,  R.  and Vigneswaran,  D.,  2011.  A Kafkaesque state:  deportation  and detention  in
South Africa. Citizenship Studies, 15(5), pp.627-642.
Taylor, I., 2003. Conflict in Central Africa: Clandestine networks & regional/global 
configurations. Review of African Political Economy, 30(95), pp.45-55.
Taylor, L.K. and Lederach, J.P., 2014. Practicing Peace: Psychological Roots of Transforming
Conflicts. Global Journal of Peace Research and Praxis, 1(1), pp.12-31.
Taylor, S.J., Bogdan, R. and DeVault, M., 2015. Introduction to qualitative research methods:
A guidebook and resource. John Wiley & Sons.
Thomas, E. and Magilvy, J. K. (2011). Qualitative rigor or research validity in qualitative 
research. Journal for Specialists in Pediatric Nursing, 16(2), 151-155.
206
Thomson, M., 2003. Images of Sangatte: Political Representation of Asylum Seeking in 
France and the UK. Sussex Centre for Migration Research.
Tickner, J.A., 1995. Introducing feminist perspectives into peace and world security 
courses. Women's Studies Quarterly, 23(3/4), pp.48-57.
Tickner, J.A., 2010. International Relations in Dialogue (Doctoral dissertation, University of
Victoria, Wellington).
Tiliouine,  H.  and  Estes,  R.J.,  2016.  Social  Development  in  North  African  Countries:
Achievements  and  Current  Challenges.  In The  State  of  Social  Progress  of  Islamic
Societies (pp. 109-136). Springer International Publishing.
Tint,  B.,  Chirimwami,  V.  and  Sarkis,  C.,  2014.  Diasporas  in  Dialogue:  Lessons  from
Reconciliation  Efforts  in  African  Refugee  Communities. Conflict  Resolution
Quarterly, 32(2), pp.177-202.
Titeca,  K. and Fahey, D., 2016. The many faces of a rebel group: the Allied Democratic
Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo. International Affairs, 92(5), pp.1189-1206.
Tive,  C., 2014. Economic community of West African states (ECOWAS): combining sub-
regional economic integration with conflict resolution (Doctoral dissertation).
Tong, A., Flemming, K., McInnes, E., Oliver, S. and Craig, J., 2012. Enhancing transparency
in  reporting  the  synthesis  of  qualitative  research:  ENTREQ. BMC  medical  research
methodology, 12(1), p.1.
Tongco, M.D.C., 2007. Purposive sampling as a tool for informant selection.
Tonheim M, Swart G 2015. Africa’s Pre-eminent Peacemaker an Appraisal of South Africa’s 
Peacemaking Role in the DRC. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resurce Centre Report, pp.1-8. 
From <mercury.ethz.ch/.../ en/eb92234f3f8c3ac5f7751627c78ea320. Accessed on  2 February
2015.
Tsang, E.W., 2013. Case study methodology: causal explanation, contextualization, and 
theorizing. Journal of international management, 19(2), pp.195-202.
Tutu, D., 1999. No future without forgiveness: A personal overview of South Africa's Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. New York, p.271.
U.S. Department of State Bureau of counterterrorism, 2014. 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm.   Accessed on 12/5/2016. 
UNHCR  Global  Trends,  2014.  www.  unhcr  .org/statistics/country/556725e69/  unhcr  - global  -
trends  - 2014  .html. Accessed on 3/12/2015. 
UNHCR, 2014. Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2013/2014. 
http://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-2014. Accessed on 
16 September 2016. 
207
UNHCR, 2015. Global Trends: Force Displacement 2015. 
http://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-2015. Accessed on 
23 October 2016. 
United  Nations  Security  Council  (2001)  Report  of  the  Panel  of  Experts  on  the  Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth from the Democratic Republic
of Congo, S/2001/357.
United States Institute of Security Studies, 2011. Peace Terms: A Glossary of Terms for 
Conflict Management and Peacebuilding. 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/peaceterms.pdf. Accessed on 23 October 2016.
.
Usanov, A., de Ridder, M., Auping, W., Lingemann, S., Espinoza, L.T., Ericsson, M., Farooki,
M., Sievers, H. and Liedtke, M., 2013. Coltan, Congo and Conflict. The Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies.
Vaishnavi,  V.K.  and Kuechler,  W.,  2015. Design science  research methods  and patterns:
innovating information and communication technology. CRC Press.
Vanore, M., Mazzucato, V. and Siegel, M., 2015. ‘Left behind’ but not left alone: Parental
migration & the psychosocial health of children in Moldova. Social Science & Medicine, 132,
pp.252-260.
Vickers,  B.,  2012.  Towards  a  new  aid  paradigm:  South  Africa  as  African  development
partner. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25(4), pp.535-556.
Vigneswaran, D., 2012. Methodological debates in human rights research: a case study of
human trafficking in South Africa.
Vogel,  C. and Raeymaekers,  T.,  2016. Terr (it)  or (ies) of Peace? The Congolese Mining
Frontier and the Fight Against “Conflict Minerals”. Antipode.
Vogt, R. ed., 2012. Europe and China: strategic partners or rivals? (Vol. 1). Hong Kong 
University Press.
Wallensteen, P. (2002). Understanding Conflict Resolution, London: Sage Publications.
Waltz, K.N., 2000. Structural realism after the Cold War. International security, 25(1), pp.5-
41.
Walzer, M., 1997. Spheres of Justice (1983). Paris, Seuil.
Weiss,  T.G. and Welz,  M.,  2014. The UN and the African Union in Mali  and beyond: a
shotgun wedding? International Affairs, 90(4), pp.889-905.
Weiss, T.G., 2000. Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and 
actual challenges. Third world quarterly, 21(5), pp.795-814.
Whetho, A . 2014. Natural Resource, Profit and Peace: Multinational Corporation and 
Conflict Transformation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. PhD Thesis, Unpublished. 
KwaZulu-Natal: University of KwaZulu-Natal.
208
Williams, C., 2013. Explaining the Great Ear in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a
Continental Crisis. Fletcher F. World Aff., 37, p.81.
Williams, R., 2015. Politics and letters: interviews with New Left Review. Verso Books.
Wolff, S and Yakinthou C (eds). (2011). Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practice. Oxon: 
Routledge. Pp.187-200.
World Factbook, 2013. The DRC. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/cf.html. Accessed on 23 October 2016.  
Yin, R.K., 2013. Case study research: Design and methods. Sage publications.
Zachary, L. and Masters, J., 2014. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Council on Foreign 
Relations, 14.
Zihindula, G., Meyer-Weitz, A. and Akintola, O., 2015. Lived Experiences of Democratic 
Republic of Congo Refugees facing Medical Xenophobia in Durban, South Africa. Journal of
Asian and African Studies, p.0021909615595990. 
Zuma, J. 2013. www.gov.za/state-nation-address-  2013. Accessed on 12/10/2015.
Zuma, J. 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8C5kuMoIeg. Accessed on 12/10/2015. 




Appendix 1. Ethical clearance certificate 
210
211
MrJa~ Mi11ic.,,11d;o [.213S2!171ltll 
.5~1'1(1!:! 1 ~ Sol!iar St:ierw.i. 
Pli'lwm;;rlliill'lll'I Cimp11s 
•""'4:1;mol1 f4!fere11~e number : Hs.s./15"62'fD!l!;0 
PfCied tllli!'·: SOwtlrl..\f~it~I & Pl!•=fruildi,s 111 ltin illtlT'I 
ln~JC Jil"W 
~ _ u .. litmf" 1l" ~ 'IPV~t! ~Ji -Old Quutilllll"1111irdm1JwieN .'.!W:I 
•f!lf D'1elKt;, Wcalil~ll ,of 1fH! Dully, ~!MJ ~p!ID 
•1111 _ ll!~Mfit'IM)ilifialfic111 1pri"rmiit• "1111phJm" n d11r1. 
-"'"!lr· 
lll~ ilhl~i!I ~hlri 111111» Cll!ftllli:ati! •~ .anl'I' valid frllr ~ rrad aU YH11 ~rn 'h~ IJ~t<: of I~~~. Tbereaifler Rec~rl!lflcBt1cn, mu i t 
II 111ppjled Jot lln a" •111111al ""'•"'-
« - .SC:-"! 'Slltnitl I ·11\1 
a:&td _ nk lln!;ier f015eillllth; P"lllfeiror·s.E' e ~dd!t .I 
« ' ~ .. QIALl11rio"•!:·,• roro 1M; 'N 1r;;inill~ 1~ ,;i IPwt!li:tK: IM~ Hll'llll!' MLld• u 
H •""'niti.., ii: iiOQW Rl!M111rah E-ltiiAI Comm!~ 
Cir 5naru~1 lngll j!:!!l!!l"l 
W.rnilll.J C!Ji!IJUt, 0-WUl Ml>!!!!l l!!l!il!in!I 
FDc!ii1 Allartn: l'rl<!llll: ~,ti•·~ ... «;~~ 
T•I•"""~ +ii." 1u: ~ 1 ~t>:- ~~1-'=ll'4e~i" Rlcs811111: •:ti tDf . , :II~ ~DI l lN!!i ~·~MB OS!MJ);l]7(i)YSJl1.oa n l rr• 'M!r!@-WlD\l'i -
--Sdail 
Appendix 2. Interview Schedule 
212
Appendix 3. Informed Consent Document
213
